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The practices and institutions that divide, for example, the ‘ablebodied,’ ‘sane,’ and 
‘whole’ from the ‘impaired,’ ‘mentally ill,’ and ‘deficient’ create the conditions 
under which all of us live; they structure the situation within which each one of us 
comes to terms with ourselves and creates a way of life. 
 
—Ladelle McWhorter, foreword to Foucault and the 
Government of Disability, ed. Shelley Tremain (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2005), xv. 
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ABSTRACT  
‘A BETTER COUNTRY TO DIE IN’: SELF-DETERMINATION, DRUGS, AND THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE IN DYING IN CANADA 
MAY 2019 
WENDY PRINGLE, B.A. UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY 
M.A., MCGILL UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
Directed by: Emily West 
 
This dissertation examines Canada’s legalization of medical assistance in dying (MAiD). 
Specifically, it focuses on how the debates surrounding the legalization process, the cultural 
history of euthanasia drugs, and the ethical dimensions of disability shaped assisted dying 
outcomes in the country in the period between the precedent-setting February 2015 Carter v. 
Canada Supreme Court case and the legislation, passed in June 2016, that enacted legalized 
MAiD. This mixed methods project uses discursive analysis of media texts, pharmacological 
history, and rhetorical analysis of first-person testimonies. The first analytic chapter, “Self-
Determination, Euthanasia, and the Right to Die,” considers how the shift toward greater 
autonomy from medicine at the end of life took place as a discursive event in Canada. The second 
chapter, “‘Cito, Tuto et Jucunde’: The Many Lives of the Drugs Used to Kill Quickly, Safely and 
Pleasantly,” scrutinizes the relationship between the medicalization of death and barbiturates, 
the drugs used in medically assisted deaths. The final chapter, “Disability and the Right to Die in 
Canada,” examines the rhetorical strategies used to justify the expansion of MAiD eligibility 
 viii 
criteria in Canada. I argue that case of MAiD illustrates how the ideology of ability limits the scope 
of our understanding of the conditions that make life livable. The recasting of health as an 
individual right and responsibility has crept into the changing conversation about death and 
dying. This individualist view is in part an ideological by-product of a culture of health based on 
privatized care and a politics of deservingness that links good health care to employment and 
hard work. 
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS AND LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Advance directive — A statement that details how a person wishes to be treated by doctors and 
care professionals at the end of life. This could include a Do Not Resuscitate 
order, as well as a decision about assisted suicide made by a person with 
dementia while they are still competent to do so.   
ALS — Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, a degenerative neuromuscular disease. 
Assisted Suicide — In assisted suicide, “an individual performs the final act to end their life. This 
often involves ingesting a lethal substance prescribed or provided by the 
physician.”1 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) — Guarantees: freedom of religion, of 
thought, of expression, of the press and of peaceful assembly the right to 
participate in political activities and the right to a democratic government the 
freedom to move around and live within Canada, and to leave Canada legal rights 
such as the right to life, liberty and security equality rights language rights.2 
Consultation Report — Consultations on Physician-Assisted Dying Summary of Key Findings 
Final Report. 
CBC — The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
CCC — Criminal Code of Canada  
Euthanasia — From Greek, meaning “good death,” this has been the blanket term for medical 
or professional help in dying. Euthanasia is distinct from assisted dying in that it is 
the doctor, and not the patient who administers the procedure. 
External Panel — The External Panel on Options for a Legislative Response to Carter v. Canada 
Grievous and irremediable medical condition — A person has a grievous and irremediable 
medical condition only if they meet all of the following criteria: (a) they have a 
serious and incurable illness, disease or disability; (b) they are in an advanced 
state of irreversible decline in capability; (c) that illness, disease or disability or 
that state of decline causes them enduring physical or psychological suffering that 
is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under conditions that they 
consider acceptable; and (d) their natural death has become reasonably 
foreseeable, taking into account all of their medical circumstances, without a 
                                                 
1 Chochinov, Frazee, and Pelletier, “Consultations on Physician-Assisted Dying - Summary of 
Results and Key Findings,” 44. 
2 Parliament of Canada, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
 xiii 
prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific length of time that they 
have remaining.3 
MAiD — Medical Assistance in Dying, refers to: 
• administration of a substance by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner at the 
request of a person that causes that person’s death (also known as voluntary 
euthanasia); or 
• a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner prescribing or providing a substance to a 
person, at that person’s request, that can be self-administered and that will cause the 
person’s own death (also known as medically- or physician-assisted suicide).4 
Permissive System — Refers to a medical and legal system that permits some form of assistance 
in dying. 
SCC — Supreme Court of Canada 
SMA — Spinal Muscular Atrophy, a degenerative neuromuscular disease 
  
                                                 
3 Wilson-Raybould, Bill C-14. 
4 Nicol and Tiedemann, “Legislative Summary of Bill C-14: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code 
and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical Assistance in Dying).” 
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TIMELINE OF MAID-RELATED EVENTS IN CANADA 
 
Date Name Significance 
September 1993 Rodriguez v. British Columbia 
The courts (BC and the SCC) ruled 
against Sue Rodriguez, who had 
ALS, and was seeking assisted 
death. She died with assistance in 
secret anyway. 
November 1994 - December 
2010 
Robert Latimer case 
Robert Latimer, convicted of killing 
his severely disabled daughter 
Tracy, loses his case (and 
subsequent appeals) for 
“compassionate homicide,” and 
serves 16 years in prison. 
January 1995 
The Special Senate 
Committee on Euthanasia 
and Assisted Suicide 
published 
Following a consultation with the 
public, the Senate publishes a 
report affirming the continued 
prohibition of euthanasia and 
assisted suicide. 
January 2012 
Physicians’ Alliance against 
Euthanasia founded 
Founding of a group of Quebec 
doctors opposed to practicing 
MAiD. 
June 2014 
Bill n°52: “An Act respecting 
end-of-life care” passed 
Quebec’s legalisation of MAiD, 
which bypassed the criminalisation 
of assisted dying, by redefining 
MAiD as care, which falls under the 
provincial mandate. 
February 2015 
Carter v. Canada 
Supreme Court ruling 
The court ruled in favor of Kay 
Carter’s pursuit of legal MAiD. 
Carter, who had spinal stenosis, 
died with assistance in Switzerland 
in 2010 before the case was 
settled. 
December 2015 
The External Panel on 
Options for a Legislative 
Response to Carter v. 
Canada’s “Consultations on 
Physician-Assisted Dying Final 
Report” published 
400-page report published by an 
external panel on assisted dying, 
with legislative recommendations, 
following the Carter ruling. 
June 2016 
Bill C-14, “An Act to amend 
the Criminal Code” passed 
The official bill legalizing MAiD, and 
detailing the eligibility 
requirements, procedures. 
June 2016 
Lamb V. Canada court 
challenged launched 
Julia Lamb and the BCCLA file a 
court challenge to C-14, on the 
basis that it discriminates against 
Lamb and others whose deaths are 
not “reasonably foreseeable.” 
Figure 1 Timeline of MAiD-Related Events
 1 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
In the last twenty years, there has been an uptick in the number of jurisdictions 
debating the right to die worldwide. With the passage of legalization legislation in 2016, Canada 
joined Belgium, Colombia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, as well as six states in 
the United States (Oregon, California, Colorado, Montana, Vermont, and Washington) which 
now all have some form of legal assisted dying protocol.5 What is most compelling about 
studying such legal changes is that, more than reclassifying voluntary assisted dying from crime 
to care, they catalyzed frank and open discussions about what makes life liveable. Couched in 
these deliberations are much deeper concerns; actors in the debate have had to examine 
whether legalizing forms of suicide or euthanasia will reshape the fabric of social life altogether. 
Whether framed as assisted suicide, or medical assistance in dying, an increasing number of 
people at the end of life are making new demands of clinical care systems and the legal 
jurisdictions governing them. While the end of life is still broadly understood as a private affair, 
to be attended only by close family and health care workers, it is increasingly common for the 
dying to speak openly about their experiences.6 Patients are no longer kept in the dark about a 
terminal prognosis, as was the norm in past decades, and are now encouraged to participate in 
the decision-making processes at the end of life.7 While the precise implications of such 
                                                 
5 Emanuel et al., “Attitudes and Practices of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the 
United States, Canada, and Europe.” 
6 Van Brussel, “A Discourse-Theoretical Approach to Death and Dying”; West, “Invitation to 
Witness.” 
7 Walter, The Revival of Death. 
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changes are beyond the scope of this project, they signal broader shifts in the rituals 
surrounding death in the era of medicalization. MAiD counts among these other changes, 
because it provides an alternative option among the “increasingly flexible cultural scripts”8 at 
the end of life.  
The cultural contexts shaping the problem of assisted dying can vary dramatically from 
one jurisdiction to the next. In the U.S. and Canada, many on the side of moving forward with a 
system that permits assisted dying in some instances are looking to European states such as the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, where support for assisted dying was established years ago, for 
guidance. We hear more stories about the changing domestic rituals surrounding death,9 the 
challenges that status quo healthcare poses to the dying and elderly,10 and the predicament of 
doctors and care workers who are caught between the wishes of their patients and present 
medical conventions.11 Medical sociology has challenged practices surrounding death and dying 
in the medicalized setting, observing in the 1960s that practitioners based decisions on whether 
to resuscitate a patient on their “presumed social value.”12 Nicholas A. Christakis’ book Death 
Foretold: Prophecy and Prognosis in Medical Care drew public attention to doctors’ tendency to 
overestimate good prognoses at the end of life, overestimating survival by a factor of 5.3.13 The 
stories of those who wish to end their lives, and prevent prolonged suffering “openly and 
                                                 
8 Timmermans, “Death Brokering,” 993. 
9 Macsweeney, “Why Death Cleaning Isn’t as Scary as It Sounds.” 
10 Kalanithi, When Breath Becomes Air. 
11 Gawande, Being Mortal. 
12 Timmermans and Sudnow, “Social Death as Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,” 453; Sudnow, Passing 
On. 
13 Christakis, Death Foretold; Kolata, “Conversation with: Nicholas Christakis.” 
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without fear,”14 have been making their way into popular discursive arenas. Regardless of the 
highly variable legal situations governing the right to die and assisted dying in different 
jurisdictions, it is evident that a marked change is underway in the terms by which we engage in 
discussions about dying. 
Lobbyists for a permissive system, such as the international Dying With Dignity group, 
have pushed the topic of assisted dying into the public eye for approximately forty years.15 
However, even defining the moment at which death occurs has been highly contested, with 
stages of development and recursion throughout the history of medicine.16 Supporters and 
detractors of MAiD alike are rushing to identify the precise social values that should govern 
restrictions and the decision-making process. In this chapter, ‘permissive system’ refers to a 
medico-juridical arrangement permitting some form of euthanasia or assisted dying. The stakes 
are high on either side of the fence; for those who directly oppose it, assisted dying protocols 
open a gate that can never be closed, putting the most vulnerable at risk. Meanwhile 
supporters argue that restrictive laws are causing immense suffering, and prolonging expensive 
and unwanted medical treatment. Further complicating the debate are the myriad case-by-case 
differences in the patients considered eligible, their unique medical circumstances, and the 
types of treatments and palliative care resources available.17 Additionally, even among those 
North Americans supportive of a permissive system, coming to agreement about the near 
                                                 
14 Porter, “At His Own Wake, Celebrating Life and the Gift of Death.” 
15 Humphry, “Chronology of Right-to-Die Events.” 
16 Bishop, The Anticipatory Corpse. 
17 Bryant, “Aid in Dying”; Sneiderman, “Decision Making at the End of Life.” 
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infinite combinations of eligibility criteria, request protocols, and lethal drugs is an enormous 
challenge. Nevertheless, the demand for legal MAiD has been steady. 
If there is a cultural counterpoint to the international right-to-die movement, it is perhaps 
found in Silicon Valley. Barbara Ehrenreich writes that the tech industry symbolizes a fixation 
with immortality, centred on the idea that technological advances will make us live longer and 
longer lives.18 The technological hubris that permeates the Valley, she argues, seeks to 
transcend even the mere pursuit of health that occupies so much of American consumer 
culture, in favor of immortality. Ehrenreich writes: 
Peter Thiel, the billionaire co-founder of PayPal, plans to live to be 120. Compared with 
some other tech billionaires, he doesn’t seem particularly ambitious. Dmitry Itskov, the 
“godfather” of the Russian Internet, says his goal is to live to 10,000; Larry Ellison, co-
founder of Oracle, finds the notion of accepting mortality “incomprehensible,” and Sergey 
Brin, co-founder of Google, hopes to someday “cure death.”19 
Such audacious bids for immortality might seem shocking, but they are very much on par with 
the direction that discourses of health have taken for the better part of the last century. In 
other words, these statements follow the same pattern that messages about health have 
repeated for years; that each of us is personally responsible for our own wellbeing, that only 
rigorous exercise, daily rituals of health, and faith in the technologies of modern medicine will 
stave off illness and the degenerating effects of old age. The discourses surrounding MAiD 
paradoxically extend such individualist views, with MAiD constructed as an individual choice, 
                                                 
18 Ehrenreich, Natural Causes, 75. 
19 Isaacson, “Next Up for Silicon Valley.” Cited in Ehrenreich. 
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not unlike the other healthy, responsible, reasonable choices healthy subjects are called upon 
to make throughout their lives.   
In the following sections of this chapter, I introduce the project and provide an overview 
of the relevant context for it. I situate the research within the field of communication studies 
and explain what is unique about understanding health in the Canadian context. I outline my 
methodological approach to the research and design of the study and present the research 
questions that guided each of the following chapters. This Introduction also offers a review of 
scholarly literature relevant to the dissertation as a whole. 
 
1.1 Dignity and the Problem of Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada 
In Canada, the debate about how to end life in the contemporary era of medicalization 
has been centered on the issue of dignity. The question of legalizing MAiD and integrating it 
into broader social practice provides a unique intersection of social concerns. It demands a 
specific articulation of the limits of medicine, such as, how far into the outer limits, or final 
weeks and days, of life should medical intervention go? It explicitly insists on hierarchizing the 
kinds of lives affected, for example, who is permitted to access such a procedure? But perhaps 
most importantly, it demands new ways of imagining what the end of life should look like 
instead. If, as some argued, a juridico-medical system20 that forbids MAiD leads to indignity, 
then what exactly is meant by dignity? Furthermore, if MAiD promises to restore dignity to 
some, what is implied about those for whom life is made unliveable by other forces? With this 
                                                 
20 Foucault and Lotringer, “The Social Extension of the Norm,” 197. Cited in Tierney. 
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research, I aim to better understand how the shift toward a permissive system reflects cultural 
beliefs about good living and dying. In my analysis of autonomy in dying discourse, I argue that 
the permission to access MAiD has been established through a particular set of rhetorical 
gestures. These gestures might be understood as a reworking of the conventional ‘make live’ or 
‘let die’ division that Foucault identified in contemporary biopolitics. 
The cultural impact of the shift to a permissive system is difficult to trace holistically, but 
some tangible changes are emerging. Educators, for example, are considering how to integrate 
discussions of death, dying and MAiD into classroom discussions, asking how children deal with 
death cognitively and emotionally, and integrating the topic of MAiD into classroom discussions 
to promote open dialogue on death and bereavement.21 Scholars have been addressing the 
implications of voluntary active euthanasia with greater frequency, particularly since the 
beginning of the Lee Carter vs. Attorney General of Canada court case made national news in 
Canada, beginning in 2013. Given the nature of MAiD, the question of legalization and 
implementation has cast a wide net of influence on intellectual practice. In Psychiatry, Schafer 
argues that the potential harm to society does not outweigh the benefits of granting the right 
to MAID for competent adults.22 In 2015, after the SCC ruling, but before the ensuing legislation 
Bill C-14, health policy scholars examined MAiD from an ethical perspective, delineating the 
range of ethical concerns that the as-yet-unreleased legislation should consider.23 In 
Washington State, the legalization of MAID prompted medical ethicists to interrogate the 
                                                 
21 Donlevy, Schroeder, and Wilcox, “Medical Assistance in Dying.” 
22 Schafer, “Physician Assisted Suicide.” 
23 Landry, Foreman, and Kekewich, “Ethical Considerations in the Regulation of Euthanasia and 
Physician-Assisted Death in Canada.” 
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implications of implementing assisted dying procedures with regard to the complex and 
sometimes incompatible patient and care provider values.24 Such studies provide insight into 
the breadth of the cultural impact of introducing MAiD into society, demonstrating that more 
than providing a new clinical option in end-of-life care, MAiD signals a sea change in how we 
think and talk about death more generally.  
 
 
1.2 Research Design 
1.2.1 Using Critical Discourse Analysis 
 In the discursive and textual analysis undertaken here, I have attempted to weave 
together a set of narrative patterns that tell a story about the way Canadians understand the 
end of life in this period of upheaval of traditional practices. Because I am invested in rendering 
a diverse and contradictory assortment of documents, statements and media texts, it has been 
critical for me as a researcher to recognize my own motivations to render complexity simple 
and the ambiguous affirmative. In many ways, there is no simple or streamlined story to tell 
about discourses of dignity in dying in Canada, since there is no coherent, easily identifiable or 
distinctly ‘Canadian’ subject to whom I can ascribe cultural patterns. Indeed, to reflect on the 
dialectical and shifting nature of the ‘culturally appropriate’ as I do here with reference to the 
discursive practices rendering MAiD admissible to society, is, in turn, simultaneously a way of 
reifying a version of Canadian subjectivity. Because of this, I have been committed to leaving 
                                                 
24 Campbell and Black, “Dignity, Death, and Dilemmas.” 
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the complex and contradictory nature of discourses of health and bodies detailed here intact. 
Given its legacy as a settler colonial state, the influence of subsequent generations of 
immigration, and its positioning as always proximate to, and yet distinct from the United States, 
the nature of health and subjectivity in Canada has always been structured by multiple cultural 
determinations. As such, I have drawn from a diverse range of influences in order to reflect the 
complex and contradictory nature of what is considered healthy subjectivity in Canada. 
The method best suited to analyzing the diverse texts that I have assembled for this study is 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). I offer a brief overview of relevant central tenets of CDA that 
inform this study. The critical vein of discourse analysis operates as a corrective to modes of 
discourse analysis understood by some to be too blind to the structures of power operating 
through it. In CDA, discourse is always laden with social values, and is reflective of the power 
relations that shape society. In being attentive to the reification of the social stratification or 
hierarchies through the exercise of “rhetorical power,”25 researchers using CDA seek to enact 
social change through the deconstruction of discursive texts.  This is distinct from other 
mandates guiding the interpretation or dissection of texts that are limited to description. In 
drawing attention to the broader forces of social power that inform modes of discursive 
interaction, for example, CDA can help us to understand how texts function to reinforce cultural 
and political capital held by the speakers in question.26 Providing eight concise descriptions of 
the function of discourse in society, Fairclough, Wodak and Mulderrig’s chapter, “Critical 
                                                 
25 Fairclough, Wodak, and Mulderrig, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 12. 
26 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power. 
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Discourse Analysis” has become a common methodological touchstone in reflecting on the 
objectives of CDA. The following list iterates these key attributes.  
• CDA addresses social problems; 
• Power relations are discursive; 
• Discourse constitutes society and culture; 
• Discourse does ideological work; 
• Discourse is historical; 
• A socio-cognitive approach is needed to understand how relations between text and 
society is mediated; 
• CDA is interpretative and explanatory and uses systematic methodology 
• CDA is a socially committed scientific paradigm. 
Taking such a multifaceted approach makes possible the project of addressing social problems 
through attention to language. Orienting the nature of research toward action in the way that 
CDA can do is key to my study, since I focus on problems with discursive practices of 
normativity. Attention to ideology and history are crucial to such work.  
Meyer describes the key qualities of critical discourse analysis that set it apart from other 
modes of discourse analysis.27 CDA recognizes the absolute historical contingency of all 
discourse. CDA likewise seeks to expose hidden power relationships that are manifest in 
discourse. The task, as Meyer further explains, of unpacking relationships of power that are 
present in texts requires an attentiveness to “the broadest range of factors that exert an 
                                                 
27 Meyer, “Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA,” 15. 
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influence on texts,” in order to understand how extralinguistic factors such as culture, society 
and ideology shape and are shaped by discourse.28 CDA encourages seeking discursive data 
from unconventional sources, such as discarded promotional materials, pamphlets, and 
independent and self-published texts. Tracing the circulation of ideas and influences across 
these diffuse discursive arenas facilitates producing a thorough representation of the discursive 
status quo. 
 Health is a notoriously slippery category,29 which makes it a good candidate for the 
kinds of insights that CDA enables. CDA is particularly well-attuned to addressing matters of 
health because it functions to isolate and identify utterances that announce one goal, while 
cloaking another. Van Dijk calls attention to the importance of analyzing discursive content 
without needing to veil any political stance. He argues that researchers using CDA should “spell 
out their point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both within their discipline and within 
society at large,” with the goal of taking the perspective of those “who suffer the most from 
dominance and inequality.”30 This approach controverts the assumption or pursuit of 
objectivity, grounding the researcher, and their politics into the research process itself. 
Ultimately, in challenging and interrogating the language of dignity and autonomy with this 
research, my aim is to contribute to a broader project of fighting inequality in social institutions. 
Gaining a better understanding of how these discursive categories shape our definitions of life 
and death is one way of better understanding shared valuations of life in contemporary 
Canadian society. 
                                                 
28 Meyer, 15. 
29 Metzl and Kirkland, Against Health. 
30 van Dijk, “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis,” 252. 
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CDA aligns well with the existing body of critical research on health and wellness in 
Communication Studies. Zoller and Kline’s “Theoretical Contributions of Interpretive and Critical 
Research in Health Communication” is particularly instructive to my project, since they offer 
concrete prescriptions for improving communication research related to health. Following their 
guidelines, I enhance and contribute to critical discussions of public health by drawing from 
broadly interdisciplinary critical theoretical frameworks, and by focusing on incorporating 
rhetorical and discursive interpretation into my analysis.31 Likewise, I explore how the socially 
constructed category of health and illness “relates to issues of power, politics, and resistance 
and how those relate to individual and cultural identity.”32 This approach has the benefit of 
making an important contribution to the more critical and interpretive facet of health 
communication research, where such research can continue to add complexity to our 
understanding of “human agency among patients, clients, media audiences, research 
participants, and campaign targets.”33 As the diffuse and nebulous assemblage of forces 
shaping health, medicine, and the discipline of bodies continue to evolve, CDA provides the 
tools critical to thinking across boundaries, and investigating key relationships as the concept of 
health develops alongside the massive social upheavals wrought by economic and cultural 
globalization.  
This research is also indebted both conceptually and methodologically to the way critical 
discursive studies of health and wellness have established the radical contingency of our 
                                                 
31 Zoller and Kline, “Theoretical Contributions of Interpretive and Critical Research in Health 
Communication,” 121. 
32 Zoller and Kline, 122. 
33 Zoller and Kline, 122. 
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understanding of health and good living. Studies such as Lupton’s Imperative of Health, Martin’s 
Flexible Bodies, Mol’s Logic of Care, and Clarke et al.’s Biomedicalization demonstrate how 
cultural context shapes medical knowledge and practice.34 These scholars uproot assumptions 
about the possibility of objectivity in medical research and practice, suggesting that the pursuit 
of objectivity itself can function, to borrow from Solomon, as a “perceptual blinder”35 to the 
realities of practicing medicine, and thinking about illness, health and the structuring of 
socialized medical care programs. Objectivity and neutrality are not boundaries to police. Nor is 
the goal of research critical of health practices to merely point out ideological bias in the 
decisions made by individuals and institutions. Instead, I analyse texts to look for patterns of 
normalization, asking as Lupton does, what stakes any public health effort has in shaping 
society. In my work, I therefore also challenge and interrogate  
…public health’s role, as a powerful social institution, in the processes of rationalization, 
normalization and social ordering, or the ways in which the discourses and practices of 
public health serve the post-Enlightenment ideal of control over the destiny of 
humanity.36 
Given that the outcome of shifting Canada to a permissive system has been framed as a rational 
remedy to suffering and indignity, I have focused on dissecting the unseen processes by which 
the decision comes to be understood as such, and on the means by which the terms of 
discourse are made intelligible in the first place.  
                                                 
34 Lupton, The Imperative of Health; Martin, Flexible Bodies; Mol, The Logic of Care; Clarke et 
al., “Biomedicalization,” 2010. 
35 Solomon, “The Rhetoric of Dehumanization.” 
36 Lupton, The Imperative of Health, 14. 
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The CDA and the critical health scholarship that influence my research are themselves 
indebted to the traditions of historiography and Foucauldian genealogy. In addition to the focus 
on a flexible definition of discourse and its power to shape social realities, this engenders a 
respect for history’s inconsistencies. “Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore 
an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things,” writes 
Foucault, “its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, having 
imposed a predetermined form to all its vicissitudes.”37 Following this, I instead look for 
patterns, without the goal of tracing easy narratives. In challenging historical work’s allegiance 
to scientific objectivity, or to the tracing of evolutionary processes, the historian can observe 
the “appearance of regular, coherent transformations”38 that are beholden neither to political 
mythology, nor to the telling of easy progress narratives. Ultimately, taking a critical orientation 
towards the object of research, and to the meaning-making influences of linguistic practices, as 
the aforementioned authors encourage, expands the possibilities for intervening on social 
praxis and destabilizing oppressive forces of normalization. 
 
1.2.2 Research Questions and Procedures 
The dissertation is organized into three analytical chapters, each of which is guided by a 
distinct research question. Chapter 2 is entitled “Self-Determination, Euthanasia and the Right 
to Die,” and asks: how is the shift toward greater autonomy from medicine at the end of life 
taking place as a discursive event in Canada? Because changes to euthanasia laws are taking 
                                                 
37 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 146. 
38 Foucault, “Return to History,” 431. 
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place in public debate and mass mediation, studying their development in public fora provides 
insight into whether and how opinions have shifted alongside significant events, such as 
Supreme Court cases in the US and Canada. The focus of this chapter began as a means of 
getting the landscape view of the situation, of understanding what, in general, was being said 
about MAiD. For this chapter, I selected statements drawn from popular media outlets, both 
local and national, on the basis of their addressing the problems of euthanasia and medically 
assisted dying in Canada. I also examined legal decrees, publicly funded opinion census data 
and bioethical inquiries. Data collection consisted of full-text searches of 190 Canadian 
newspapers indexed in the Canadian Newsstream database. The search terms “physician 
assisted suicide,” “medical assistance in dying,” and “physician assisted dying” were used, while 
excluding the many articles that address other facets of MAiD. Overall, I analyzed 
approximately 75 of the documents the search produced. In addition to opinion pieces and 
letters to the editor, news articles were also included, since these provided valuable insights 
into the framing of autonomy in pro-MAiD discourse. Additionally, some data were drawn from 
a report published in December 2015 by a federally mandated external panel, which served as a 
public consultation in the period between the Carter v. Canada Supreme Court ruling which set 
the precedent to legalize assisted suicide, and the formal legislation legalizing some forms of 
assisted dying which passed in June 2016. This 400-page report, entitled “Consultations on 
Physician-Assisted Dying: Summary of Results and Key Findings” (hereafter “Consultation 
Report”), for which the authors consulted medical professionals and the Canadian public, as 
well as experts from countries that have already enacted a permissive system, served as an 
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index of some of the relevant media coverage of public debate about the issue. Wherever 
possible, the original press documents discovered through this report were consulted directly. 
The goal of this chapter is to understand how MAiD became legible as a desirable legal 
right in the country. I examine how a particular mode of discursive framing constructed MAiD 
as a culturally appropriate end-of-life ritual, charting the arguments about the procedure in 
order of least in favor (including outright rejection on a moral basis, and rejection on the basis 
of medical ethics) to most in favor (including those wishing to revise medical ethics and 
procedures to accommodate the practice, and those who embrace MAiD as a social good in and 
of itself). This last position, which I term autonomy in dying discourse, ultimately proved 
successful in pushing for a permissive system. I situate autonomy in dying discourse within the 
broader processes of individualization that have shared conceptions of the body under the 
medical gaze, arguing that it is naturalized as an extension of liberal subjectivity. 
Chapter 3, entitled “‘Cito, Tuto et Jucunde’: The Many Lives of the Drugs Used to Kill 
Quickly, Safely and Pleasantly” examines the relationship between barbiturates and the 
medicalization of death. In the planning of this research, I wanted to engage a concrete, 
material facet of the issue, but during the proposal stage no clear material object had emerged. 
As the research developed, it became clear that there was something of a taboo in mentioning 
the drugs used in the process. Beyond seeking to fill in a less understood facet of assisted dying, 
looking at the drugs and how they worked on the body promised to offer a concrete aspect to 
the story. As it turned out, the precise mechanism by which barbiturates act on the body 
remains unknown. Instead of illuminating a material, embodied component, the story of the 
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drugs turned out to be a social one. Even the most finite dimension of assisted death—the 
killing itself—proved to be largely a matter of social construction. 
The focus of this chapter developed as a result of an unexpected link between capital 
punishment and MAiD. The drugs are not only used to induce death in both MAiD and punitive 
lethal injection, but historically had a wildly popular therapeutic and recreational career as well. 
So, while in their therapeutic phase, they were knitted into discourses of a ‘good life,’ they are 
now linked to death. Besides serving as an opportunity to clarify how exactly the MAiD 
procedure works—a detail that was often downplayed or omitted in much of the existing 
discourse—examining the drugs themselves provided an entryway into the biopolitical 
construction of a ‘good death.’  
In researching this chapter, I gathered press coverage of ‘botched’ executions, legal 
scholarship surrounding barbiturates, pharmacological studies of barbiturates and 
benzodiazepines, and sociological and anthropological drug histories. I examined these sources, 
putting them into conversation with key arguments in social studies of medicine, and 
contemporary critical and disability theory. I examine arguments about suicide from early 
liberal political doctrine and juxtapose them with contemporary critical biopolitical arguments 
about health and access to care. I make strategic use of scientific knowledge about the drugs 
used in both MAiD and lethal injections as a way of interrogating the medicalization of the end 
of life. Fostering certain kinds of life over others is a technique of biopolitical regulation in 
which the pharmaceutical industry is complicit, but we understand less about how this 
regulation functions at the end of life than during other stages. By examining the different uses 
of barbiturates, I explore how they facilitate different outcomes for the dying. This chapter 
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demonstrates how the drugs function as a boundary between two opposite extremes in the 
spectrum of end-of-life scenarios. I argue that the procedures surrounding both lethal injection 
and MAiD are focused on the same goal of modernizing and sanitizing death and dying for the 
benefit of those who must bear witness to it. 
Chapter 4, “Disability and the Right to Die in Canada,” scrutinizes the rhetorical 
strategies for justifying the expansion of MAiD eligibility criteria. Research for this chapter 
focused on case studies of disabled individuals arguing that they are negatively affected by 
restrictive eligibility criteria in Bill C-14. I had originally intended to investigate the colonial 
dimension of assisted dying discourse, but the matter of disability was ever-present across 
coverage of the issue. Articulating how exactly disability was constructed by those seeking 
MAiD became important to the project. Furthermore, as I learned more about the history of 
disability studies throughout the research process, it was clear that the work would be 
incomplete without attention to the important ways that disability scholarship and activism has 
engaged critically with curative medicine. I focused particularly on the Lamb v. Canada court 
challenge, in which the restrictions on accessing MAiD in the present legislation are being 
challenged on the basis of its exclusions of people with disabilities. For context, I also looked at 
anti-MAiD disability activism discourse, although to a lesser extent. I selected statements drawn 
from popular media outlets, provincial and federal legal documentation, lobby group web 
resources, and personal blog websites. Data collection for chapter 4 consisted of full-text 
searches of the 190 Canadian newspapers indexed in the Canadian Newsstream database. 
Search terms centered on the legal cases in question, and the names of the four individuals 
who serve as representative cases. Lamb, Moro, Brault, and Nadeau-Whissell were among the 
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most vocal in expressing discontent with the impugned laws in public fora. I treat them as 
representative of individuals negatively affected by caveats of the transition to legal MAiD 
because they provided the most thorough accounts of their experiences, and because their 
diverse experiences—some dealing with life-long conditions, others with late-onset illnesses—
show the range of people negatively affected by the law’s restrictions. Perhaps more than any 
other facet of the MAiD issue in Canada, the deliberation and debate that surrounds the Lamb 
court challenge offers a unique opportunity to focus on those subjugated by the hierarchizing 
effects of the biopolitical order. I analyzed data for its ability to indicate what rhetorical 
strategies were used in justifying the expansion of MAiD eligibility criteria in Canada. I grouped 
and coded the data according to similarities in their framing of the problem and commonalities 
in the detailing of experiences living with illness and disability. I examined the statements here 
with the goal of better understanding how the category of disability influences and is 
influenced by pro-MAiD discourse.  
Since the autonomy of the medicalized body is complicated by a number of factors, 
including race, gender, class, and ability, then it is necessary to articulate how these processes 
may be shaping discourses of ‘good’ life and ‘dignified’ death today. As such, the aim of this 
chapter is to better understand how Canada’s transition to a permissive system is shaped by 
the context of ableism. I examined the discursive statements selected here, attempting to take 
the perspective of those “who suffer the most from dominance and inequality.”39 Ableist 
framing and language were present in the discourse of people on both sides of this facet of the 
debate, even among those who argued from the position of disability rights. Rather than 
                                                 
39 van Dijk, “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis,” 252. 
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treating the words of pro-MAiD actors as self-evident, I trace the ways that the statements 
produce meaning and pay attention to their intended effect.40 By ‘tracing’ the meaning-making 
effects of discourse, I mean examining the ways that speakers draw on shared understandings 
of, for example, health and ability, to signal positive or negative associations with the concept 
of MAiD. Isolating the threads of reason which hold together such arguments illuminates the 
ways that beliefs about healthy bodies are perpetuated. This approach facilitates consideration 
of the wider social context in which these discursive exchanges take place. From this 
perspective, I share a commitment from feminist research to examine the “...historically 
contingent social, economic, and political processes that materially contour the terrain on 
which structural inequalities are built.”41 In attending to the experiences of ill and disabled 
people with regard to MAiD, I aim to challenge the prioritization of medical control over the 
lived experiences of ill and disabled people. Furthermore, I seek to dispute the view that “the 
patients who cannot be ‘repaired’—the chronically ill, the disabled, and the dying… symbolize 
the ‘failure’ of medicine, and more, the failure of the Western scientific project to control 
nature.”42 In this sense, my approach draws on feminist perspectives on health and disability. I 
draw on disability and queer theory to theorize the modes of temporality that such rhetorical 
framing constructs. The purpose of this chapter is to address the concern for vulnerable people 
that many worried would be harmed by the transition to a system permitting MAiD, from the 
perspective of the so-called vulnerable themselves.  
                                                 
40 Gilbert and Mulkay, Opening Pandora’s Box; Karsoho et al., “Constructing Physician-Assisted 
Dying.” 
41 Naples, Feminism and Method, 138. 
42 Wendell, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability,” 114. 
 20 
Finally, the main objective of the concluding chapter is to summarize the findings of my 
study and expand on the significant contributions to theories of health in the field of 
Communication. I highlight the importance of engaging texts across multiple discursive arenas 
and synthesize my findings with the broader issues in social studies of medicine, health and 
society. I offer suggestions for additional ways in which scholars of communication may 
continue to engage the matter of assisted dying through a critical lens, as it gains traction as a 
social phenomenon in a growing number of jurisdictions. 
The thread linking together the following chapters is the discourse of a ‘good death.’ In 
chapter 2, delineating between the different modes of discourse allowed me to isolate the 
relationship between the individualism of conventional health discourse, and the push for 
improving end-of-life procedures made by MAiD proponents. Chapter 3 investigates the 
accessibility of a ‘good’ drug-assisted death across social boundaries. Although the same drugs, 
barbiturates, are believed to be the best option for inducing a quick and painless death in both 
assisted dying and capital punishment contexts, their effectiveness is complicated by a number 
of social and institutional factors. In exploring the ways that the drugs serve as a boundary 
object between social worlds, I complicate the view that drugs can offer a “quick, easy and 
painless,” ‘good death’ to anyone. By examining the temporal dimension of the discourse of a 
‘good death,’ chapter 4 addresses the problem of those who are presently excluded from 
access. Since there has been a tendency for pro-MAiD discourse to collapse the space between 
‘living the good life’ and a good death, this phase of the research explores how curative 
medicine can prolong suffering for sick or differently abled individuals. 
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1.2.3 Ethics, Representation, and Positionality 
My approach to this research is informed by Wahab’s overview of the strata of social 
power: institutional, cultural, disciplinary, and discursive. Wahab’s reflections on the 
positionality of the researcher in the context of anti-racist research illustrate the challenges in 
reconciling the irreducible difference between researcher and subject, self and other. His focus 
is on race, but the principle or irreducible difference holds true in other contexts. 
Deconstructing the ‘neutral’ position of whiteness and naturalized discursive authority exposes 
how power and authority are manifested in medical discourse and in culturally situated debates 
about dignity and autonomy at the end of life. Following Wahab, the researcher “is not only 
called upon to be reflexive, but critical of his/her own positioning, politics, interests, and 
desires, and therefore to deconstruct racialized currents in the process of textual 
negotiation/entanglements.”43 For this project, in which the texts I analyse rarely address issues 
of race directly, I am therefore responsible to negotiate with an unwritten and unspoken other 
who is not present in the texts. In the context of studying media discourse, this means asking 
whose account is missing from the feature article, lobby action, or report? Wahab argues that 
“discourse affords multiple sites to contest and question the embodied (white researcher) and 
historical (colonial/liberal) constructedness of authority.”44 Drawing on this challenge to the 
normalization of authority, I ask how matters of race, ability and privilege structure the 
presence and coverage of whose lives, and in turn whose deaths matter in Canada.  
                                                 
43 Wahab, “Questioning Authority,” 47. 
44 Wahab, 47. 
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While the matter of MAID is rife with ethical challenges and dilemmas, I do not locate 
this project in the field of biomedical ethics. Rather the forms of medical knowledge and 
discursive framing that I explore in this research serve as a means of reflecting on the 
structuring logics of society. In this project, I work to position myself as a researcher between 
the legal, civil and medical interlocutors among whom the conversations about assisted dying 
have taken place. While on the one hand medicine has long offered a familiar and fruitful locus 
for theorizing the disciplining of the body,45 I rely on the recent critical interrogations of health 
and medicine detailed here for guidance in articulating the complex intersecting relationships 
between the forces of late capitalist global capital, the development of drug technologies and 
other tools of medicine, the legacy of liberal regimes of governmentality and their effect in 
reshaping the rites and rituals of the medicalized subject. 
 Since this research is concerned with the role of medicine in society, I take a critical 
perspective on scientific knowledge production and the positioning of medical science as an 
authority that governs our practices and standards of good living. Throughout this research, the 
question of the medicalization of everyday life looms large. As a researcher, I am concerned 
with challenging this process, and also with attempting to trace the cultural processes that 
made such a process possible. Taking a critical look at the position of the researcher, as 
Haraway argues, is not only a question of ethics, but also, in reorienting us to the object of 
study, a question of epistemology. As Haraway is well-positioned to remind us, social studies of 
science can and should do more than point out the flaws and blind spots of scientific reasoning 
but can take up the work of remaking the goals of scientific practice in its own right. “We need 
                                                 
45 Foucault, Discipline and Punish; Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic. 
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the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and bodies get made, not in order to 
deny meanings and bodies, but in order to build meanings and bodies that have a chance for 
life.”46 For my approach to research this contention from Haraway means taking stock of the 
ways that medical reason intersects with social practice and public discourse, and making sense 
of how they work in concert to reshape bodies and the meanings ascribed to them.   
This research is feminist because it has stakes in identifying the structures of power that 
shape social practice, with the goal of promoting equality. Where the functions of science and 
medicine are concerned, there is no guarantee that the procedures, technologies, policies and 
practices involved will benefit everyone equally. Good research takes into consideration those 
subjects who are conventionally left out of the discussion in question. Critical engagement with 
science, argues Haraway, works toward offering a more thorough account of who is affected 
and how. “Feminists have stakes in a successor science project that offers a more adequate, 
richer, better account of a world, in order to live in it well and in critical, reflexive relation to 
our own as well as others’ practices of domination and the unequal parts of privilege and 
oppression that make up all positions.”47 My aim with Chapter 4 in particular is to attend to 
those who have argued that they are excluded from the dominant discourse. While there are 
many more perspectives that I might have considered with this study, I believe it is done in such 
a way as to amplify and incorporate the perspectives of those who have those most to lose 
when the social institutions that govern MAiD are restructured.    
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1.3 Understanding the Canadian Context 
1.3.1 The Settler State  
Canada champions its celebration of difference and multicultural diversity as its primary 
identifying characteristic, but both historical studies and contemporary examples demonstrate 
that racial difference is used to bolster a higher valuation of unmarked white embodied 
subjectivity more often than it celebrates or protects racialized or colonized people. In 
interrogating the institutions of medicine and public health initiatives both in Canada and 
abroad, it is clear that they have been constructed at the expense of, and as a way of 
controlling, racialized bodies. If the health of the national body is at stake in the debates about 
whether and how to die with dignity in Canada, then we need to get a clearer picture of how 
the mutually constituting forces of biological knowledge and political power are applied 
differently to marked and unmarked bodies. Debating what death can or should look like in 
Canada depends on a clearer understanding of how the logics of embodied difference are 
already stacking the odds against equal political participation in, and access to health in the 
nation.  
The concept of health and good living in Canada is historically enmeshed with the logics 
of white supremacy and settler colonial ideology. Not only does a legacy of colonial violence 
overshadow the legacy of health in the nation, but the ongoing neocolonial practices continue 
to uphold the primacy of the healthy, white bourgeois body while marginalizing indigenous, 
immigrant and refugee people. In addition to settling of first nations lands, these colonial 
aftereffects are manifest, for example, in the coerced sterilization of indigenous women, and 
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ongoing youth suicide crisis in First Nations communities.48 Indigenous, critical race and 
postcolonial scholars in Canada argue for theorizing Canadian national identity in the context of 
its history as a settler state, with a history of racist and eugenicist practices. More specifically, I 
agree with Morgensen, who argues that “settler colonialism performs biopower in deeply 
historical and fully contemporary ways.”49 There can be no robust theorization of the forces of 
biopower without direct engagement with the past and present forms of colonialism, 
particularly as they are enacted through the vectors of global capitalism and international 
neoliberal governance. To think biopolitically, as this research does, without attending to the 
facets of ongoing colonization would be to allow settler colonial power to “remain naturalized,” 
but furthermore, it would ignore the reality that biopower itself is “the product and process of 
a colonial world.”50 The tools of biopolitical thinking are a means of interrogating the status of 
bodies subject to power. I engage the colonial facets of biopower in Canada as a means of 
exposing and denaturalizing the ways its logics of elimination51 and debilitation52 continue to 
privilege and resituate a healthy, white, and able body at the center of society.  
Eugenics have shaped the understanding of health itself in the nation. As Karen Stote’s 
study of coercive sterilization of aboriginal women in Canada articulates, the history of 
targeting women ties the colonial state to the oppression of women. Likewise, as Grekul et al. 
detail, eugenic logics in the Alberta Eugenics Board in the prairie province of Alberta 
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aggressively targeted so-called ‘feeble-minded,’ and ‘mentally defective’ individuals by 
sterilizing them. These efforts were not parallel to, but intersected directly with colonialist 
policies, when, for example, aboriginal women who did not consent to the procedure were 
deemed mentally deficient to forgo consent. Even where eugenic practices were not aimed at 
explicitly racialized bodies, the control and institutionalization of disabled people was likewise 
done in the name of safeguarding the purity of the white race.53 Colonial practices are 
inextricable from the logics of eugenics. Settler people used eugenicist ideologies to justify 
colonization. In turn, explains Stote, the “poor health, poverty, and other conditions 
experienced by Aboriginal peoples as a direct result of colonial policy then became indicative of 
their lower racial evolution.”54 The pursuit of ‘good health’ was both the justification for the 
policing of nonwhite bodies, and, when poor health was observed among indigenous people, it 
was held up as evidence of an always already deficient body. The language of medical 
documentation unearthed in Stote’s research illustrates how eugenic efforts were guided by 
overlapping racism and misogyny, seeking, as one doctor wrote, to erase the “incorrigible, wild, 
undisciplined and promiscuous”55 aboriginal body. Sterilization was done in the name of 
preventing the proliferation of further generations, whom they believed “might become social 
problems”56 because they would carry inherited mental deficiencies or diseases forward. 
Beyond the view that these discourses of savagery or primitivism were constructed in 
opposition to colonial ideals, we should also understand that these configurations were 
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essential to the identity building practices of colonial people. As Bacchi explains, women of this 
era were concerned that eugenics “reduced the maternal function to a mere biological 
capacity,”57 but took seriously the charge that structural improvements to prevent the negative 
effects of environment and “hereditary weakness” propagating the threat of “race suicide” and 
the declining birth-rate of white Anglo-Saxons in the nation.58 These examples illustrate how 
eugenic paranoia suffused discussions of health in Canadian history, and offer insight into the 
legacies of this history that persist today. The disciplining of health is only one facet of this 
identity building practice but scrutinizing the history of health in the settler state provides a 
powerful tool for examining the mutually intersecting forces of sexism, ableism and settler 
colonial practices. 
Anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler has offered an enduring amendment to Foucault’s four 
figures of Victorian anxieties. So while Foucault theorized around the masturbating child, the 
Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult, Stoler counterposes these with a “racially erotic 
counterpoint,” that embodies “the savage, the primitive, the colonized.”59 This configuration is 
crucial in understanding how the colonial imaginary views racial difference as a threat to the 
“healthy, vigorous, bourgeois body.”60 In the settler Canadian context, the same colonial 
delineations dictated the regulation of bodies through regimes of health, hygiene and 
education. The residential schools and other regulatory tactics, including the reserve system, 
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the Indian Act,61 and the registry of Indian Status, which, following Bonita Lawrence, are a form 
of “identity regulation,”62 were calculated attempts to erase and amalgamate first nations 
peoples. The deliberate removal of indigenous children from their families and communities, to 
be adopted by white families or educated in boarding schools run by the church (in a rare 
strategic collaboration between the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist 
churches) was framed as the only possible solution to the indigenous ways of living that were 
seen as threats to the ideals of civility and hygiene in the colony proper. The extent of sexual 
abuse, neglect, forced and coerced sterilizations,63 and the erasures of language and cultural 
practices are impossible to relate here. In beginning to unpack the atrocities enacted in these 
institutions, however, it is important to understand that they were coded as public health 
initiatives and conducted in the name of the health of the nation and for the good of the 
“Indian.” The popular imagination holds that these practices are features of a troubled but 
already faded past. However, the last residential school was not closed until 199664 and settler 
politics continue to shape notions of healthy living and ideal bodies in Canada, particularly the 
fixation on the healthy, white, hardworking body at the expense of others. The care disparity is 
particularly evident in points of access to health care, where instances of colonial racism are 
numerous. For example, the 2008 death of Brian Sinclair, a 45-year-old Anishinaabeg man in a 
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wheelchair, in a Winnipeg emergency room spurred public outcry.65 Stories like Sinclair’s are 
common and, as historians Perry and McCallum argue, countless other instances of such racism 
put indigenous people at risk of being “ignored to death”66 in Canadian health care 
environments.   
Beyond the directly oppressive practices of colonizing indigenous people in the nation, 
settler politics also shape Canada’s engagement with immigrant populations. A series of 
immigration bans in the 20th century restricted Japanese immigration, and at some points 
banned immigration from China and India altogether.67 Throughout the 20th century most 
English speaking people believed that Anglo-Saxon, British descendants “were the apex of 
biological evolution and that Canada's greatness depended on its Anglo-Saxon heritage.”68 Both 
immigration policy and the treatment of immigrant communities living in the country have 
been deeply affected by these beliefs. As Reitmanova et al. have demonstrated, the Canadian 
press has worked hard to construct the image of racialized immigrants as the carriers of life-
threatening disease for over a hundred years.69 These accounts, which are fuelled by discourses 
of fear, construct the racialized body of the other as presenting a number of threats to the 
healthy, white Canadian ideal. In this discursive configuration, the “irresponsible racialized 
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body”70 brings disease into the country, straining the systems of public health by defrauding it 
of resources, and neglecting to adhere to the supposedly higher standards of Canadian care and 
treatment. In illustrating the similarities between turn of the century complaints of Vancouver’s 
Chinatown as “a reeking mass of filth”71 and contemporary press coverage of refugees and 
immigrants as the irresponsible carriers of tuberculosis, the authors make the clear case that 
little has changed in regard to the racialization of ideals of health in Canada.  
 
1.3.2 Bodies Under Universal Care 
The concept of universal care shapes the ideals of health and embodiment in Canada. 
Publicly funded care is delivered through thirteen provincial and territorial health insurance 
plans. Health policy decisions are regulated at the federal level and although policies and 
practices vary somewhat between provinces, the standard of care is considered a national 
concern. Canada began its transition to a single-payer health care system nearly 70 years ago. 
In the United States, the Canadian system is frequently upheld as an appealing alternative to 
the hybrid system of health insurance by those seeking reform in the American system. 
Canadian citizens have had access to public funded essential medical care since 1961, yet it is 
difficult to argue that true “universality” of care or health outcomes has been established. 
Access to hospital services are an important part of health care, but many other facets of health 
and wellbeing are inaccessible for some communities. For example, in 2018, the David Suzuki 
Foundation reported that over 100 communities in Canada are without access to clean water. 
In 2014, a United Nations envoy found that the “‘well-being gap’ between aboriginal and non-
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aboriginal people in Canada is not improving.”72 Recent immigrants and asylum seekers face 
fluctuations in the healthcare available to them. In the last decade, refugee health benefits, 
subject to changes in parliament, have been stripped and then restored.73 Such instances 
suggest that universality is more ideal than reality for many. In this section, I illustrate how, in 
addition to the health gaps between settler and indigenous communities, Canada’s colonial 
history also shapes singular ideals of embodiment and identity more generally.74  
It is impossible to isolate the notion of the healthy body as located in Canadian culture 
from its colonial origins. Bodies and identities in the colonial state, argues Stoler, cohere in 
“microsites in which bourgeois identity was rooted in notions of European civility, in which 
designations of racial membership were subject to gendered appraisals, and in which 
‘character,’ ‘good breeding,’ dispassionate reason, and proper rearing were part of the 
changing cultural and epistemic indexing of race.”75 These designations are central to white, 
‘Western’ embodied identities not in spite of the colonial order, but because of it. I position 
interpretations of health, care and bodies as extending out of these colonial dichotomies, of 
self and other. The centrality of the rational, self-determining liberal subject emerges in my 
discussion of autonomy in dying discourse in chapter 2. In “Cito, Tuto, et Jucunde” I discuss how 
pharmaceuticals have been hailed for their ability to make dying quick easy and painless; it is in 
reality not made evenly available to different populations, even when death is inevitable. In the 
next chapter, I interrogate the centrality of the able-bodied figure in discourses of dying. My 
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findings suggest that markers of ability are closely tied to the white, bourgeois body that 
epitomizes healthy living.  
The debate about end of life care and euthanasia has frequently focused on ‘dignity,’ 
and this rhetorical strategy has complex implications. Throughout the chapters that follow, I 
work to expose how the infrastructures governing health (such as the pharmaceutical industry 
and legal system) are not designed in a way that extends dignity to everyone. Instead, dignity in 
death is afforded only to some, much in the same way that hierarchies structure quality of life 
at other stages of life. 
The histories of medicine and scientific research illustrate how the lived realities of poor 
and racialized subjects have often been disparate from the more privileged classes that 
medicalization efforts support. It is important to contextualize the liberatory, personal 
autonomy rhetoric of the right to die movement with other historical markers of medical 
progress. Within the same decade as the birth of the right-to-die movement in the 1960s, for 
example, medical researchers were still conducting lethal experiments on black men in 
Alabama.76 The experiment, which furthered medical understandings of the progression of 
disease and resulting death, exemplifies how medicine has historically upheld the health for 
some at the expense of black and brown people.77 The experiment illustrates how scientific 
body knowledge (including medical definitions and understanding of illness and death) is 
inseparable from hierarchies of differently valued bodies. As Brit Rusert’s study of the 
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experiment shows, there are close historical links between the pursuit of “public health” and 
discourses of racial hygiene.78 Such historical antecedents in the history of medicine are not 
anomalies, but rather characterise its role in reinforcing racial hierarchies under white 
supremacy. Within the same decade, some Americans were pursuing release from medicine’s 
authority in order to die, while other black Americans were dying from untreated syphilis under 
medical supervision. Many medical advances have come at the expense of poor, black and 
brown bodies. These disparities in care are not only historical. Although research ethics 
practices have improved, the information gathered by such practices as the Tuskegee 
experiments remain a part of the corpus of scientific and medical knowledge today.  
Canada champions its celebration of difference and multicultural diversity as one of its 
primary identifying characteristics, but both historical studies and contemporary examples 
demonstrate that racial difference is more often used to bolster a higher valuation of 
unmarked, white embodied subjectivity. It is impossible to isolate biological and cultural forms 
of racisms, since these ways of talking about difference have always informed one another. In 
interrogating the institutions of medicine and public health initiatives both in Canada and 
abroad, it is clear that they have been constructed at the expense of, and as a way of 
controlling, racialized bodies. If the health of the national body is at stake in the debates about 
whether and how to die with dignity in Canada, then we need to get a clearer picture of how 
the mutually constituting forces of biological knowledge and political power are applied 
differently to marked and unmarked bodies. Debating what death can or should look like in 
Canada depends on a clearer understanding of how the logics of embodied difference are 
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already stacking the odds against equal political participation in, and access to health in the 
nation. This study aims to better understand how culturally grounded ideas of healthy bodies 
are manifest in discourses of death and dying.  
There is a wide gap between the universality of health and care in political discourse and 
government mandates and the daily realities of people living in Canada. While I argue that we 
are moving towards the view that the right to die in dignity is a universal right, it also carries a 
common central implication about the West as do many other discourses of health. The 
suggestion is that “we,” in the developed, Western world, have access to a level of personal 
autonomy that “they,” the implied cultural other, do not have. As anthropologist Annemarie 
Mol argues, “What counts is that ‘we’ are individualised and autonomous. It is this that makes 
‘us’ modern and belong to ‘the West.’”79 In this sense, such beliefs about health and autonomy 
do more than shape our ideals of embodiment; they also call up an image of the implied other, 
who by virtue of their exclusion comes to signify those who do not have the privilege of 
controlling their bodies and futures. The right to die in dignity signifies more than a marker of 
ideals of bodily autonomy, but of liberal political rights more generally.   
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CHAPTER 2  
SELF-DETERMINATION, EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 
In places moving towards a permissive system, establishing common terms by which to 
debate and discuss the issue became a primary goal. In Canada, where the passage of Bill C-14 
legalized the practice in 2016, identifying language which framed assisted dying as an 
acceptable and desirable option was crucial in promoting acceptability of assisted dying, 
rendering it “culturally appropriate.”80 Zeroing in on the terms by which this cultural 
appropriateness was established in the country offers insight into the ways in which the end of 
life is being reimagined. This chapter identifies the discursive framings used in Canada’s assisted 
dying debates, by analyzing the rhetorical strategies of proponents of a permissive system. This 
articulation of autonomy at the end of life, however, was not without caveats; many patients 
who sought access to MAiD had to ‘earn’ their right to die by establishing proof of their having 
lived happy and fulfilling lives. I argue that it was by framing medical assistance in dying as an 
act of self-determination that advocates of the practice challenged a biopolitics of death 
normalized by medicine and the liberal state, rendering MAiD culturally acceptable. 
This chapter considers how people advocating for the legalization of MAiD in Canada 
rendered it both permissible and culturally meaningful in public discourse. I examine the modes 
of discourse by which people responded to the practice for the period between the 
decriminalization of the practice with the Carter v. Canada Supreme Court case in 2015 and its 
formal legalization in June 2016.  The possibility of legalizing MAiD was debated as early as 
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1993 during Rodriguez v. British Columbia in which Rodriguez, a woman with ALS, sought legal 
recourse to what was at the time called assisted suicide. I begin with the 2015 Supreme Court 
case because during this time there was a spike in public interest in the matter, and because 
existing scholarly discussions have thoroughly detailed the pre-Carter discourse.81 After the 
legislation passed, public interest in MAiD waned.  Using the framing of these debates, which 
traversed legal, medical, and ethical territory, I trace the discursive construction of the 
medicalized body. I argue that the emphasis on the autonomy of patients seeking MAiD proved 
crucial to rendering the practice acceptable to Canadians, ultimately making the shift towards a 
permissive system possible. As a result of this framing, some individuals whose situations do 
not align with the biopolitical ideals of good living are excluded from the ‘dignity in death’ 
extended to others. 
A key challenge of debates about assisted dying is in the overlapping but distinct forms 
of the practice. Throughout the media coverage and public debate of the issue in Canada, a 
great deal of disagreement transpired as a result of the definitional ambiguity that surrounds 
assisted dying. Euthanasia literally means “good death,” but refers specifically to the act of 
ending someone else’s life with their consent to alleviate suffering. Assisted suicide implies that 
a person has help obtaining the drugs necessary to end their own lives, but they take the final 
action themselves. For advocates of a permissive system, there was an imperative to articulate 
a category in-between, distinct from both suicide and euthanasia. Suicide suggested an act of 
desperation, while euthanasia provoked fears of a “slippery slope,” in which there was a risk of 
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elderly, terminally ill, or disabled people being euthanized against their wishes. As the history of 
these concepts demonstrates, there have always been concerns about what euthanasia and 
suicide signify for the wellbeing of the populace, and about what threat their existence poses to 
authority, by exposing or delineating the limits of political power. In stepping away from the 
association with suicide, and perhaps also by denoting service and care in its acronymed form, 
MAiD serves as an acceptable middle ground term. 
By addressing this particular vein of discourse among the many arguments about 
assisted dying, as well as in identifying what was unique about the debate unfolding in the 
context of Canada, this research expands existing literature on the social contours that govern 
our understanding of health, in general, and, more specifically, the challenge that the matter of 
“dying with dignity” poses to our existing juridico-medical systems. My analysis furthers the 
argument held by many scholars that the concepts of health and wellness are increasingly 
bound up in the neoliberal notion that wellbeing is a concern of the individualized subject,82 a 
goal pursued in the technologies and rituals of daily life.83 
Within the specific context in Canada, this research adds to the work of others, such as 
Karsoho et al.,84 whose insightful analysis of the debates leading up to the Carter v. Canada 
decision first established how proponents of MAiD framed the transition to a permissive system 
positively. In delving deeper into how patients and advocates in support of the practice framed 
their arguments, this chapter demonstrates how health discourses shaped by the logics of self-
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determination are extending into the final stages of life. I first briefly address the history of the 
relationship between voluntary and assisted dying and the structures of biopolitical power in 
the modern liberal state. Following this, I develop my analysis of the arguments made in favor 
of MAiD by Canadians who, during the period of legal deliberations, were supportive of 
introducing a permissive system, drawn from court documents, political mandates, advocacy 
work, and media coverage. Finally, I present my conclusions, which provide some answers to 
the question offered by sociologist Thomas Tierney with regard to the right to die movement: 
“how will we become the sorts of subjects who can exercise such a right?”85 I argue that in 
Canada the euthanasia debates presented two primary challenges. First, right to die discourse 
attempted to recast euthanasia as an act of self-governance in which a timely death serves as a 
final ‘healthy choice’ of the autonomous subject. Second, this kind of rhetorical framing 
reinforces the exclusionary logics of ableism that govern normalizing regimes in which health is 
conceived as an act of self-determination. 
2.1 Governmentality, Death, And Public Health 
2.1.1 Is ‘Natural’ Death A Matter of Public Health? 
As the above question at the heart of the debate illustrates, autonomy and self-
determination have been the central problem in debating medical assistance in dying. 
Organizations such as Dying With Dignity argue that the choice to alleviate suffering at the end 
of life especially through medical means of assistance is a human right. The organization is the 
Canadian counterpart of the American group called Death With Dignity, founded in 1993 
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around the legalization of assisted suicide in Oregon. Canada’s Dying With Dignity is a non-
profit “committed to improving quality of dying, protecting end-of-life rights, and helping 
Canadians avoid unwanted suffering.”86 Those arguing against the legalisation of medical 
assistance in dying say that legalisation in some cases may lead to abuses of elderly, disabled or 
otherwise vulnerable people. Even within those who agree with instituting a permissive system, 
disagreement as to how it should be implemented is structured around the degree of 
autonomy that both patients and medical professionals should have in the instance of assisted 
death. For example, some proponents of legalizing assisted suicide (when a patient self-
administers life ending drugs) vehemently oppose euthanasia (in which a doctor administers 
the drugs) on the grounds that it risks abuses. A vast majority of the media coverage and legal 
debate has followed along these lines, attempting to chart the exact degree of patient 
autonomy desired by the public, and, after each decision, reflecting on the appropriate self-
determination granted to each party as a consequence.  
Medical assistance in dying was first a crime but has been redefined as care. The 
passage between these two things precipitated deliberation about the limits of government (in 
granting the right to die) and the parameters of medicine (in incorporating death and suicide 
into the frame of health care). The discursive processes that attempt to answer the question “Is 
death a matter of public health?” also hold clues about the role and objectives of government. 
So while the precedents set by previous court cases demonstrated that it was unthinkable for 
any person’s life to be lawfully shortened, this has now become thinkable.87 Section 14 of the 
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Criminal Code of Canada states that “No person is entitled to consent to have death inflicted on 
them, and such consent does not affect the criminal responsibility of any person who inflicts 
death on the person who gave consent.”88 This determination held for over thirty years. It 
defined what constituted an ethical end of life, ruling out anything other than a “natural” 
death. A definition of what constitutes a “natural” death, however, is much more difficult to 
articulate. It is at the very heart of the problems with legalising assisted dying to denaturalize 
and interrogate what is meant by a “natural” death.  
This reclassification from a legal to a medical jurisdiction is not unique to medical 
assistance in dying. Historically speaking, social problems deemed morally problematic having 
to do with the body have been reassigned to medical authority in a similar fashion. As Clarke et 
al. describe, alcoholism, homosexuality, abortion, and drug use, all once presumed exclusively 
criminal matters, have now been adopted into the frame of medical knowledge and praxis.89 
These examples are only part of a broader expansion of “medical jurisdiction, authority, and 
practices into increasingly broader areas of people’s lives.”90 This process, which took place 
roughly between 1890 and 1945, was identified by Zola, who termed it “medicalization.”91 
These historical approaches suggest that through this theoretical framework the question of 
medicine came to encompass social and cultural matters, and was no longer centred exclusively 
on concerns of a “medico-scientific”92 nature. The transition of dying with intention from a 
strictly legal category to a matter of medical determination followed a similar pattern. 
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Some threads of the debate on assisted dying in Canada have simply been attempts to 
situate the matter in its rightful place in civil society. Many medical professionals, for example, 
reject the possibility of engaging with medical assistance in dying on the basis that it contradicts 
the Hippocratic oath, to “do no harm.”93 Since this forms the very foundation of medical care, 
some groups argue, no act that ends a life could be considered a part of medicine. This 
rejection is central to the arguments of groups such as the Collectifs de Médecins Contre 
l’Euthanasie (Physicians Alliance Against Euthanasia), a group founded in 2012 by 24 Quebec 
doctors who oppose assisted suicide and euthanasia. The group’s mandate states: “To provoke 
death voluntarily, by lethal injection or any other method, cannot be considered under any 
circumstance as “medical care”, and is contrary to medical ethics.”94 As I will discuss, many 
Canadians want to reject MAiD because it is seen as rationally at odds with the goals of 
medicine. Even some individuals who support a permissive system concede that medical 
training is structured around protecting and prolonging life. The process of decriminalization 
precipitated a need to place MAiD elsewhere and the struggle to find its rightful place produced 
illuminating dialogue on the boundaries of medicine, law and the parameters of health care 
that take shape across these discursive categories.  
By contrast, when Québec passed assisted dying laws before the Supreme Court 
deliberation at the federal level, it had to frame the issue as a health concern first, so as to be 
able to retain independence from national authority.95 The matter is complicated by the 
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division of federal and provincial powers, with federal courts presiding over criminal law, but 
healthcare systems controlled by provincial governments. So, while the provincial deliberation 
hinged on the view that medically assisted death constitutes care and is thus a provincial 
matter, at the federal level, the Supreme Court case centered on criminal actions, and amended 
the Criminal Code. While each of these motions to move toward a permissive system had to 
isolate different facets of assisted dying, so as to draw jurisdictional boundaries around the 
issue itself, assisted dying, of course, concerns both criminal law and a matter of health. 
Regardless of efforts to detach one aspect of assisted dying from another, by its nature the 
problem of assisted dying simultaneously occupies several arenas of social life.   
Each of the systems involved in the deliberation process, such as medicine and law 
discussed here, depends on a different system of knowledge and truth. They intersect but are 
not usually exactly equivalent or even compatible in their deliberation on assisted dying. That 
the issue of assisted dying cannot find an easy home in either of these is a testament to its 
reflection of governmentality’s diffuse and decentralized nature. The determinations made by 
legal deliberations on assisted dying are not only a measure of the tenability of new clinical 
practices, but of the tenability of governmentality itself. These efforts reinforce 
governmentality, making it “thinkable, calculable, and practicable.”96 In enacting its power in 
the lived experiences of the dying, the deliberations on assisted deaths reinforce the power of 
governmentality itself, a force which “depends on systems of knowledge and truths, both to 
constitute and define the object of its activities, and continually to monitor its progress.”97 
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Assisted dying is sometimes the object of medical, or legal activities, and sometimes not, 
depending on what is at stake and on who is asking. As the more detailed analyses of the 
debates demonstrate below, in the course of the debates, the ‘unnaturalness’ of medically 
assisted death was naturalized, divorced from the conceived violence of suicide, and 
rearticulated as acceptable and even desirable. 
2.1.2 Governmentality 
From a political perspective, the federal government’s decision to decriminalize MAiD is 
a direct example of state authority over life. Broadly speaking, however, the exercise of power 
is not simply enacted as the dominance of state over population in the contemporary 
biopolitical order. As such, greater autonomy cannot simply be granted or reclaimed. Foucault’s 
concept of governmentality sees power as “diffuse, as emerging not necessarily from the state 
but from all areas of social life.” Instead of a unified sovereign power, contemporary 
government is enacted in the diffuse networks of professional and expert knowledge that have 
emerged in the modern era, including medicine and psychology. Rather than a coherent, 
calculating subject or agent, the state is enacted in the “…institutions, procedures, tactics, 
calculations, knowledges and technologies”98 that are otherwise understood and the result of 
government. These areas of expertise are not extensions of state power, or acting in its proxy, 
but are rather the exercise of governmentality in and of itself.    
Governmentality, Foucault argues, is a novel capacity of governing that gradually 
emerged in Europe from the sixteenth century, in association with the invention, 
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operationalization and institutionalization of such knowledges, tactics and technologies.99 The 
knowledges and technologies that make up governmentality’s regimes of truth produce the 
terms by which its subjects come to understand themselves. The regimes of truth produced in 
the sphere of medicine, for example, produce the terms by which we understand what it means 
to be healthy and governance of health in the legal sphere. These truth regimes structure the 
range of possible topics and conclusions within the arenas of public discourse. They provide the 
foundation by which the terms of discourse become intelligible in the first place. In the 
tradition of biopolitical scholarship that extends out of Foucault’s approach, knowledge and 
governance of the self are understood as inextricably linked to the forces of political power 
shaping daily rituals and practice. These forces adhere in the “…institutions, procedures, tactics, 
calculations, knowledges and technologies”100 that make up social life. Governmentality’s 
regimes of truth produce the terms by which subjects come to understand themselves. Regimes 
of truth produced in the sphere of medicine, for example, produce the terms by which we 
understand what it means to be healthy subjects, subsequently influencing the right to health 
in the sphere of law. Medicine and the judicial system are implicated in defining the terms of 
death including when it is appropriate to die, and which types of death are permissible.  
 
2.1.3 Early Definitions of Suicide in Liberal Doctrine 
Linking the broader political significance of euthanasia and assisted suicide with the role 
of the state provides greater context for interpreting the reframing of the subject as possessing 
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the right to self-determination at the end of life. At the heart of the debate is a question of 
ownership. “Do people own their own lives (and deaths), or are we as a society responsible for 
saving our fellows from their own errors?”101 The stakes for redefining the permissibility of 
euthanasia and assisted suicide are not only high for patients and their families. As liberal 
political rhetoric has demonstrated historically, suicide frequently serves as a locus for the 
articulation of power, in which the rights of the individual are defined in relation to God, the 
state, or fellow citizens.  
The term suicide emerged in the English language sometime in the mid seventeenth 
century.102 Since that time, it has undergone many changes. Historian Edwin Shneidman reflects 
on the shifting definitions of the concept we now call suicide. Shneidman’s study of 
Encyclopedia Britannica entries encapsulates the dramatic shifts in the meaning of suicide over 
the last two hundred years, spanning from the sin of “Self Murder” in 1777, to the twentieth 
century interpretations as expressed in the language of contemporary psychology. The locus for 
blame and responsibility vary significantly between the entries. Besides offering an important 
reminder of the dramatic shifts in the meaning of the concept, the study also identifies key 
philosophical treatises cited in the various editions, which serve to signpost the ideological 
purposes to which suicide has been tied. Because of its function as a reference tool for broad 
English-speaking public audiences, the Encyclopedia provides an indication of the more 
influential theories of suicide in Western ideologies.  
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The 1910 article on suicide offered a primarily mathematical interpretation, citing it as 
“a sign of the presence of maladies in the body politic [which] deserve careful consideration.”103 
By 1973, the official offering from Encyclopedia Britannica included definitions from diverse and 
contradicting sources. While Saint Augustine and Saint Aquinas condemned suicide as a failure 
of a “deficient person,”104 and deemed it a sin, Hume calls it neither crime nor sin. Next the 
early sociological interventions of Durkheim, whose in-depth study emphasized the social 
causes of suicide. Freud, by contrast, unsurprisingly locates the blame for suicide on the 
individual, more specifically isolating it in the unconscious mind, or caused by unresolved 
trauma. The inclusion of these diverse offerings by the Encyclopedia Britannica illustrate a 
recognition of the unresolved tensions existing between suicide discourses across medicine, 
law, philosophy and religion. With each new edition, the entries became more elaborate and 
reflect a greater diversity of voices.  
While contradictory definitions are not surprising, the disagreement between liberal 
philosophers is relevant to the establishment of power over individual life under liberal 
democratic governments. The 1860 edition of Britannica includes a passage from John Stuart 
Mill’s On Liberty. Mill, alongside several others engaging with the classical liberal tradition, also 
including Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant views suicide or the end of life as crucial to 
elaborating liberalism. Mill argues that forcibly preventing someone from buying poison is a 
violation of their freedoms.105 By this logic, suicide is understood as a kind of ultimate privilege 
in defining the breadth of liberalism, an ultimate limit of the rights of the individual. At the 
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heart of the debate is a question of ownership. Philosophies of liberalism do not offer any 
consensus, or resolute solution to the problem, but their shared fixation with suicide illustrates 
its importance to defining the rights of the citizen under liberal doctrine.      
Rousseau, whose 1761 novel Julie, or, the New Heloise106 argues against permitting 
suicide, and following Rousseau’s belief that man is naturally innocent, weighs the blame of 
suicide on social forces. John Locke, in contrast to Rousseau, cited earlier Christian views, 
“claiming that though God bestowed upon us our natural personal liberty, that liberty does not 
include the liberty to destroy oneself.”107 In Locke’s theological politics, the right over life and 
body are tied to his understandings of arbitrary power, self and property.  
No Body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no Body has an 
absolute Arbitrary Power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own Life, or take 
away the Life or Property of another.108 
Locke’s statement contradicts Mill’s affirmation that no one should be prevented from the 
possibility of suicide. It also bears resemblance to section 14 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 
that states “No person is entitled to consent to have death inflicted on them.”109 According to 
both the Code and Locke, the power over life lies not with the individual, but with a higher 
power.   
A survey of the shifting definition of suicide illustrates suicide’s divergent definitions; 
slaughter, sin, deficiency, and inherent political right. There was no single consensus within 
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liberal doctrine as to the moral status of suicide. Examining the shifting discourses of death and 
dying denaturalizes assumptions about which kinds of deaths are violent and premature, and 
which kinds are naturalized as timely and acceptable. Part of the challenge for those advocating 
the legalization of assisted dying in Canada has been in distancing assisted dying from such 
older definitions as some of those detailed above, where suicide is equated with violence, sin or 
tragedy. As the above examples illustrate, definitions of suicide frequently gesture to the 
political and ideological forces that shape society. The importance of suicide in defining the 
limits of liberty has carried forward into contemporary debates such as Canada’s. I turn next to 
identifying the distinct modes by which suicide has been typified in public discourse in Canada. 
Charting these perspectives in the history of liberal thought demonstrate micro shifts in 
opinions towards suicide and death. Before there was any possibility of becoming the sorts of 
subjects who have a right to die, to borrow Tierney’s phrasing, Liberalism questioned the outer 
limits of autonomy and state power with regard to suicide. This breadth of tone with regards to 
the historical limits of the rights of autonomous individuals sets a precedent for a wide variety 
of perspectives on MAiD, which is addressed in the next section.  
 
2.2 Contemporary Discourses of Death and Dying in Canada 
In the months following the Supreme Court of Canada’s Carter v. Canada decision, the 
External Panel on Options for a Legislative Response to Carter v. Canada (hereafter the panel) 
prepared a report presented to the Minister of Health, Jane Philpott, on the future of legislating 
assisted suicide after the landmark court ruling. The intent of the report was to consider how 
government should organize to meet the coming demand for assisted dying, in the legislation 
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to follow as well as the guiding philosophical principles that would steer new decisions. The 
final consultation report was published on December 15th, 2015. It provides some of the 
clearest articulations of the goals of instituting a “permissive system.” It includes extensive 
coverage of consultations with stakeholders, including lobby groups, medical associations, 
scholars and community representatives. Given its breadth, which includes input from 
individuals (who mailed in statements) and experts (with whom the panel met face-to-face, or 
from whom they received official statements), the report offers an extensive survey of the 
breadth of opinions on physician assistance in dying in Canada.  
One portion of the report, a media analysis of the period between September 2014 and 
November 2015, illustrates how media coverage and public awareness were influenced by 
events such as the Supreme Court litigation and the announcement and coverage of the 
consultation process itself. The analysis section of the report was conducted by an independent 
external media analysis service. The section deals with provincial and national news coverage in 
print and online. The articles were sampled and coded for tone; either positive, negative, or 
neutral. Representative excerpts are included to demonstrate changes over time, as well as to 
show how coverage differed by province. This media analysis section is useful in that it serves 
as a snapshot of national media coverage of the issue during a finite period, while illustrating 
the shifts in the favorability towards a permissive system. The breakdown of geographic areas 
offers the opportunity to correlate the positive or negative tone of coverage by province to the 
respective legal actions and provincially mandated health policy that takes place during this 
time period and shortly after.  
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In this research, I use the media analysis portion of the Consultation Report as a kind of 
index to the multitude of news articles on the subject. The majority of the news articles, public 
statements and other discursive texts that I looked at were collectedly independently. The 
Analysis section of the consultation report covered 8,939 media items, collected between 
September 1, 2014 through November 22, 2015.110 Whenever possible, I consulted the original 
texts of the news articles excerpted in the Consultation Report. The Consultation report also 
contains abstracts of 321 documents received by the panel, including consultations from 
Dignitas, the operation that assists death in Switzerland, statements from religious 
organizations and interest groups, and statements written and submitted by individuals 
expressing their beliefs. This report also includes details on the federal and provincial roles in 
governing health, comparable international laws addressing MAiD, a discussion of issues 
regarding terminology, details on eligibility criteria and other procedures such as the request 
for MAiD, recommendations regarding government oversight and records management, and 
the issue of reconciling existing palliative care systems with the implementation of MAiD. 
Overall, the report served as a useful resource for contextual detail throughout the research 
process.     
In Emily Martin’s categorization of interviews on immunity in American culture, she 
treats the diverse assortment of data collected as “a collectively produced text, a kind of 
encyclopedia of what a diverse population thinks is sayable, imaginable, or thinkable about 
health, illness, the body, and the society.”111 In that study, the divergence of opinions and 
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understandings of the immune system demonstrate its crucial status as a source of social 
power. Following Martin, in this chapter, I highlight a common pattern among the things said 
about assisted dying, identifying what is “sayable, imaginable, or thinkable” about physician 
assisted death. Across these discursive arenas, three dominant strains of discourse are 
apparent, which follow a pattern outlined by Van Brussel in “A Discourse-Theoretical Approach 
to Death and Dying.”112  My own approach draws on Van Brussel’s three original categories, 
with the addition of a fourth I call autonomy in dying discourse. While a great deal of the 
material I reviewed resonated with the three categories it became evident that a fourth 
category was necessary to encompass a great deal of what was said. The autonomy in dying 
discourse that percolated around the Carter case was what made the shift towards a permissive 
system possible. 
The four primary categories of statements I examine are as follows: moral rejection, 
medical rationalist, medical revivalist, and autonomy in dying discourse. Moral rejections 
disagreed most strongly with MAiD, primarily on the basis of faith, or a belief that it was an 
assault on the sanctity of human life. Medical-rationalist discourse centered on the belief that 
medicine’s goal is the preservation of life, frequently arguing that no assistance in dying could 
legitimately be called medicine. Medical-revivalist discourse challenged the conventions of 
medicine, suggesting that incompatibilities between medical ethics and assistance in dying 
should be rectified in order to meet with public support for the practice. Finally, autonomy in 
dying discourse consisted in a demand for total autonomy of the dying to choose the conditions 
of their death. Autonomy in dying discourse was frequently accompanied with the notion that 
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the right to choose had to be earned, by meeting several criteria such as having lived a happy, 
fulfilling life, having worked hard, and having lived with purpose. I conclude by arguing that 
discourse about autonomy at the end of life demonstrates that regimes of “good living” also 
dictate the conditions of dying.  
2.2.1 Moral Rejection 
 In this section, I turn to the first of these four categories, the rejection of assistance in 
dying on moral grounds. For many interest groups and individuals commenting on the 
possibility of introducing a permissive system, voluntarily shortening any human life remained 
unthinkable. The rejection of MAiD on moral grounds was a common occurrence throughout 
the media coverage of Carter v. Canada and Bill C-14. By contrast with the Belgian context of 
Van Brussel’s study, in which MAiD was already legal and more widely accepted, a greater 
number of outright rejections were present in Canadian popular discourse. Groups rejecting 
MAiD on moral grounds were vocal in multiple media outlets, as well as in the federal public 
consultation process. Many, though not all, of these rejections made appeals to faith. A great 
deal of them were expressed through individual submissions to the consultation committee. 
Others were published in newspaper editorials and opinion pieces. A number of the statements 
that reject MAiD from a moral stance draw comparisons with suicide as it is conventionally 
understood, as an act of violence and desperation. In likening MAiD with suicide, moral 
arguments recall the diagnosis of social or individual failures and maladies from earlier 
Liberalisms to negate the possibility of a justified voluntary death. In focusing the blame and 
responsibility of suicide on larger social problems, moral rejectionist discourse echoes the logics 
of Rousseau and Durkheim. Moral-rejectionist discourse equates MAiD with suicide, diverting 
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attention from the question of individual rights and freedoms that serve as the basis for most 
demands to legalize MAiD, such as in the Rodriguez and Carter Supreme Court cases. By 
diverting from the question of individual rights, moral rejection focuses on the larger social ills 
deemed to be the cause of a degradation of the general quality of life.  
Other moral rejections argue against MAiD because even the legal permissibility of 
MAiD in cases where death is “reasonably foreseeable” could create a “slippery slope.” The 
slippery slope argument posits that by allowing any one kind of assisted death or euthanasia to 
occur, other forms of coerced or unjustifiable assisted deaths will inevitably follow. Slippery 
slope comparisons were common, appearing in nearly every argument against MAID from a 
moral standpoint. Some suggested that if legal procedures and drugs were made available that 
patients would be coerced into requesting MAiD, while others argued that it might become so 
commonplace that elderly people, or those experiencing mental illness without a fatal 
prognosis would seek MAiD as an ‘easy way out.’ One such commentator was conservative 
newspaper columnist Margaret Wente. 
The trouble is that practices that begin as extremely rare – such as killing depressed 
people – can quickly become normative. And social permission to die can evolve into 
social pressure to die. How many elderly people do you know who are terrified of 
becoming a burden to their children? I’ve known a few. I suspect that if they’d had the 
choice, more than one of them would have gladly chosen to die early to avoid that fate.113 
In suggesting that one form of assisted dying would quickly “evolve” into another, Wente 
summons an image of social norms and moral standards cascading into chaos. Wente likewise 
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draws the possibility of assisted death for depressed people into the frame of argument. 
Assisting the suicides of otherwise healthy mentally ill or depressed people remains illegal in 
Canada, but its legality in the Netherlands114 remains a target for those using the slippery slope 
model to argue against any form of euthanasia.  
Another such example was André Schutten, a lawyer for Christian legal action non-profit 
the Association for Reformed Political Action (ARPA), who emphasized that legalising MAiD 
would undermine the state’s primary role in protecting the lives of citizens from other people. 
“When it comes to the right to life, a substantially minimized risk is an unacceptable risk. 
Innocent people will die and the state will be complicit in their deaths.”115 Schutten refers to 
the loss of innocent lives as an inevitability under a permissive system. While the above 
newspaper editorial was argued in secular ethical language, the ARPA mandate is a pro-life 
organization, fighting for “pre-born human rights,” and foregrounding biblical passages in its 
core principles. Schutten and Wente’s statements both underscore the potential for good and 
innocent people to face harm. Implicit in this focus on innocence is an equal and opposite 
assessment of guilt among those involved in MAiD. 
 Finally, a very large number of public comments came from religious groups of diverse 
faiths, including multi faith coalitions. These statements focus primarily on the sanctity of life, 
with any attempt to end human life constructed as being in violation of either explicitly cited 
religious beliefs, or moral standards, regardless of the age or health of the person in question. 
Many statements from faith groups focused on the limited availability of palliative care, which, 
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they argued, would provide a better alternative to ending life prematurely. In one statement, a 
joint group argued that “that any action intended to end human life is morally and ethically 
wrong,” and indicated that their coalition was “on the basis of our respective traditions and 
beliefs.”116 
 
2.2.2 Medical-Rationalist 
Among historians of death and sociologists of medicine, there is some disagreement as 
to how public conceptions of death have evolved in Western history. Medievalist historian 
Phillippe Ariès argues that from the twelfth century onward, death was increasingly denied, 
although it had been considered tame and not feared in the early middle ages.117 Contrary to 
Ariès’ death denial theory, the discourse centred study of medical sociologist David Armstrong 
suggests that shifting conceptions of death that occurred during the modernisation of the 
western world was not a denial, or silencing of death discourse, but rather an increasing 
number of voices (specifically experts, clinicians, doctors etc.) who spoke about death. 
According to Armstrong, there was no “replacement of speech by silence, rather a 
reconfiguration of what could and could not be said”118 about death. Beginning in the mid 
nineteenth century, death moved out of the private sphere and into the sphere of the public 
institution, with a proliferation of expert opinion and medical advice structuring discourse 
about death. This mode of discourse is termed “medical rationalist” by Van Brussel. 
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Van Brussel describes a shift in discourses of death and dying, in which a “medical-
rationalist” approach is replaced by a “medical-revivalist” approach.119 The “medical-
rationalist” discourse describes the attitude toward death and dying that has dominated much 
of Western popular culture and medical practice in the twentieth century. This attitude 
originates in late eighteenth century medical practice, where withholding a poor prognosis 
from the patient became the norm. Under medical-rationalist logic, the denial of death—
however inevitable or imminent—was understood as essential to maintaining the hope and 
minimizing the distress of the dying patient.120 Furthermore, the technical understandings of 
the illness overshadowed the dying subject. 
In the modernist logic of medical–rationalism, dying was articulated as instrumentalist 
and impersonal; the dying processes became a technical matter, bereft of their existential 
and personal significance. Because of the strong belief in medical progress, death was 
often regarded as an extreme example of illness.121 
Understanding that the medical-rationalist approach viewed the patient as no more 
than a carrier of, or host to the disease or illness, it isn’t difficult to see why sheltering the dying 
from their prognosis became common. Moreover, physicians and nurses were not specifically 
trained in caring for the dying,122 focusing instead on the treatment of illness and prevention of 
death. This medical-rationalist discourse is at the heart of many popular dramatizations of 
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death, where even in late old age, death is often narrativized as the patient losing a battle, or 
succumbing to tragedy. 
Medical rationalist discourse posits that life’s end should occur within the sphere of 
medicine. It champions the unique history of knowledge and treatment that medicine holds. It 
recognises the authority of doctors as superior to patients when it comes to the question of 
when life should end. Van Brussel, drawing on Seale, explains that medical-rationalist discourse 
constructs “the dying subject as no more than a carrier or an exemplar of disease,” in which 
they are merely a more extreme case than some.123 This discourse understands death to be the 
exclusive territory of the bodily knowledges of medicine. Without MAiD, the problem of when 
life will end is tied to the complex web of scientific research, available treatments, drug 
formularies and a multitude of determinations each of which, without the legalisation of 
assisted dying, is to be arbitrated exclusively by doctors and medical professionals. Since 
roughly the mid twentieth century, doctors no longer withhold the truth about the eventuality 
of death from their patients. But even these more recent examples of medical rationalist 
discourse, can, according to Van Brussel, be understood as an extension of the same modernist 
logic. For many people, the conventions of modern medicine are incommensurable with the 
possibility of assisted dying. Medical-rationalist interlocutors invoke medicine’s own discursive 
tools to discredit or discourage a permissive system. 
Across the assisted dying debates in Canada, doctors were most frequently cited in 
opposition to a permissive system. In the months leading up to the SCC decision, and to the 
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passage of Bill C-14, many physicians were active in national media outlets arguing against the 
possibility of introducing MAiD. While few initially voiced support of medical assistance in 
dying, after the passage of Bill C-14 the Canadian Medical Association reported that eighty-
three percent of its delegates supported modifying the law to make it less restrictive and that 
physicians who had been on either side of the legalization debate were seeing the 
implementation of medical assistance in dying as “going relatively well.” 124 This reluctance to 
publicly voice support for a practice that is still legally contentious, may be, as Wright et al. 
point out with reference to the UK and Belgium, strictly based on hesitation to support 
practices that are not yet legal.125 Physicians in jurisdictions with permissive MAiD protocols, by 
contrast, more frequently express public support of the matter. Data collected for this project 
found, in agreement with Wright et al.’s study of comments made in the press by Canadian 
doctors, that many of the statements made about MAiD are centered on contentions about 
integrating euthanasia with the goals of medicine. Medical rationalist discourse seeks to align 
the possibility of implementing a permissive system alongside the central tenets of medical 
reason. It aims to make sense of the practice of MAiD, including its possibilities and limitations, 
according to the rules of medicine itself, with limited reference to measures of acceptability or 
norms external to medicine. Furthermore, doctors employing medical rationalist discourse in 
deliberating publicly on the issue of MAiD tended to focus on their role as protectors of life, 
sometimes to iterate the threat of prolonged suffering, and, conversely, at times to caution 
against abuse of the vulnerable.   
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In this section, I trace the position’s relationship with the history of medicine and the 
means by which doctors and others make appeals to this history as a way of distancing medical 
practice from assisted suicide. Some who argue by this logic also suggest that it should fall 
under the purview of some other care system. Medical-rationalist discourse is tied to moral 
oppositions to assisted dying but is distinct from the moral approach in that it is ostensibly 
focused on preserving the ideals of medicine.126 Medical rationalists cite the Hippocratic 
tradition as a foundation of contemporary civil society. Medical rationalism also suffuses 
deliberations that are neither for nor against legalizing MAiD. The sticking point, across much 
medical rationalist discourse is whether or not assistance in dying could possibly be considered 
medical care. Even some proponents of assisted dying believe it should not be the responsibility 
of medical professionals because of inherent contradictions with medical ethics.  
One of the more active opponents of MAiD, the Quebec-based Physician’s Alliance 
Against Euthanasia,127 take a medical-rationalist approach as central to their mandate. The 
group argues that “medical licensing bodies must continue to fulfil their role as protectors of 
the public and of life…”.128 So long as the patient is alive, they claim, it is the priority of 
medicine to preserve life, never to shorten it.  
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Medical-rationalist discourse emphasizes technical language and terminology when 
discussing death. It is also characterized by favoring disease statistics and discussions about the 
capacities of medicine, rather than attention to the patients themselves. This mode of 
reasoning reverts attention to survival statistics, or to advanced treatment procedures and 
away from the individual situation or wishes of the patient. Medical-rationalist discourse also 
frequently cites modern medicine’s enhanced mastery over the symptoms of suffering as 
reason to avoid MAiD. This discourse reifies modernist narratives of progress to illustrate 
medicine’s ever-expanding abilities to both treat illness and ease suffering. This is one of the 
rhetorical approaches undertaken by the Physician’s Alliance Against Euthanasia in their official 
mandate.  
The 2400-year-old Hippocratic tradition was a major advance in civilization. It forbids 
euthanasia and mandates the protection of the weak and the maintenance of trust 
between the physician and the patient. It calls on physicians and other health 
professionals to use their knowledge and skills to heal the sick, creating a climate of 
mutual solidarity. It is ironic that the accepted standards of this ancient code of conduct, 
written at a time when the means of countering end of life suffering were very limited, 
might be considered inadequate in this age of refined capacity to control symptoms.129 
The statement argues that advances in medical technology and treatment are further reason to 
treat the dying without limit. Citing statistics of survival rates and the modernization of pain 
management drugs renders the experience of the dying patient as another component or stage 
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of traditional medical care, arguing that modern medicine can provide everything needed to 
see them through to the ends of their lives without unnecessary pain.    
Some medical commenters employing medical-rationalist discourse redirect discussion 
of MAiD to highlight the nature of disease. One Vancouver doctor, Dr. Will Johnston, when 
asked on March 9, 2016 to comment on the first known instance of MAiD in Canada, 
denounced the doctor involved and lamented the years the patient may have lost as a result. 
Johnston describes the involvement of Dr. Ellen Weibe, “…unseemly and, I would say, 
unprofessional behaviour that you would expect from a zealot for suicide.” 130 He continues by 
explaining that 600 people die of ALS each year in Canada, adding that it is “very unusual for 
people with ALS to have pain from the ALS.” The comments, published for an interview in a 
Catholic magazine, are exemplary of medical-rationalism as Van Brussel describes it, with the 
dying subject understood as first and foremost an extreme or advanced case of disease. Ms. S, 
the first person to receive MAiD in Canada, was a retired clinical psychologist, a hiker and a 
dancer.131 Under medical rationalist thinking the bottom line remains life expectancy and 
prognoses, both of which are used to undermine or challenge the legitimacy of MAiD.   
At times, commentary in the media from doctors was directed towards explaining the 
professional commitments of medicine to lay audiences in an attempt to underscore the direct 
contradiction of being a doctor with shortening or ending life. Some medical professionals were 
cited in the consultation report published by the External Panel on Options for a Legislative 
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Response to Carter v. Canada expressing such sentiments, directly citing their professional 
responsibilities as contradictory to the legalization of MAiD. 
As a doctor, I can’t accept something that is non-medical, non-scientific. It even goes 
against my code of ethics in Quebec. Under the code of ethics, if we have treatments to 
offer or an operation, we must always use the least dangerous.132 
The doctor further argues that MAiD is not a health service, and asks that the justice system do 
more to clarify this matter on a national level. This comment was made by Dr. Paul Saba, who 
headed an effort by the Coalition of Physicians for Social Justice in Quebec who in 2015 were 
seeking to challenge the Supreme Court’s Carter decision. In rejecting the legalisation of MAiD 
on the basis of its incompatibility with medicine, physicians like Johnston and Saba express their 
discontent with the law using moral and ethical reasons, but they are primarily rejecting MAiD 
on the basis that it is incompatible with the tradition of medical practice. This discursive 
strategy is a powerful one, but it notably focuses on the medical framework by way of omitting 
discussion of the people affected by, or in favor of MAiD.      
Medical rationalist discourse is not limited to medical professionals. Some of the public 
lay respondents to the open consultation also espouse this mode of reasoning in the rejection 
of MAiD. In the case of one respondent, they argue that the rightful role of medicine necessarily 
excludes it from having any part in the voluntary dying process. “Physicians are not 
executioners. Their purpose is to promote health and to heal. They should never be put into a 
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position that they have to execute an individual or recommend an executioner to them.”133 In 
juxtaposing “physician” with “executioner,” the respondent renders the two as necessary polar 
opposites, with one resting in the arena of crime and punishment and the other that of healing 
and medicine. Like the medical professionals cited above, this respondent did not actually 
directly comment on whether they thought assistance in dying should happen in some form or 
another in Canada, focusing instead on its incompatibility with the sphere of professional 
medicine. While there are other approaches to the rejection of MAiD that also use medical 
rationalist reasoning, such as the rejection of the possibility of total informed consent 
throughout the process of legalization,134 the most common manifestation of this type of 
discourse in the rejection of MAiD is to position it as diametrically opposed to the practice of 
medicine.  
 Medical rationalist discourse is significant in that it demonstrates a prominent belief 
among Canadians about who should be trusted to determine how the final stages of life are 
lived. It asks that doctors continue to work to treat disease, prolong life and prevent death. It 
asks that the state do its duty to ensure that medicine continues to function in this way. It also 
reifies the authority of medicine and the state over the individual subject-patient. By deferring 
judgements about the legalisation of assistance in dying back on to medicine itself, medical 
rationalist discourse creates a kind of feedback loop whereby the legitimacy and veracity of 
medical logic reaffirms itself. Within the statements discussed above, the question of whether 
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medical assistance in dying should happen is answered in the language of medicine itself, 
landing at a resounding ‘no’ when the matter is pitted against the Hippocratic foundations of 
medicine as its defining characteristic.  
 Assisted dying protocols are closely tied to the experiences and beliefs of doctors. As the 
statements detailed above demonstrate, many doctors conceived of goals of their profession as 
directly in contradiction with the changes being proposed. They argued against the institution 
of a permissive system drawing on the history of medical reason as evidence. The cultural 
moment that the MAiD debate catalyzed provided a challenge to doctors in many ways. While 
for some the possibility of a permissive system promised to offer new ways for doctors to care 
for and give solace to suffering patients, doctors and medical professionals espousing medical 
rationalist discourse remained committed to upholding the longstanding principles of medicine 
as the protection of human life. While not all Canadian doctors who discussed MAiD in a public 
way disagreed with the implementation of MAiD, the proliferation of medical rationalist 
discourse to counter movement towards a permissive system illustrates how assisted dying can 
be conceived as a large-scale challenge to the goals of the practice of medicine itself.  
 
2.2.3 Medical-Revivalist 
 Not all medical professionals are invested in keeping a distance from assisted suicide, 
and many Canadian doctors publicly voice support for the legalisation of MAiD. In direct 
contrast with those discussed above, a tendency toward challenging a stagnancy in conventions 
of medical care that prevent MAiD, or otherwise withhold options for patients at the end of 
their lives is emerging among some doctors. Van Brussel has termed these discussions medical-
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revivalist discourse. Some commenters employing medical revivalist discourse argue that 
medicine should change to accommodate MAiD, while others argue that if assistance in dying is 
to be provided, doctors will have to relinquish their authority over end-of-life patients to other 
professionals better equipped to assist the dying. The “medical-revivalist” discourse focuses on 
accepting death without embarrassment. The shift to medical-revivalist discourse, Van Brussel 
argues, is marked by a greater acknowledgement of the patient themselves and a move away 
from the absoluteness of the corpse. Following the revivalist discourse, “the truth of death 
ceased to be located in dark recesses of the silent corpse, and instead became embodied in the 
words and deeds of the dying patient.”135 As Armstrong explains, the shift supposes that a 
greater level of autonomy is granted to the patient themselves, who then takes up the planning 
and decisions surrounding their end of life as a practice of self-identification.  
Thus the new discipline of medical ethics took over the medical analysis of death and 
required the confession of the clinician while the new discourse on dying encouraged the 
dying qua subject to speak. For one hundred years it had been the body which spoke, 
now it was the subject identity.136 
Armstrong further characterizes this new form of subject identification as more than a moment 
for empowering the dying. Beyond the autonomy granted to the patient-subject, breaking the 
silence imposed by the medical-rationalist discourse also enacts a challenge to the 
“unconditional benevolence”137 of the biomedical apparatus. If the patient takes up the 
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medical-revivalist discourse, the role of doctors, drugs, and the “tangle of tubes”138 that 
envelop the dying patient in the medical sphere take a backseat to the patient’s own needs and 
wishes. Van Brussel stresses that medical-revivalist discourse does not signify any departure 
from biomedicine, since even this “reflexive and conscious planning of one’s dying process”139 
occurs within the confines of the hospice or care home. 
Some physicians taking a medical-revivalist approach often signal the move as a way to 
align Canadian practices with a more global move toward permissive systems underway in the 
US and Europe. These doctors signal an awareness, or affiliation with this broader conversation, 
for example, European medical ethicists Bosshard et al., whose “A Role for Doctors in Assisted 
Dying?” reconciles the public demand for assistance in dying with the possibility that doctors 
may not actually be the ones best suited to positions of expertise in the matter.    
A society striving for an open approach towards assisted dying should carefully identify 
the tasks that should be assigned exclusively to medical doctors and separate out those 
that might be better performed by other professions.140 
These physicians recognise that whether they opt to keep out or become the experts141 in the 
matter of assisted dying, the momentum of the issue dictates that they will need to play a role 
in one form or another, regardless of any perceived contradiction with medical ethics. One 
physician in Victoria, British Columbia argued in a 2015 letter to the Times Colonist newspaper 
that while the relinquishing of control over patients at the end of life may seem to pose a 
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threat, the benefit to the peace of mind of those affected should make the legalisation of MAiD 
the only plausible option. 
The advantages of this legislation are simple but immense. It will give control, and hence 
peace of mind, to patients who are facing progressive illness and helplessness when they 
know that they are able to end it if and when they feel ready.142 
When medical professionals such as Bosshard et al. call for this approach, they also draw 
attention to the possibility that the role of medicine may change, that it may need to adapt so 
as to meet new demands of public health care systems. By implication, when doctors and 
medical professionals suggest that others may be more qualified to make end of life decisions 
for patients (including the patients themselves) they are theorizing an alternate possible future 
for the function of medicine at the end of life, one in which the expertise of doctors may take a 
backseat to the desires of patients or to the recommendations of experts from nonmedical 
professions. Medical-revivalist discourse contrasts with medical-rationalist discourse by arguing 
that changes should be made to protocol and ethical standards. Whereas both acknowledge 
that MAiD contradicts long-held standard procedures, medical-revivalist discourse emphasizes 
changes that meet social need, while medical-rationalist discourse refuses to do so. 
 Since the June 2016 passage of Bill C-14 legalizing MAiD, the official position of the 
Canadian Medical Association (CMA) has been to embrace MAiD, offering physician training 
programs and other resources for physicians and medical professionals adapting to the new 
procedures. The Consultation Report notes that elective training could cover technical 
procedures relating to the administration of assistance in dying, as well as making assessments 
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of the patient, sharing decision making, and communication with the family of the patient.143 
The College of Family Physicians of Canada (CFPC) also supported lifting the prohibition of 
MAiD, emphasizing how changes to physician training from residency through to continuing 
professional development would help meet the new demand. These revisions of professional 
and technical procedures signal a desire to update and adapt the conventions of medicine to 
rectify the latent incompatibilities between the permissive system and medical practice. 
 
2.2.4 Autonomy in Dying Discourse and the Framing of Self-Determination 
Ultimately it was in articulating it as a reasonable act of self-determination that 
proponents, particularly dying people and their families, were able to reframe MAiD as a 
culturally acceptable practice. Often a central focus of discourse in support of legalisation 
focused on details from the lives of individuals seeking access to MAiD. These details served to 
frame their lives as fulfilling and happy, thereby making the choice to die a timely and/or 
justifiable one. Articulating assisted dying as a choice made by a rational person, who has, it is 
argued, contributed to society and lived a ‘good life,’ makes it possible to interpret MAiD as a 
‘good death.’ The terms ‘good life’ and ‘good death’ are my own—these were not present in 
the texts themselves—and yet it was remarkable how frequently discourse of assisted dying 
talked about life. In these rhetorical gestures I call Autonomy in Dying Discourse, as much is said 
about living well (encompassing full participation in society, rewarding work, and strong family 
bonds) as is said about dying. Discourses of ‘good life’ were inextricable from argumentation in 
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favor of MAiD; details evidencing a life well lived were all those things the individual could do 
before they fell ill but couldn’t do anymore as a result of their illness. Likewise, descriptions of a 
‘good death’ could encompass everything that the alternatives—the “agony of treatment,” 
dying “piece by piece,” or the “violence and trauma”144 that unassisted suicide might inflict on 
family members left behind—could not offer. In this discourse, a common theme is that a ‘good 
death’ is that which makes it possible to not “suffer from the knowledge that they lack the 
ability to bring a peaceful end to their lives at a time and in a manner of their own choosing.”145 
Though frequently defined in the negative, these modes of reasoning that emphasized good 
living and dying were common throughout pro-MAiD discourse. Immediate challenges to the 
eligibility clauses of the legislation, however, argued that the autonomy being granted to some 
whose death is “reasonably foreseeable” was being denied to those whose conditions were 
ineligible but could nonetheless be intolerable. Disability proved a difficult challenge to the 
stability of eligibility conditions. This was officially due to the “reasonably foreseeable” 
restriction, but the discourses of self-determination and autonomy that granted MAiD to those 
people who could demonstrate their having lived long, happy fulfilled lives also excluded those 
disabled people for whom making such a case proved more challenging.  
For the Supreme Court Case dealing with physician assisted suicide prior to Carter v. 
Canada in 2016, a case filed by Sue Rodriguez of British Columbia in 1993, Supreme Court 
Justice Sopinka wrote in the decision that, “…there is a right to choose how one’s body will be 
dealt with, even in the context of beneficial medical treatment, has long been recognized by 
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the common law.”146 Sopinka was in favour of Sue Rodriguez’ right-to-die appeal, but was 
ultimately in the minority and the court ruled against Rodriguez’s plea. Throughout legal 
discourse on the right to die in Canada, the Rodriguez case, as well as the suits filed by abortion 
physician Dr. Henry Morgentaler in 1976, 1988, and 1993 serve as touchstones for defining the 
limits of personal bodily autonomy. Many of those arguing in favour of the right to die draw 
reasoning from more personal places, but legal precedents are common fodder in official 
documentation. Sopinka’s phrasing of this right is repurposed in the consultations report as a 
working definition of personal autonomy under medicine, “as a cornerstone principle of 
medical ethics and practice…”147 Discourse of autonomy at the end of life has become 
increasingly visible in North American news media in the last five years, for example appearing 
in a series of long-form articles profiling recent recipients of MAiD in Canada and the United 
States in the New York Times. As I will demonstrate, the Supreme Court decision hinged on the 
situation of one woman, for whom the establishment of independence and autonomy were 
critical factors in the case of legalisation. Although she ultimately died before the Federal 
Supreme Court decision was made,148 Gloria Taylor was one of five plaintiffs in a British 
Columbia Supreme Court suit against the federal ban on assisted suicide.149 The descriptions of 
Gloria Taylor in the Consultations Report are an indication of what conditions are considered as 
acceptable measures of autonomy and independence. 
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The individual at the heart of the Carter decision, Gloria Taylor, was described at trial as ‘a 
strong and independent person’ who lived ‘a busy life’ with the satisfactions of work, a 
loving and present family, and meaningful community engagement. From the trial 
records, and from personal accounts heard by the Panel, it is clear that Ms. Taylor was 
loved, respected, supported and secure—a woman who faced the certainty of her death 
with clarity and candour. In the circumstances of Ms. Taylor’s life, the Court found her 
request for physician-assisted death to be a fully autonomous and personal choice.150  
In this narrativization of Taylor’s life, the discourse of the ‘good life’ is recognizable in its 
markers of fulfilment, like the emphasis on her engagement with community and family. In 
these proceedings, Gloria Taylor is described as an active member of society, meeting a number 
of criteria we might consider indicative of a happy life. If, following the logic of autonomy in 
dying discourse, Taylor was both autonomous and well supported by her community and family 
engagement, then there is less concern that her choices at the end of life are not being made 
autonomously. That these elements of Taylor’s life are reproduced in the Consultations Report 
as well as in the Carter v. Canada Supreme Court trial documentation indicate that the report 
authors also see “satisfying work,” a “loving and present family,” and “meaningful community 
engagement” as proof both of her ability to make a reasoned decision about ending her own 
life and of her having lived a good life. Autonomy in dying discourse argues that a ‘good death’ 
is possible when the dying person has the right to choose some of the conditions of their death. 
Beyond using these descriptions to qualify Taylor as a fully capable person, able to make 
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rational decisions, the report authors also use these details from Taylor’s life to suggest that 
these also represent a ‘good’ life and, it is suggested, she was better able to face “the certainty 
of her death with clarity and candour”151 as a result. The implication is that, given her history, 
Taylor was a natural candidate to have been allowed to choose MAiD.  In this sense, the role of 
autonomy in MAiD goes beyond informed consent and becomes almost a set of preconditions 
marking the subject as eligible for a ‘good,’ assisted death. 
Autonomy in Dying Discourse mobilizes the concepts of ‘good life’ and ‘good death’ to 
justify the transition to a permissive system. The individuals seeking legalisation of MAiD for 
their own benefit featured in media reporting and as plaintiffs in legal cases have a wide variety 
of prognoses and conditions, but a majority have physically or neurologically degenerative 
diseases that are associated with a decline in quality of life. Although some statements of this 
type are tied to past legal battles, they also frequently discuss issues related to maintaining 
autonomy and independence at the end of life. Of all the statements collected, these 
arguments that employ Autonomy in Dying Discourse are the most unambiguously in favor of 
legalisation, with subjects arguing that the right to die at a time of their own choosing should 
be granted to Canadians without restrictions that could prolong unnecessary suffering.  
There is a demonstrated pattern of gradually increased patient autonomy in end-of-life 
decision making. Timmermans, writing about the context of medicine in Western societies in 
general, traces a trend in which patients and families are vying for greater authority over end-
of-life procedures within the sphere of professional medical care. He argues that people at the 
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end of life have access to “increasingly flexible cultural scripts,”152 within the medical 
infrastructure and beyond. If death is to be interpreted as good it should involve “aggressive 
symptom management, and attention to the religious, social and psychological needs of the 
dying and their loved ones to achieve the normative goal of accepting impending death.”153 
Most scripts are directed toward establishing death as good wherever possible. Timmermans 
calls the processes by which doctors and medical professionals render death meaningful in an 
institutional setting “death brokering,” which has the function of assigning meaning and value 
to different possible death scenarios. Death brokering “...Distinguishes the acceptable line 
between curing or letting go, achieving a ‘good’ death and avoiding ‘bad’ deaths.”154 Under 
these conditions, the patient’s prognosis and ultimate outcome are rendered meaningful for 
the family and to the institution of medicine. Taylor’s case in the Supreme Court, although 
taking place in a legal rather than a medical setting, follows the same pattern of brokering that 
Timmermans describes. Setting up her life as ‘good,’ helps to reason that her death could 
follow a script of ‘letting go’ and not have to follow the conventional scripts of curative 
medicine in which death is conceived as only a failure to cure. This distinction privileges those 
whose lives carry enough sunny details to fit the ‘good living’ bill, and leaves out the rest. 
Autonomy in dying discourse posits that the desires of the dying patient should come 
before those of families and care providers. The focus on patient autonomy is also often paired 
with evidence that the person in question has lived a full, happy, and rewarding life. The 
prevalence of autonomy in dying discourse in the Canadian news media indicates a shift in the 
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tides of discursive construction of death and dying. Autonomy in dying discourse represents a 
move away from an emphasis on medical control and toward the dignity, control and desires of 
the dying person. In this sense, autonomy in dying discourse may be seen as going against the 
“sick role” described by sociologist Parsons in the 1950s, which expects “child-like behaviors, 
passivity, isolation, and dependency”155 of the patient. Ultimately, however, because MAID still 
depends on health providers to approve and administer, it is not altogether detached from 
medicine,156 but still refigures the cultural scripts available to the dying person.   
 Frequently, discourses of autonomy reflect an in-depth knowledge of the condition 
affecting the patient. Those advocating for their right to die frequently express mastery of the 
medical knowledge of their condition, which is expressed alongside frank discussions of 
personal beliefs. Disability was frequently framed in public exchanges as a challenge to 
articulating the kind of autonomous choice that would be necessary for voluntarily choosing 
MAiD. One vocal proponent of legal MAiD, Stephen Fletcher, is a Member of Parliament and 
quadriplegic who gave several interviews expressing his beliefs. “I’m disabled. I’m as disabled as 
you can get,” he explained, “But I don’t think my life is going to be in any way diminished 
because, in the hospital down the street, there’s less suffering.”157 Fletcher’s comments 
underscore a desire for ultimate autonomy in his final stages. He also argues against the notion 
that giving patients at the end of life the right to choose to die sooner increases the risk of 
abuses against disabled people. In leveraging his own disabilities against oppositions to MAiD 
                                                 
155 Green and Barnartt, Sociology Looking at Disability, xviii. 
156 Van Brussel, “A Discourse-Theoretical Approach to Death and Dying,” 20; Parsons, The Social 
System. 
157 Duffy, “Tory MP Discusses Quest to Pass Right-to-Die Legislation.” 
 75 
made by Canadian disability rights group Toujours Vivant—Not Dead Yet Canada,158 who voiced 
concern that a permissive system threatened the livelihoods of disabled people, Fletcher argues 
that people with disabilities may also assert rational autonomy in choosing MAiD at the end of 
their lives. Fletcher’s comments emphasize how MAiD is able to provide for a good death with 
minimized suffering. Furthermore, by juxtaposing his own agency against the precedent set by 
the legislation, Fletcher argues that disability should not preclude access to end-of-life choices 
like MAiD. 
 After the assisted dying legislation was passed in 2016, with Bill C-14, numerous groups 
spoke out against one limitation within the bill. The requirement that the patient in question’s 
death be “reasonably foreseeable” was seen by some as an unnecessary restriction for 
individuals whose suffering is too great to bear, even when they may not be close to death. One 
of the more visible outcries came from the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, and the 
plaintiff Julia Lamb who has spinal muscular atrophy. “If my suffering becomes intolerable,” she 
said in an interview with the Toronto Star, “I would like to make the final choice about how 
much suffering to endure.”159 Lamb’s case complicates the naturalized link between gaining 
access to a ‘good’ death as a result of having lived a ‘good’ life. Her case instead focuses on how 
the eligibility criteria restrict her access to a good death. Restrictive criteria were understood by 
many in the deliberative process as a protection against the abuse of vulnerable disabled 
people, but if, as Lamb’s statements suggest, the restrictions may only prolong suffering and 
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withhold self-determination from some individuals, Bill C-14 might rightly be charged with 
ableism, a problem I discuss in more detail in Chapter 4.    
 A common feature of autonomy in dying discourse is the tendency to emphasize the 
happiness and emotional stability of the people in question. This justification counters the 
assumption that choosing to end one’s own life is necessarily an act of desperation and crisis. It 
also proposes the possibility that the person in question might still be satisfied with the life they 
have lived up to this point. This mode of argument asks opponents of MAiD to reconsider the 
view that a life ended through medical intervention is necessarily cut short. The Star article 
describes Lamb as having “lived a fulfilling life with a loving family,” and that she “enjoys her 
part-time job as a marketing assistant.”160 In another interview, Lamb explained that:  
I live a great life and I’m very happy. And I do not want to die right now… But I do want 
the option to have dignity with death and to be able to alleviate any severe suffering I 
might come into at the hands of my disability.161  
The description of a life full of friends, family and work, as well as a fulfilling and happy 
experience distances medical assistance in dying from the assumption that it is like suicide as 
we normally understand it. While suicide is understood as a choice made in a moment of 
desperation and crisis, autonomy in dying discourse constructs MAiD as a decision made after a 
period of careful deliberation. It constructs the subject as having lived a happy life but for the 
recent decline in their health.  
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 Autonomy in dying discourse is recognizable for its focus on how the right to die a ‘good 
death’ without suffering and uncertainty should be made available to people who have lived 
‘good’ lives. The move towards this line of rhetoric follows a pattern of “increasingly flexible 
cultural scripts” surrounding death and dying in general.162 These shifting end-of-life scripts 
have marked moves toward greater patient autonomy in general. Those employing this 
discourse argue that autonomous people who have lived happy fulfilling lives should be granted 
access to cultural scripts that permit modes of dying that were not offered by conventional 
curative medicine prior to the legalization of MAiD. To counter the argument that legal MAiD 
sets a dangerous precedent, or exposes the vulnerable to coercion, autonomy in dying 
discourse centers on the rights of individuals, rather than the vulnerability of groups like people 
with disabilities. Autonomy in dying discourse’s focus on the happy, fulfilled lives of people 
seeking MAiD seeks to rewrite the conventional script of suicide to include the possibility that 
death is not always about failure. Instead, by focusing on avoiding prolonged suffering in the 
final stages of life, autonomy in dying discourse argues that access to MAiD should provide 
people at the end of their lives the right to ‘let go.’ In some ways, the notion that assisted 
suicide would be rendered acceptable by framing it as autonomy is unsurprising. After all, why 
at the end of life, would we want to think of ourselves as anything other than the strong and 
independent individuals we present during other stages of life? While this may provide some 
the opportunity to limit their suffering, it may also stretch the ideal of total autonomy beyond 
any functional limit. The problem with this, is that none of us live our lives as perfectly 
autonomous individuals; we all move through many stages of dependency and vulnerability, 
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however independent we believe ourselves to be. This is especially true at the end of life. 
Perhaps isolating this gesture as a discursive strategy, one that serves to expand the cultural 
scripts available to those at the end of their lives, helps to identify at what cost the 
performance of happiness and autonomy comes. 
 
2.3 Reifying a Biopolitics of Ability 
To the degree that it has offered some people a chance to reduce their suffering, the 
effort to reframe assisted suicide may be understood in a positive light. The framing of the right 
to die, however, is troubled by the same paradox that anthropologist Naomi Richards163 has 
identified in the UK euthanasia debates: that at the same time as right to die discourse 
demands greater freedom from the medicalized state, it must also seek to acquire the “consent 
and authentication” from within the medical profession to be given such freedom. Following 
Richards, I ask if, as the discursive patterns detail here, we grant the right to die only to those 
whose lives are marked fulfilled or complete through meeting certain conditions in their 
lifestyles, then is it really an emancipatory biopolitical effort? Or does autonomy in dying 
discourse’s fixation on having lived an independent, fulfilling and autonomous life merely 
reinforce the biopolitical order that constructs individualized and self-regulatory subjects 
whose continued participation and contribution to society depends on their status as healthy 
and active? 
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Autonomy in dying discourse recasts assisted suicide as culturally acceptable by folding 
the practice in with the concept of health as a practice of individual achievement. This framing 
of health fits with that identified by Kirkland and Metzl, who argue that health is increasingly 
framed as “a source of self-concept and achievement.”164 Contemporary biopolitical scholarship 
identifies how the institutions of health and wellness, the science of pharmacology, and the 
logics of physical fitness work to reinforce control over bodies through regimes of self-
discipline.165 Crip theory demonstrates how compulsory able-bodiedness limits our 
understanding of ways of being in the world.166 Within the communication tradition, the 
expanding tradition of critical studies of health scholarship is documenting how the shift 
towards conceiving of health as an individual practice is taking place, particularly in the 
recasting of care as patient choice,167 and the individual responsibility to make healthy lifestyle 
choices.168 Examining the ideological implications of Canada’s assisted suicide debates offers a 
closer understanding of how people are renegotiating the meaning attached to the end of life. 
Following Zoller and Kline, taking a critical communication perspective in the study of health 
discourse enables us to “attend to the audience’s ability to negotiate meaning” across medical 
and wellness discourse.169 Autonomy in dying discourse suggests that death and dying are 
becoming more closely tied to this emphasis on thinking about health as a matter of personal 
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choice. We are moving towards conceiving of the end of life as a ritual of self-identification,170 
one that occurs within the realm of medicalization, but simultaneously attempts to keep a 
distance from the authority of medicine.  
The discourses of autonomy addressed here reflect a pattern of patient advocacy, and 
challenges to medicalization. In pushing back against legal and medical authority to claim new 
rights for themselves, MAiD advocacy and the demand for greater autonomy at the end of life 
resemble the efforts of the AIDS activist effort ACTUP171 and the long history of feminist 
scholarly and activist challenges to the medicalization of women’s bodies.172 Although MAiD 
still occurs within the purview of medical care and supervision, it represents for many a step 
away from the absolute medicalization of death and dying, for example as the prolonging of 
aggressive treatments into the final stages of life, which has become standard. The very 
acknowledgement that such a choice to die sooner might be preferable to the options of 
prolonging treatment or sedating pain, posed a threat to the medical status quo. Even for 
doctors and care workers who supported the transition to a permissive system, MAiD 
represented a departure from the Hippocratic conventions of medicine.173 Canada’s MAiD 
debates provide an opportunity to interrogate the terms by which people come to understand 
what makes life livable in the era of medicalized governance.174 
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As critical knowledge about the ways discourses of health shape our lives continue to 
emerge, we are learning more about what it means to be a healthy subject in contemporary 
society. What autonomy in dying discourse suggests is that the right to die is established 
through the same troubled logics that structure the biopolitics of the living. Autonomy in dying 
discourse takes up the same logics of ‘righteous’ living that Lupton identifies in the discipline of 
the self in an era of secularization. Lupton argues that among certain classes “‘healthiness’ has 
replaced ‘godliness’ as a yardstick of accomplishment and proper living.”175 Autonomy in dying 
discourse focuses on its subjects having lived healthy, happy lives because such descriptions of 
health are the means by which we measure a ‘life well lived,’ which signal at the same time that 
their death is acceptable or timely. People taking up discourses of autonomy from medicine to 
assert a right to die are making a demand for freedom, but the effect of such discourse is to 
reassert the notion that good liberal subjectivity is centred on self-regulation and productivity. 
In so doing, this reification of the able and productive subject excludes many from 
consideration, particularly the disabled, and others to whom the conditions of permissibility for 
alternate end of life scenarios are not extended. 
2.4 Conclusion 
 As an increasing number of jurisdictions reconsider the legality of medical assistance in 
dying, heated public debates have sprung up around the question of medical assistance in 
dying. In Canada, those advocating for a transition to a healthcare system that permits MAiD 
foregrounded the idea that such a decision should be considered a right of the autonomous 
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individual to end their suffering. In order to frame MAiD as an act of self-determination, 
advocates took up a mode of rhetorical framing that I characterize as autonomy in dying 
discourse. Reframing MAiD as a rational choice and not an act of desperation, proponents 
emphasized that those seeking the procedure had lived happy, healthy and independent lives. 
This framing sought to position MAiD as a choice like any other decision about healthy living 
that individuals make in their lifetime. Positioning the right to die with medical assistance as a 
concern of the individual helped to make MAiD more culturally acceptable by aligning it with 
the broader ideological valorization of the self-determining liberal body. Such a shift in the 
contours of the biopolitical imaginary fits with the tendency for Western historical conceptions 
of suicide to evolve alongside changing beliefs about the rights and limitations of liberal 
subjectivity.  
Today, as a growing number of nations worldwide are facing aging populations, the 
question of how healthcare will evolve alongside such transition is ever present. One of the 
changes precipitated in such a shifting healthcare landscape is that many are rethinking what 
the end of life should look like; we are witnessing a greater number of public debates about 
what characterizes a ‘good’ death in the era of secularization. While actively discussing the final 
stage of life was still relatively taboo just a few decades ago, it is now more commonplace for 
the terminally ill to participate in coordinating “choreographed” deaths, to which they give 
careful consideration, “as if planning a wedding.”176 This ‘good’ death is constructed within the 
competing influences of medicalization, individualism, and ableism. Although the Canadian laws 
still only apply to a limited range of patient circumstances, MAiD is being woven into shifting 
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ideological understandings of how to die well in the contemporary era. What is valuable here is 
that these changes are a step away from outright denial and delay of the onset of the end of life 
that medicalization and youth-fixated consumer culture have been upholding. Conceptualizing 
death as something other than failure is a step in the right direction. Understanding how MAiD 
has been made culturally acceptable is crucial to keeping track of how the politics of dying are 
evolving. Despite these arguably progressive shifts in beliefs about death and dying, I have 
argued here that the language used to justify the legalization of MAiD operates within the same 
exclusionary logics of autonomy and self-determination that structure much health discourse 
today. In this sense, the case of autonomy in dying discourse in Canada illustrates how 
decisions about dying are still rooted in how we interpret good living; they favor self-
determination over dependence. 
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CHAPTER 3  
“CITO, TUTO ET JUCUNDE”: THE MANY LIVES OF THE DRUGS USED TO 
KILL QUICKLY, SAFELY AND PLEASANTLY 
Social studies of medicine and pharmaceuticals have articulated how drugs function as 
boundary objects, serving to “…reconfigure relations between multiple social worlds.”177 In 
functioning as both commodity and technology, drugs are boundary objects in that they fulfill 
multiple social roles, while demarcating barriers between social strata. Barbiturates, for 
example, serve as boundary objects in the ways they mediate between spheres of medicine and 
law. Watkins observes the blurring of boundaries between licit and illicit drug use,178 arguing 
that the history of drug abuse is inextricable from that of the pharmaceutical industry. 
Gradmann’s study of vaccines in nineteenth century history examines how the development of 
tuberculin forged bonds between industrialists, public health officials, and clinicians in this 
era.179 Gaudillère and Löwy’s collection likewise explores the boundaries of market and 
research imperatives in the history of pharmaceutical development.180 By tracing the arc of a 
drug’s career, or “cycles”181 as Pieters and Snelders have described them, historians of medicine 
can observe the social boundaries traversed and reinforced in the lifetime of a drug’s 
popularity. These social histories of drugs expose the many attachments that pharmaceutical 
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technologies have across disparate spheres of society. Additionally, “drug biographies,” such as 
the work of medical historian Andrea Tone, whose study of barbiturates provides historical 
context to this chapter, disrupt the notion of a singular purpose or effect of a drug on social 
environments. I draw from these approaches to the study of drugs to consider barbiturates and 
other sedatives hailed for their ability to send someone into a quick and painless death within 
the context of the drugs’ past lives as everyday sleep aids and party pills.   
The question guiding this chapter is: What is the relationship between the 
medicalization of death and barbiturates? I interrogate the affective inequalities across their 
use in different social spaces, looking at how their social function has shifted in relation to class, 
race and gender. In this chapter, I use drugs as an entryway into examining the biopolitical 
construction of a “good death,” in which barbiturates, and benzodiazepines and others have 
been used to induce death quickly and without pain or uncertainty. Following Lentacker, I 
position the drugs as a boundary object that exists at intersections between social worlds. 
Mobilizing Berlant and Puar’s theories of slow death and debilitation, I argue that barbiturates 
exemplify the inherent instability of drug technologies, whose usefulness and benefit are 
contingent on social circumstance. Following Puar, I argue that barbiturates (and their closely 
related substances) follow the biopolitical metrics of capacitation and debilitation; they 
facilitate capacitation for some as a liberal rationale, while enacting in the same vector the 
deliberate debilitation of others.  
In a growing number of medically assisted dying protocols, barbiturates are being used 
to facilitate quick and painless deaths for those for whom a certain measure of biopolitical 
agency is within reach. Discourse surrounding these protocols suggests that many are willing to 
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discuss how and when a ‘good’ death may occur, but in addition to meeting the criteria of 
sufficient medical need, these good deaths are only made accessible to those who already 
enjoy a certain level of social and biopolitical capital. As the analysis of autonomy in dying 
discourse in the previous chapter details, access to a medically assisted good death is 
contingent on a prerequisite set of criteria that establish the subject as deserving, having 
earned a good death by virtue of having lived well. In the first section, I examine the cultural 
history of barbiturates, whose extensive usage across therapeutic, recreational and clinical 
contexts demonstrates their function as boundary objects. In juxtaposing an analysis of the 
early stages of barbiturates’ therapeutic and recreational career with their recently catastrophic 
application in lethal injection protocols, I explore how the drugs illustrate the radical 
contingency of pharmacological technologies on social circumstance. The shifting meaning and 
use of the drug illustrate the changing social landscape upon which the career cycles of 
barbiturates have taken place. The many determining social, economic and cultural factors 
shaping the “complex unity”182 of the drugs’ significance has meant that barbiturates have 
signified different things at different times. Early in their career, they promised to enhance life 
by easing fear, pain and anxiety and offering a good night’s sleep. By mid 20th century, 
barbiturates were a dangerous threat to society, increasingly associated with accidental death 
and suicide. Finally, in their most recent career cycle, they came to signify a swift and painless 
death, have been used successfully in medically assisted dying protocols, and less successfully 
for lethal injection as capital punishment. Each of these applications offers a radically distinct 
interpretation of the politics of life.  
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3.1 Early Barbiturate Use: A New Form of Chemical Comfort in the U.S. and Canada 
 
At the turn of the 20th century, the belief that modern medicine could provide solutions 
to the everyday ills of individuals was increasingly popular. While the average person previously 
did not visit a doctor unless they were seriously ill, the twentieth century saw increasing rates 
of drugs prescribed for ailments once seen as a natural part of everyday life. For many decades 
before barbiturates were used to induce death in executions and assisted dying protocols, they 
were widely prescribed by doctors for therapeutic purposes and were made relatively easily 
available to the middle class in the United States.183 As the history of barbiturates shows, such 
trends in drug proliferation and use are tightly connected to economic imperatives of the 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as to the importance tied to certain ideals of health and good 
living by social and cultural forces. The rise of barbiturates owes a great deal to a dream of 
living without fear and anxiety in the perils of fast-paced modern life. At each juncture in their 
career, barbiturates signified a different ideal, each of which was not tied exclusively to an 
inherent property of the drug itself, nor of its effect on bodies, but that reflected the culture 
norms of the era.   
3.1.1 Discovery 
 
Barbiturates are a group of drugs that act as central nervous system depressants, having 
relaxing, anti-anxiety, and anti-convulsive effects.184 Barbituric acid, the parent compound of all 
barbiturates, was first synthesized in 1864 by German chemist and Nobel laureate Adolf von 
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Baeyer.185 The base molecule was easily modified and each of the hundreds of variants boasted 
slightly different therapeutic effects. Thirty different variants were trademarked and sold in the 
United States.186 As Tone’s chronicle of anxiety drugs details, barbiturates were less toxic than 
their antecedents and widely considered effective treatments for “extreme nervousness, 
neurasthenia, hypochondria, melancholia [and] conditions of anxiety.”187 With the market 
rapidly responding to the demand for barbiturates, their proliferation was exponential.  
Barbiturates were first introduced to the U.S. market in 1903 and increased in 
popularity after their initial application in asylum psychiatry. Barbiturates were being 
prescribed for the same reasons, such as nervousness and anxiety, but were seen as a newer 
better alternative to currently available drugs.188 Doctors and patients migrated toward 
barbiturates when strategic marketing from Merck and Bayer popularized the idea that they 
were a safer alternative to the other sedatives and hypnotics available at the time.189 The 
indications for barbiturates were not new. Veronal, the first brand name version of a 
psychotropic barbiturate, and its successor drugs were “rapidly and enthusiastically adopted by 
prescribing doctors”190 who used them in treatments as diverse as “depression, anxiety, 
insomnia, epilepsy, chronic alcoholism, obstetrics, ulcers, and hyperthyroidism.”191 In 1912, 
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when vast new categories of hypnotics and sedatives were emerging, German psychiatrist Max 
Seige commented that many did not satisfy the requisite qualities for therapeutic treatment. 
The first reports sounded in every respect extremely favourable; but before long it 
became clear that [these drugs] did not satisfy the traditional conditions of Cito, tuto et 
jucunde [quickly, safely, and pleasantly], at least, that they already in small doses caused 
all kinds of unpleasant or detrimental side-effects. Finally most of them found a small 
limited special territory, in which the conscientious physician uses them.192 
The spike in the popularity of barbiturates also coincided with the tightening of restrictions on 
opiates, after an opium convention at The Hague, and the Harrison Act in the United States.193 
Pieters and Snelders describe how newfound concerns about the safety of opiates  had left a 
“gap in family medicine chests,” after which point, “doctors and lay consumers in search for 
psychoactive substances with sedative and hypnotic properties increasingly drifted towards the 
barbiturates.”194 The solution had shifted in favor of barbiturates, but the problem remained 
the same: anxiety, neuroses and stress were being reported and observed at higher rates than 
ever before, particularly in the United States.195 Even when admonishing the over prescription 
of barbiturates during the high peaks of their usage, a 1956 official inquisition published in the 
United States admitted that there must be “a large volume of legitimate therapeutic need.”196 
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Barbiturates came to be seen as something of a necessary evil, which in spite of certain dangers 
and abuses, was considered a reasonable solution to many ailments. 
3.1.2 Recreational Use 
The drugs were not only popular as doctor prescribed cures but became widely popular 
in black and grey market uses, for recreation and self-medication. According to Bryant, the wide 
availability and acceptability of barbiturates, as opposed to marijuana and heroin, made them 
the cheapest and most socially acceptable way to take the edge off in the 1930s and 1940s.197 
Although initially priced higher than other popular sedatives,198 barbiturates came to be 
considered a more accessible option for lower income people who couldn’t afford 
psychoanalysis. Tone describes barbiturates as “a poor man’s alternative to psychoanalysis,” 
and explains that they could be purchased without a prescription in the United States until 
1922.199 Despite later regulation of barbiturates, they became increasingly available through 
backchannel resellers, pharmacists and bootleggers, who “did a brisk trade at saloons, truck 
stops, hotels, and other public venues.”200 This rapid proliferation of a prescription drug into so 
many other arenas of daily life coincides with the deeper trend of medicalization underway in 
the United States in the mid twentieth century. During this time, as Clarke et al. explain, 
medicine and medical ideologies were creeping in to new parts of daily life. Not only was 
medicine given new jurisdiction in presiding over aspects of life once relegated to religion or to 
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the law, such as that of crime, drug abuse, alcoholism, and abortion,201 but individuals 
increasingly turned also to the new and promising solutions to familiar problems that medicine 
had to offer. As such, in the case of recreational use of and self-medication with barbiturates, 
people came to see the drug as a cure-all for common ailments, serious afflictions and even 
boredom. In keeping with the progression of medicalization as Clarke et al. define it, in which 
medical control and logic are extended into new frames of life, many barbiturate users of this 
era were not necessarily unwell. Just as medicine began to take control of rituals such as 
childbirth, medical control became the new norm in dealing with stress and anxiety. 
As the drugs grew more popular, production steadily increased, and by 1950 Veronal 
and other barbiturates could be bought for as little as a dollar a dozen.202 Roughly 1500 
different variants had been made for the US market by mid-century. Collectively nicknamed 
“goofballs,” there were so many varieties available that users came up with names like “yellow 
jackets, blue angels, pink ladies, and reds” to distinguish between all of the pills, capsules and 
powders that were available. Popular accounts of barbiturate use, such as Seconal in Jacqueline 
Susann’s Valley of the Dolls,203 explore how widespread recreational use became in the middle 
of the twentieth century. Doctors also continued to prescribe the drugs despite mounting 
public outcry over their dangers. While the popular press lamented the rise in overdoses, it was 
widely believed that under proper regulation and doctor supervision, barbiturates were an 
advanced solution for the modern day stresses of the nervous housewife or worried 
businessman. Despite the commonality of overdoses, some of them deadly, public health 
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reports of the era claimed that withholding barbiturates from anxious patients in need was 
unethical.204 Beyond the frame of medicine, economic forces also contributed to their 
proliferation. Pieters and Snelders describe how even in the early days of barbiturates, when 
costs were higher, they became the most popular of the available sedative and hypnotics 
thanks to the “…successful efforts of the pharmaceutical industry to associate barbiturates with 
science, but also the growing economic strength of the middle-classes and the expanding 
health insurance industry which reimbursed patients for prescription drug costs.”205 As these 
factors contributed to the growing belief that medicine would provide the solution to nearly 
any common problem, barbiturates enjoyed a flourishing career.  
In their seminal “Biomedicalization” article, Clarke et al. describe how new and 
increasingly complex processes of medicalization are rapidly expanding how we understand 
health and the human body. The authors chart its rise from the latter half of the twentieth 
century to the present day. Biomedicalization is distinct from medicalization. Medicalization 
refers to the “extension of medical jurisdiction, authority, and practices into increasingly 
broader areas of people’s lives,”206 while the addition of bio signals a greater attention to detail 
at the micro level, resulting in “transformations of both the human and nonhuman made 
possible by such technoscientific innovations as molecular biology, biotechnologies, 
genomization, transplant medicine, and new medical technologies.”207 These changes have 
resulted in large-scale revisions of the ways that health and bodies are understood not only by 
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medical specialists, but also by the so-called lay public. In addition to reshaping the 
epistemological frames of medical knowledge, biomedicalization has also been manifested in 
changes to how such knowledge is “produced, distributed and consumed.”208 This includes the 
expansion of for-profit interests in the sphere of medicine, but also takes place at the individual 
level. Under biomedicalization, subjects also view their own health and illness in new and 
different ways. Part of the process of biomedicalization, the authors explain, is the “extension 
of medical jurisdiction over health itself (in addition to illness, disease, and injury) and the 
commodification of health.”209 In this process,  
… health itself and the proper management of chronic illnesses are becoming individual 
moral responsibilities to be fulfilled through improved access to knowledge, self- 
surveillance, prevention, risk assessment, the treatment of risk, and the consumption 
of appropriate self-help/biomedical goods and services.210 
The resulting changes, the authors explain, results in a transformation of the “bodies and lives” 
of the subjects of biomedicalization. These transformations are not an inevitable force, nor are 
they the direct result of technological advancement changing human destiny. While advances in 
technologies play a role, social dynamics are the driving force across the changes wrought by 
biomedicalization. Crucial to understanding the massive proliferation of barbiturates during this 
era is the medicalization of health itself, even where illness was not present. Complaints of 
stress, difficulty sleeping, and recurring pain were not treated with drugs only a few decades 
prior. Rather, they were considered a part of natural healthy life. As the history of the drugs’ 
                                                 
208 Clarke et al., 161. 
209 Clarke et al., “Biomedicalization,” 2010, 162. 
210 Clarke et al., 162. 
 94 
popularity illustrates, these shifts in the treatment of and attitudes towards stress, anxiety and 
pain illustrate the permeability and flexibility of the boundary between health and illness, 
underscoring the function of health as a semiotic process. During the period of widespread 
recreational use of barbiturates, new conceptions of what it means to be healthy or ill were 
articulated as they passed through new spaces of culture and consumption.  
3.1.3 Reclassification and Replacement 
In the United States as well as in Canada, barbiturates were used to complement 
narcotics, in addition to being a replacement for them. In Canada in the 1960s, the sharp rise in 
deaths from barbiturates was attributed to this shift, where “persons formerly addicted to 
narcotics were now utilizing various combinations of barbiturates, amphetamines, alcohol, and 
newer forms of chemical comfort.”211 One statistical study of barbiturate deaths in Canada, 
showed an increase in both accidental deaths and suicides resulting from barbiturates.212 As the 
drug came increasingly to be associated with danger, government inquiries tracked the drug’s 
effect on the population, and the search for a new wonder drug had already begun. Veronal 
remained in use until the 1990s, but barbiturates in general began to fall out of popularity in 
the 1960s when increased awareness of the risks of overdose proliferated, overruling their once 
celebrated benefits. During the peak of their popularity, however, barbiturates were also 
frequently intentionally used for their fatal effects and were involved in many high profile and 
celebrity overdoses, including Marilyn Monroe, Judy Garland and Jean Seberg. The increasing 
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popularity of other drugs, like benzodiazepines (such as Xanax, Klonopin, and Valium, all 
overwhelmingly popular today), which were newly introduced and heavily marketed at the 
time, coincided with the decline of barbiturates. At this stage of their career, in the 1960s, 
barbiturates were increasingly recognized a public health hazard, but the demand for a way to 
take the edge off when the stress of modern life was too much was as high as ever. Widespread 
use of the drug, notably its increase in popularity among working class people, had drawn 
attention to problems with its safety. Barbiturates could still deliver a quick and pleasurable 
relief from pain and anxiety, but lacked in tuto, the safety that was seen as essential to the 
acceptability of drugs.  
Overall the drugs were considered a helpful aid for treating anxiety and stress. The 
legitimacy of the drugs was supported by advances in wartime psychiatry, with pills becoming a 
more accessible and cheap option for civilians with a case of the nerves. Just as 
benzodiazepines were introduced, barbiturates were classified as unsafe for long-term use and 
fell out of fashion. The social history of pharmacology demonstrates that this is not an 
uncommon pattern; drugs considered safe for widespread therapeutic distribution are only 
marked hazardous when newer options are patented and made ready to flood the market. 
Barbiturates were no exception and disappeared from most medicine cabinets by the late 
1980s.213 While the medicalization of anxiety has continued after the rapid decline in 
barbiturate use, the exponential growth in popularity and proliferation of use had been 
unmatched up until this time. The popularity of the drugs demonstrates how desperately 
ordinary people sought a quick, safe and painless escape from pain, insomnia and anxiety. As 
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studies of this period suggest, medicine was being freighted with fulfilling what was for many a 
deep-seated desire to live free from fear and anxiety. As their troubled history suggests, 
barbiturates were far from able to provide such a solution, but their reputation in providing a 
swift and painless death was growing.  
While barbiturates failed safely to deliver on the promise of life without pain, they were 
increasingly associated with death and suicide214 and largely fell out of popular recreational and 
therapeutic use. In the early 1980s, when American law enforcement officials looked to 
injectable drugs as a more humane alternative to existing methods of execution, the Oklahoma 
state legislator asked its medical examiner for a solution. Dr. Jay Chapman, who was not a 
licensed anaesthesiologist, came up with what would come to be known as the standard three 
drug lethal injection protocol within a matter of days.215 During this final and most recent 
career of barbiturates, the three-drug protocol for capital punishment’s troubled history points 
to new limits established within medicine’s pursuit of a humane lethal procedure. In their new 
application, barbiturates crossed the boundary between medicine and law enforcement. These 
three drugs, including the short acting barbiturate sodium thiopental, took on an “aura of 
scientific fantasy about the benefit of the new,”216 and promised to modernise and sanitise 
capital punishment for the contemporary era.  
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The history of barbiturates from the turn of the twentieth century to date has traversed 
boundaries between state, medicine, self, and, increasingly, corporations. In the course of 
these shifts, the drugs have fulfilled a variety of medicinal and social needs, articulated by ever 
changing ideals of medicine and conceptions of embodiment. As they moved through different 
vectors of scientific and social need, the drugs have borne witness to multiple stages of the 
medicalization and biomedicalization of illness, health and death. In exploring the 
medicalization of death through the cultural history of barbiturates, this chapter articulates the 
shifting relationship that medicine has had with the drug. In the process of uncovering the 
history of the drugs, I explore the pharmacological side of barbiturates, including their initial 
discovery, mechanism of action, and the history of their therapeutic applications in Western 
(mostly North American) clinical practice. While attention to this facet of the drugs enriches the 
story of their many lives, ultimately in the process of this research it became clear that the 
precise mechanism by which barbiturates induce death remains unclear to scientists. This 
lacuna in the realm of institutionalized medicine is certainly troubling, given the drugs’ crucial 
role in providing a quick, painless and reliable death under a growing number of assisted dying 
protocols worldwide. In examining a number of cases of their application in clinical and also 
criminal settings and the recent literature on the mechanism of action of barbiturates, 
however, this chapter argues that successful medical assistance in dying is highly contingent 
upon social factors. The precise means by which death can be brought about by medical means 
is unclear and while the possibilities of a swift and painless death as brought on by 
pharmaceutical means do exist, it is rather the conditions dictating the embodied experience 
during life that make an easy death possible. 
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3.2 Barbiturates: Uncertainty and Indeterminacy 
In addressing matters of technology, culture and embodiment, my approach is 
grounded in a conception of nature and culture as coextensive, always interacting and 
“infolding” upon one another in what Haraway calls the naturecultural.217 Scholars who 
theorize across the “natural” realm of the biological and scientific, and the “cultural” realm of 
the social argue that no articulation of so-called natural phenomena is complete without the 
recognition that it exists only in the context of cultural and socially metered modes of 
perception.218 Elizabeth Wilson’s study of the pharmacology of mood raises questions about 
how the pharmacokinetics (the study of the movement of drugs in the body) of other drugs 
intersect with cultural practice. If, as she argues, a better understanding of the pharmacology of 
mood can be “a vibrant source of political agency and energy”219 for feminism, then how might 
knowledge of the pharmaceutical technology used to induce a “good death” inform our 
understanding of assisted dying? Following Wilson, I zero in on these drugs that kill as a way of 
interrogating the presumption that medico-pharmaceutical expertise can expedite easy 
painless death. Finally, drawing on Puar’s mobilization of crip nationalism to fold the mutually 
constitutive processes of racialization, poverty and debilitation into my conception and 
mobilization of neoliberal biopolitics, I examine the current status of “a good death,” one 
provided by the technological assemblage of contemporary pharmacology, where experiences 
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of embodiment, ability and agency vary by extremes. Ultimately, I argue, these disparate 
experiences are as likely to dictate the likelihood of a painless death, as the technical mastery 
of pharmaceuticals. 
In this section, I employ naturecultural thinking to explore how an unexpected turn in 
the practices of global pharmaceutical corporations have reshaped possibilities of American law 
enforcement agencies providing a swift and painless death as a part of their capital punishment 
protocols. Scientific understanding of how to induce death in a humane manner with consistent 
results is limited. Given that medicine is oriented toward the preservation of life, this is perhaps 
unsurprising. The institutions of medical and pharmacological research are directed toward 
identifying and ameliorating the drugs and procedures that will extend and enhance living. Just 
as some doctors have argued that any procedure inducing death could not be classified as 
medicine, although drugs have been used to hasten death for centuries, these instances are 
treated as crimes and rarely approached from a medical perspective. To put it in different 
terms, within the frame of medical reason, death has always been a risk or side effect of a drug 
and not an intentional result. Barbiturates are one of the primary drugs used in euthanasia and 
medical assistance in dying, alongside opioids and another class of drugs called neuromuscular 
relaxants, and benzodiazepines. Of the variety of barbiturates that have been synthesized, 
marketed and prescribed for different purposes, sodium pentobarbital and secobarbital are 
best suited to medically assisted dying because of their ability to induce sleep and have a fatal 
effect in a single dose within a relatively short period of time.220 For this reason, the drugs are 
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favored by medical professionals inducing suicide, as well as in prisons for capital punishment. 
Secobarbital is currently the most common prescription for assisted suicide in Oregon and 
Washington.221 The effects are dependent on dosage, but barbiturates can “reduce blood 
pressure, disrupt normal heart rate, and cause circulatory collapse.”222 Fig. 2 depicts the 
complex assortment of drugs used in assisted dying and capital punishment applications, 
including the breadth of the drugs’ original medical purpose. In both intentional and accidental 
cases, they induce death through severe respiratory depression, once the person is 
unconscious.223 The precise biological mechanisms by which barbiturates kill a person, 
however, are not clearly understood. In 2000, sixteen years after the Netherlands legalized 
euthanasia, Dutch commentators lamented that no one had yet invented the easy and effective 
suicide pill named the “Pil van Drion,” or “Drion’s Pill” after Huibert Drion, a Dutch Supreme 
Court Judge had proposed a suicide pill that would end someone’s life “in an acceptable way at 
the moment that to them… appears suitable.”224 That even a country where intravenous 
euthanasia and assisted dying via oral drugs are widely accepted and has been integrated into 
clinical practice, struggles to find the right drug suggests the persistence of a pharmacological 
problem. 
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 drug type 
most common 
medical use 
administration effect use in MAiD 
use in 
executions 
sodium 
thiopental 
barbiturate 
common surgical 
anaesthtic 
intravenous causes unconsciousness unknown yes 
pancuronium 
bromide 
aminosteroid 
muscle relaxant / 
paralytic 
intravenous paralysis unknown yes 
potassium 
chloride 
metal halide salt 
supplementation 
for low blood 
potassium 
intravenous 
induces cardiac arrest 
and permanently stops 
heartbeat 
yes yes 
midazolam benzodiazepine sedative 
oral or 
intravenous 
sedative yes yes 
fentanyl opiate pain relief 
transdermal, oral, 
or intravenous 
euphoria, pain relief no planned 
propofol sedative-hypnotic 
general anesthesia 
and procedural 
sedation 
intravenous puts person to sleep yes unknown 
secobarbital barbiturate sedative oral 
induces sleep, lethal at 
high doses 
yes no 
rocuronium 
nondepolarizing 
neuromuscular 
blocker 
paralyzer intravenous paralyzes yes unknown 
lidocaine local anaesthetic numbing the skin intravenous 
numbs the vein before 
midazolam injection 
yes yes 
chloroquine antimalarial 
prevention of 
malaria 
oral stops heart yes unknown 
pentobarbital barbiturate insomnia treatment oral slows brain activity yes yes 
Figure 2 Drugs Used in MAiD and Capital Punishment 
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Wilson argues that curiosity about pharmacology can recapture biology for feminism. 
Her study of anti-depressants traces the politics of anti-psychiatry in feminism, which casts 
Prozac and other SSRIs and SNRIs (drugs popularly referred to as antidepressants) as too 
deterministic, or blind to its social causes. In this register, anti-psychiatry actually obscures a 
good understanding of depression and hence its treatment. A fixation with social construction 
casts the realm of biology as “a site of stasis and predetermination,” she argues, which “has left 
academic feminism in a singularly ineffectual position for analyzing the new biochemical 
treatments of depressive states.” Wilson has two recommendations; that depression be treated 
with attention to both emotional and organic aspects of its manifestation, and that feminist 
theory should pay better attention to the political agency of biology. Of particular note is 
Wilson’s engagement with the pharmacokinetic action of antidepressants. Her analysis 
highlights the interdependence of biological and cultural systems at work in the regulation of 
serotonergic activity (serotonin is the neurotransmitter believed to be responsible for feelings 
of happiness and thus the target of many modern treatments for depression). In detailing the 
coextensive effects of chemicals (the drugs) and culture (the forces shaping how they are 
prescribed and taken) Wilson articulates a naturecultural perspective. She illustrates how even 
the physical phenomena, such as diet and the synthesis of proteins, are shaped and governed 
by cultural practices and beliefs. In her formulation, there is no biological phenomena that 
exists somehow above or beyond cultural influence or measurement. And yet she is adamant 
that feminism has a great deal to gain from “engaging with the vicissitudes of biological 
systems.” She argues that feminists engaged with the treatment of depressive states can’t 
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afford to ignore the biological phenomena that shape physiological and psychological 
treatments of depression.  
My approach in examining medico-scientific control over life in the neoliberal era also 
draws from the tradition of biopolitical theory that extends out of Foucault’s Omnes et 
Singulatim and Society Must Be Defended lectures.225 These studies of Judaeo-Christian proto-
politicizing regimes of power brought to light the models by which Western political structures 
have sought to control life (bios) with power (regulae). While biopolitical rule existed first as the 
absolute monarchic or godly power to “take life” or “let live,” more recent scholarship argues 
that it has evolved into a decentralized and diffuse effort to foster some kinds of life, while 
disallowing others.226 To theorize the biopolitical through the frame of fostering and disallowing 
life renders new iterations of life giving and life taking into the realm of the political. Lemke, 
Rose, and Rabinow, following Foucault suggest that the function of biopower in the twenty-first 
century is increasingly a force of an individualizing politics.227 This political logic renders the 
institutions of health and wellness, the science of pharmacology, the logics of physical fitness, 
reproductive science, surgical enhancement, immunization, technological mastery and 
biological weaponry as functions of the contemporary biopolitical era. I draw from theories of 
biomedicalization228 that trace the instrumentalization of life through the vectors of medicine 
and technoscience to interpret the rapid proliferation of barbiturates as a recreational drug and 
widely available anxiety and insomnia remedy. 
                                                 
225 “Omnes Et Singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political Reason.” 
226 Rabinow and Rose, “Biopower Today,” 2006. 
227 Lemke, Biopolitics; Rabinow and Rose, “Biopower Today,” 2006; Rose, The Politics of Life 
Itself. 
228 Clarke et al., “Biomedicalization,” April 2003. 
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Despite the usefulness to the study of depression that the science of pharmacokinetics 
brought to Wilson’s study of depression, as it turns out, existing knowledge of the ways 
barbiturates act on the body is limited. The variant types of barbiturates are numerous, and 
each produces a slightly different effect, but overall, they are used to produce a feeling of 
relaxation and euphoria. Despite the risks, during the first phase of their use, the drugs were 
seen as a useful aid to promote healthy living in stressful times. Therapeutic and recreational 
barbiturate use in the drugs’ infancy were intended as supports for living, but the frequency 
with which they killed people continued to be a problem. The most recent pharmacological 
research still has not identified the exact mechanism of action by which barbiturates affect the 
body.229 This means that despite over a hundred years of widespread use, neither physicians 
nor neuroscientists know precisely how they work. Current pharmacological research suggests 
that “barbiturates act by prolonging and potentiating the action of γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA) 
on GABAA receptors and at higher concentrations directly activating the receptors.”230 All that is 
known for certain is that barbiturates depress the central nervous system, and have sedative 
and anticonvulsant effects.231 Despite the differences between types, all variants produce 
“anticonvulsant and anxiolytic activity, sedation, hypnosis, general anesthesia.”232 They have a 
low and highly variable therapeutic window. At the highest doses, they produce what is called 
“death by respiratory depression,”233 which means that they slow down vital functions to the 
                                                 
229 Löscher and Rogawski, “How Theories Evolved Concerning the Mechanism of Action of 
Barbiturates,” 13–14. 
230 Löscher and Rogawski, 12. 
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Barbiturates.” 
232 Löscher and Rogawski, 13. 
233 Löscher and Rogawski, 13. 
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point of stopping breathing. That is, it is clear that they work by relaxing you to death, but 
exactly how this takes place in the body remains unknown. This may be part of the reason why 
it is frequently paired with other drugs that will stop breathing or the heartbeat after the 
anaesthetic effect of the barbiturate.234 
Shorter acting variants can be used for emergency anesthesia, and, because of their 
rapid effects in depressing the central nervous system, for lethal injection in the United States 
and some other countries. At the time of its introduction to capital punishment in 1982, the 
short-acting drug sodium thiopental was celebrated as a more humane option than 
electrocution. In reality of course, this drug and the other barbiturates frequently fail when 
they’re put to the task of killing, even when prepared and delivered in a cocktail of other drugs. 
While the switch to lethal injection was seen as more humane, most of the numerous problems 
arising after the fact have been tied to the paradox of killing with drugs designed to cure.   
The use of lethal injection is increasingly problematic, as producers of the drugs in the 
United States and abroad cut off the supply to law enforcement citing moral objections. In the 
last ten years, numerous headlines have reported the botching of executions, where prisoners 
suffered through the process. This year, Arkansas announced its intention to execute seven 
inmates in eleven days, in what many considered to be a rush to use its expensive drugs in 
                                                 
234 This combination is also used in the Netherlands, where the barbiturate thiopental is 
followed with a paralytic, or neuromuscular relaxant. Dutch researchers have lamented the 
imperfect nature of their own longstanding euthanasia drugs of choice. Groenewoud, Johanna 
H., Agnes van der Heide, Bregje D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Dick L. Willems, Paul J. van der Maas, 
and Gerrit van der Wal. “Clinical Problems with the Performance of Euthanasia and Physician-
Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands.” New England Journal of Medicine 342, no. 8 (February 24, 
2000): 551–56. 
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advance of their expiration.235 Of the increasing number of botched executions, many were the 
result of attempting to use only one drug instead of three; usually with the barbiturates sodium 
thiopental, or pentobarbital.236 To complicate things even further, the European Union and 
some international drug manufacturers banned the sale of the more reliable sodium thiopental 
and pentobarbital for use in executions,237 and so law enforcement turned to entirely new drug 
cocktails, now consisting of drugs from the benzodiazepine family (that of Xanax, Klonopin, and 
Valium). Just as with barbiturates, there are no official clinical guidelines for how to administer 
a lethal dose of these drugs, meaning that the execution is supposed to occur through the toxic 
side effects of the drugs, while making (sometimes blind) guesses as to at what levels that will 
occur.238 The rush to conjure up new pharmacological preparations has had catastrophic 
results. The executions can take up to several hours, and inmates have experienced a spectrum 
of horrific symptoms before passing. In a handful of cases, inmates have survived and remain 
on death row today, as in the case of Doyle Hamm of Alabama, a 61-year-old inmate with 
advanced lymphatic cancer and carcinoma who survived the execution process.239 
                                                 
235 Baumgartner and Johnson, “Analysis | Arkansas Plans to Execute 7 Men in 11 Days. They’re 
Likely to Botch One.” 
236 Given the highly private and personal nature of MAiD procedures, details about how and 
when they may have gone wrong in the Canadian setting are hard to find. Speaking at a panel 
on medical aid in dying in Quebec in January 2018, Dr. Alain Naud stressed that the dosage 
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237 These still have clinical applications in the treatment of epilepsy and in preoperative 
sedation.  
238 Redden, “New Lethal Injections Could Cause Extreme Pain, Make Deaths ‘Drag on’ for 
Hours.” 
239 Reuters, “‘Gory, Botched.’” 
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Of the new experiments, Deborah Denno, of the Neuroscience and Law Centre at 
Fordham University says: “It’s like when you wonder what you’re going to be eating tonight and 
you go home and root through your refrigerator to see what’s there. That’s what these 
departments of corrections are doing with these drugs.”240 When some states recognized the 
new impossibilities of lethal injection, they brought back older methods, including the electric 
chair, hanging and firing squad. All three of these methods have been used in the last ten 
years.241 
3.3 Slow Death and Debilitation in the Contemporary Neoliberal Era 
In the years following the 2010 elimination of sodium thiopental, the most common 
drug in the three-drug protocol,242 from the U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturing market, a 
number of cases of botched executions came to light in news media discourse. The cases 
pressed the question of the permissibility of lethal injection as well as cast capital punishment 
itself with greater doubt. In the national media discourse that ensued in the U.S., people 
debated whether there was any possibility of inducing a “humane” death for those sentenced 
to die. Some lamented the irony that while a good death was still possible for euthanized 
animals, the fierce international debates about the permissibility of the death sentence were 
making such a practice impossible for ending human lives. As my analysis of death row inmate 
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Clayton Lockett’s case illustrates, although the drug shortage made it difficult for states to carry 
out lethal injection, examining the bigger picture points to a crisis much longer in the making. 
Rather than simply exemplifying the impossibility of producing a quick and painless death, the 
recent cases of botched executions are only a more extreme example of the debilitating effects 
of neoliberal logics of health in the capitalist era. I suggest a reading of Lockett’s life in which 
debilitation and decline are not wrought as an accident or failure of a well-intending system of 
governance, but rather as an extreme example of deliberate slow debilitation as articulated by 
Puar in The Right to Maim. 
As the earlier chapter on autonomy in dying discourse in this dissertation argues, 
establishing the right to an autonomous and dignified death, as demonstrated in Canada’s 
medical assistance in dying debates, is highly contingent on establishing that life has been lived 
to the fullest. The right to a good death, one without pain, anguish, or uncertainty became 
hotly debated when, beginning in roughly 2010, the drugs used in providing a “humane” death 
to American death row prisoners became scarce. This section examines the case of Clayton 
Lockett, whose death provoked debate about the pharmacological possibility of providing a 
good death. Tracing the transnational symbolic economy of drugs, specifically the barbiturates 
and benzodiazepines relied upon to reliably provide a swift and painless death, I explore how 
“drugs emerge from and reconfigure relations between multiple social worlds.”243 Furthermore, 
drawing on Berlant’s conception of “slow death” and Puar’s articulation of debility, I examine 
Lockett’s case through the lens of neoliberal biopolitics. In light of the direct implication of the 
pharmaceutical industrial complex, I argue that contrary to the narrative that classified them as 
                                                 
243 Lentacker, “The Symbolic Economy of Drugs,” 141. 
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a crisis, botched executions like Lockett’s are an inevitability when contemporary systems of 
biopolitical governance naturalise the debilitating decline and slow death of impoverished and 
racialized populations.   
A June 2015 article in The Atlantic recounts the final moments in the life of Clayton 
Lockett, a convicted Oklahoma death row prisoner. Lockett’s execution had gone so poorly as 
to make national news in the United States, invigorating debates about the moral status of 
lethal injection, of capital punishment itself, and of the tenability of then current law 
enforcement protocols which were in flux as a result of a shortage of the drugs initially used in 
lethal injection. The 38-year-old Lockett had both confessed to and been condemned to the 
death penalty for the brutal murder of 19-year-old Stephanie Neiman fifteen years prior. 
Beyond his own criminal past, the story of Lockett’s life that emerged in the decades-long 
criminal cases, and the media discourse surrounding his execution, detailed a life marked by 
poverty, neglect, rape and abuse. In examining Lockett’s life, and the conditions of his death, I 
explore the darker flip-side of the world of barbiturates and benzodiazepines, one which 
disrupts the association with a swift and painless deliverance that they enjoyed in the earlier 
decades of their use. 
Before being brought to the death chamber, Lockett had unsuccessfully attempted to do 
the job himself three times, fashioning a noose out of bedsheets, swallowing hoarded pills, and 
slitting his wrists with a blade cracked from a safety razor. According to the article, Lockett had 
known about the experimental nature of new injection procedures, and that when fellow 
Oklahoma prisoner Michael Wilson was executed earlier the same year, that he had been heard 
saying “I feel my whole body burning” in his final moments. When Lockett’s stepmother visited 
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him for the last time, he had begged her not to attend the execution as a witness. “I do not 
want you to be at the execution, because I do not know the outcome. I do not think it’s gonna 
be very good. Because the drugs that they use have not been tested.”244 His fears were well 
warranted. Lockett finally died after a drawn-out process, with multiple attempted injection 
sites all over his body, and only ten minutes after the director of the Oklahoma Department of 
Corrections had given the order to stop the execution. In the attention that Lockett’s case 
garnered after the gruesome details of his final moments circulated across popular media, two 
patterns of concern emerged. The first, that Lockett’s death and other botched executions were 
unacceptable to the most supportive of capital punishment and that even convicted killers may 
even deserve greater dignity in death than they were presently allowed. And second, that the 
problem of lethal drugs and how to use them may be posing as great a challenge to the capital 
punishment as other issues plaguing the system including, among other things, increasing 
attention to “significant evidence of mental illness, intellectual disability, brain damage, severe 
trauma, and/or innocence”245 combined. The catastrophe became symbolic of the widespread 
failures of the American system of law enforcement, in addition to representing a crisis for 
states with lethal injection protocols.  
Lauren Berlant articulates her concept of “slow death” as referring to “the physical 
wearing out of a population and the deterioration of people in that population that is very 
nearly a defining condition of their experience and historical existence.”246  The concept is 
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rooted in a critique of neoliberalism; Berlant takes as a point of departure David Harvey’s 
observation that “under capitalism sickness is defined as the inability to work.”247 In 
investigating obesity as rooted in the political and cultural rituals that shape work, leisure, and 
the racializing logics of class, Berlant reflects on how, when it comes to matters of health, the 
odds are stacked against some more than others. Berlant’s articulation of slow death is also 
rooted in the tradition of Foucauldian biopolitics; Berlant relies on the concept of biopower to 
centre the diffuse nature of the forces that engender a growing obesity epidemic. She argues 
that those embodying the so-called obesity crises are neither unintended casualties of 
capitalism, nor “dupes to the interests of power.”248 Rather, biopolitical forces frame the 
victims as guilty of creating an obesity epidemic, or some other public health crisis. 
Biopower operates when a hegemonic bloc organizes the reproduction of life in ways that 
allow political crises to be cast as conditions of specific bodies and their competence at 
maintaining health or other conditions of social belonging; thus this bloc gets to judge the 
problematic body’s subjects, whose agency is deemed to be fundamentally destructive.249   
Following these logics, Berlant explains, people belonging to certain populations are “marked 
out for wearing out.”250 In Berlant’s formulation, these are the “working-class and 
subproletarian” populations whose status as consumers is essential to the continued successes 
of the global processed-food regime and capital in a more general sense. The wearing out takes 
place simultaneously in the privatization of health care and the erosion of the welfare state, 
                                                 
247 Berlant, 754; Harvey, Spaces of Hope. 
248 Berlant, “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency),” 765. 
249 Berlant, 765. 
250 Berlant, 761. 
 112 
with consumption and care repackaged as a concern of individual will and self-determination. 
While obesity, the resulting illnesses and associated decline are one facet of the manifestation 
of slow death that Berlant delineates, slow death’s heuristic function provides a capacious 
frame for investigating the affective and embodied experience of the present neoliberal era.   
Revisiting the tragedy of Clayton Lockett’s life and death through the lens of Berlant’s 
configuration widens the frame of interpretation. Following Berlant, we might interpret 
Lockett’s cruel, unusual and inhumane slow death as beginning not at 5:27 PM on April 29, 
2014 when he was scheduled to be executed by the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, nor even 
after being sentenced to the death penalty or for other prior infractions. Rather, Lockett’s 
debilitating decline and eventual demise began much earlier, during the years of childhood in 
which he experienced neglect, rape, incarceration, systemic racism and abuse. In The Right to 
Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability, Puar argues that critiques of embodiment and social 
welfare are lacking in attention to the contributions of disability theory. Puar argues that we 
should understand bodily capacity and debility as tied to the cultural and financial trappings of 
neoliberalism. In identifying the category of debility, which is distinct from disability in that it, in 
consonance with Berlant, “foregrounds the slow wearing down of populations instead of the 
event of becoming disabled,”251 Puar designs a means for critiquing the expectations of life 
under late capitalism and the neoliberal order. Drawing from Lauren Berlant’s conception of 
“Slow Death,”252 Puar conceives of debility as marking “the convergence of capitalism and slow 
death via its enfolding into neoliberalism.”253 Following Puar, we might examine where 
                                                 
251 Puar, The Right to Maim. xiii-xiv. 
252 Berlant, “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency).” 
253 Puar, The Right to Maim, 1. 
 113 
Lockett’s life was marked by his poverty and race, and how his debilitation and decline were 
inevitabilities, even where his criminality and sentence were not. The naturalizing discourses 
that link race, poverty and criminality marked Lockett’s trajectory as inexorable, however grim 
or shocking the details of his life and death. The discourse of crisis that ensued from Lockett’s 
execution painted his final moments as cruel and unusual. However, as Berlant suggests, 
biopower operates to cast crises as conditions of specific bodies, and while Lockett’s final 43 
minutes of agony were undoubtedly cruel, his having lived under a regime of racialized poverty 
and the debilitating decline that ensued were far from unusual.  
This formulation extends the conception of capacity beyond something like corporeal or 
intellectual ability, theorizing the social means by which we come to inhabit modes of living 
that are supported or neglected through systems of racialization, technology, governance, and 
capital. According to Puar, these forces shape our social being far beyond the conventional 
indexing of culturally rooted valuations of bodily ability, or capacity. Stressing that a universal 
definition of disability does not exist, she argues that “disability is not a fixed state or attribute 
but exists in relation to assemblages of capacity and debility, modulated across historical time, 
geopolitical space, institutional mandates, and discursive regimes.”254 This is not only a 
statement as to the relativity of disability, or that everyone will pass through states of disability 
at some point in their lives, but is rather intended to index the manifestation of disabled states 
to global regimes of political and rhetorical power that both produce disabled states, and name 
it as such (or not) according to their own needs. 
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The globalization of disability as an identity through human rights discourses 
contributes to a standardization of bodily usefulness and uselessness that discounts 
not only the specificity of location but also the ways bodies exceed or defy identities 
and subjects. The non-disabled/disabled binary traverses social, geographic, and 
political spaces. The distinctions or parameters between disabled and non-disabled 
bodies shift historically, as designations between productivity, vagrancy, deviancy, 
illness, and labor market relations have undergone transformations from subsistence 
work to waged labor to hypercapitalist modes of surplus accumulation and neoliberal 
subject formation.255  
Puar’s conception of disability and debility is important here because it consists in a 
theorization of embodiment that indexes a multitude of bodily interactions with the global, 
historical and cultural forces that shape capacitation. With regard to debilitation, we no longer 
have any separation from the technologies, or more specifically “technological assemblages,” 
that shape embodiment. As a result, bodily capacity or ability can no longer be measured by 
their reliance on technological enhancement, but rather through the degree to which one has 
access to resources. The advantage of Puar’s mobilization of debility is that it operates beyond 
conceptions of disability, to mark the social processes by which populations as a whole are 
debilitated by the forces of neoliberal capital, among others. Expanding on Berlant’s term “slow 
death,” Puar conceives of slow death as “a mode of neoliberal and affective capacitation or 
debilitation as mediated by different technological assemblages.”256 In theorizing ability and 
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debility on a continuum that transcends national boundaries or networks of care, Puar 
juxtaposes this spectrum of embodiment with the forces of global capital. 
What Berlant and Puar’s complementary theories offer is a mode of theorizing death 
and debility as shaped by forces beyond the frames of medical knowledge and practice, or of 
pharmaceutical technology. Death and debility, when framed as contingent on matters such as 
race, coloniality, labour market relations and deviancy, in addition to their conventional 
associations with illness and ability, are no longer understood as individual tragedy, but rather 
as systemic inevitabilities. “Debilitation is not a by-product of the operation of biopolitics but an 
intended result,” writes Puar, “functioning both as a disruption of the non-disabled/disabled 
binary—as an in-between space—and as a supplement to disability, that which shadows and 
often overlaps with disability.”257 Puar’s formulation strikes back at the normative logics of 
health and ability put forward by the discursive spheres of health and medicine. Under the 
logics of medicine and normative regimes of health, illness, death and debilitation are 
understood as unfortunate inevitabilities against which diligent self-care and healthy living 
must strive. While these frameworks help to contextualize the “crisis” of lethal execution within 
broader cultural occurrences of debilitation, they alone do not respond to the matter of drugs, 
specifically the fact that the same lethal drugs seem to be unevenly successful at doing what’s 
expected of them. To better understand this, I discuss next the intersections of natural 
phenomena (the drugs and how they act upon the body) and the cultural contexts that render 
different outcomes.       
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3.4 Medicine, Discourse and the Naturecultural Body 
Medical anthropologist Byron Good argues that we should think of medicine “as a 
symbolic form through which reality is formulated and organized in a distinctive manner.”258 
This framing suggests that medicine is not an objective or straightforward set of practices, but 
rather a kind of belief system, just as religion, science and mythology similarly function to shape 
imagination and perception. Critical discursive studies of health and wellness have established 
the radical cultural contingency of our understanding of health and good living. Scholars 
exploring the function of medicine and public health argue that while the definition of health 
and illness are constantly shaped by government and capital, bodies in “constant renegotiation, 
subjectivity and bodily practices”259 are a locus of power and struggle. This naturecultural 
perspective facilitates the exploration of the dynamics between new biotechnologies and their 
environments, which Acero argues “substantively mediate gender relations and the 
environment in contemporary livelihoods; they reshape bodies, change health practices, and 
redefine rights.”260 Studying medicine as rooted in, rather than acting objectively upon society 
exposes the inseparability of social power from bodies as subject to medical reason.  
The recent histories of biological reason and its application as a tool of governance have 
demonstrated instrumentalization of human life, and the scope of racist politics of medicine 
and technoscience.261 Bodily knowledge and biological reason are shaped by cultural ideals that 
are frequently predetermined by prejudice. Historically, scientific knowledge of difference has 
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been used to reinforce hierarchies of superiority through supremacist specification. This is true 
for differences of sexuality, gender, ability and race. The archive of science, upon which all 
biological knowledge is built and continues to circulate today, is a sexist, racist and colonial 
one.262  Clinical techniques, and the parameters of health and normalcy have been established 
as a result of centuries of exploitation. The proliferation of medical reason, the medicalization 
of the rituals of daily life, and the resulting shifts in how most people interpret their own 
embodied experience arise out of the instrumentalization of bodies marked as difference. Such 
practices of differentiation have treated racialized, gendered, classed and homosexual bodies 
as “objects to be measured, zones to be mapped, and texts to be interpreted.”263 Recognizing 
this history of medical reason and biological knowledge is one way to illustrate the rootedness 
of bodies in culture, or what is called the naturecultural body. Bodies, even as accessed through 
the language of medical science are always already cultural and are therefore inflected with the 
presumed inequality and difference that have historically suffused medical discourse. Given 
medicine’s function as a symbolic form through which different iterations of social reality are 
produced, how should we interpret the dramatically different articulations of embodiment and 
health that have been reflected in each of the career stages of barbiturates? To attempt an 
answer, I examine next the history of corporate involvement in barbiturate distribution, the 
result of which has shaped the drugs’ availability and social significance. 
In their function as tools of medicine, drugs provide a useful point of analysis in 
decoding the status of death in the contemporary era. Forces within the pharmaceutical 
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industry, encompassing not only giant transnational corporations, but also smaller producers 
from India, importing services from the UK and European regulators were entangled in the 
recent scramble among US states seeking lethal drugs. While the blockage of exportation of 
lethal drugs was celebrated as a triumph for human rights, it’s had unintended effects for the 
experiences of Michael Wilson, Clayton Lockett and others whose executions were botched as a 
result. When Hospira, the American manufacturer of sodium thiopental, the primary drug used 
in lethal injection protocols since the beginning ceased its production in 2010, corrections 
agencies had to turn to other options. While sodium thiopental is a rapid-onset short-acting 
barbiturate, the next choice of drug was pentobarbital, which American agencies imported 
from Lundbeck, a Danish corporation who also subsequently ceased export of the drug in 2011 
as soon as they learned how it was being used in the U.S.264 After Lundbeck’s decision, 
American prison authorities ultimately resorted to backroom deals to acquire the drugs in 
question, including tens of thousands of dollars’ worth of pancuronium bromide, sodium 
thiopental and the same type of solution, potassium chloride, which was used in Lockett’s 
execution. One investigation revealed that the supplier for several states’ supply of the drugs 
was an operation run out of a single locked cabinet by one man in the back of his driving school 
in a London suburb.265 Lethal injection drugs, which straddle medicine and law by their very 
nature, demonstrate how, as historian  Antoine Lentacker argues, “drugs emerge from and 
reconfigure relations between multiple social worlds.”266 Drugs are weighted with enormous 
symbolic potential, coming to represent social ideals far beyond their actual capabilities and, 
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when they fail to meet expectation or do what we hope they will do, expose how the symbolic 
economy of drugs “works to dissimulate the inherent instability of substances; it disguises and 
displaces the long and fragile chain of agents, practices, and institutions that affirms the 
identity and efficacy of medications.”267 The use of the drugs posed a threat to the public 
identities of the drug manufacturers, for whom the image of enhancing and preserving life was 
paramount and the association with execution was seen as bad publicity.268 In exposing the 
connection of Lundbeck’s drug with capital punishment, a London human-rights organization 
called Reprieve drew attention to the off-label use of pharmacological technologies as a means 
of leveraging political power against the U.S. legal system. This move forced a reconfiguration 
of the relationship between the American departments of corrections and the pharmaceutical 
industry on whom they had come to rely to provide a swift, painless and quick death for 
condemned death row prisoners. It also complicated access to the drugs used in assisted dying 
protocols in the U.S., since some states used similar drugs for this purpose.269 
In 2014, when news of botched lethal injections first broke, law enforcement was using 
a different cocktail of drugs for each execution, prompting commentators and watchdogs such 
as the ACLU and the Death Penalty Information Center to suggest that inmates were being 
experimented on.270 There’s no reason to suspect that this is an exaggeration. As grisly reports 
have emerged detailing the executions of inmates, it seems clear that some states are 
experimenting on their death row inmates as a way of identifying some new set of procedures 
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or cocktail of drugs that works better, killing faster, with no pain, and more predictable results, 
than do the current options. Beyond the fact that this is a gross violation of human rights, this 
practice exemplifies the “government of life” whereby regimes of biological control reshape not 
only the epistemological frameworks of professional and medical expertise, but also the 
everyday lives of regular people. Rose argues that while human life was once articulated at the 
level of individuals, or populations, vitality is now observed, controlled and commodified at the 
level of discrete disembedded and diverse biological objects.271 That is, what we might call “life 
itself” no longer only references people or groups of people, but is also articulated at the level 
of organs, cells, genes and proteins. Furthermore, whether intentionally or not, the recent 
string of experimental lethal injections continues the tradition in Western science and medicine 
to instrumentalize the bodies of poor and racialized people in the service of advancing 
knowledge about lethal procedures.272  
Given the increasing attention to and popularity of medically assisted dying in a number 
of countries worldwide, it is difficult to imagine that these experiments, which recall better 
known catastrophes from the history of medical ethics such as those in Nazi-era Germany, the 
American Tuskegee Experiments and Imperial Japan, could not contribute in significant ways to 
contemporary understandings of the limits of life. Doctors played important roles in each of 
these experimental projects. Dr. Guillotin’s 1789 invention was intended to provide the most 
humane death, and while the electric chair was conceived by a dentist, Groner explains that its 
debut was attended by many doctors.273 In the United States today, medicine has a 
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complicated relationship with execution by lethal injection. While the original three drug 
protocol first tested in 1982 was developed by a doctor, most major medical associations and 
nurse associations are “strongly opposed” to participation in executions or forbid them 
altogether. In practice however, many physicians and healthcare workers participate in the 
procedures, by injecting lethal drugs, ordering lethal drugs, placing intravenous lines, 
monitoring vital signs, or pronouncing the prisoner dead. In spite of this, one doctor writing in 
2002 claimed that while many American doctors were willing to participate in executions, some 
were unaware that their participation directly contradicts professional directives.274 Across the 
U.S. statutory codes regarding the permissible extent of physician participation in executions by 
lethal injection vary from state to state and in at least two states, medical boards have faced 
legal action for their participation.275 The participation of medicine in the lethal injection 
process remains a complicated battle, with each new obstacle to the process creating ever 
more uncertain outcomes for the inmates facing capital punishment.  
Given that there has been some measure of professional medical participation in the 
lethal injection procedure since its inception, whether through direct participation or in the 
form of expert consultation or design, how can the frequency of botching executions be 
explained? One possible reason, discussed in more detail below, is that the drugs selected in 
execution protocols are intended to give the impression of a peaceful and painless death, with 
the experience of the inmate themselves coming second. A second potentially more significant 
reason is that the likelihood of an inmate’s having a peaceful or painless death is already 
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predetermined by cultural circumstance, as much as any certainty that biological knowledge of 
ending life could provide. So, while there are several similarities in the ways that (intravenous) 
medical assistance in dying and lethal injections are done, it is not exclusively the drugs 
themselves that dictate a swift and painless death but a complex set of mutually constituting 
determinations. In Canadian MAiD protocols, for example, the doctor or nurse practitioner 
conducting the process brings a full set of extra drugs in a separate box, in the event that the 
first aren’t effective in an appropriate timeframe.276 The second set of syringes are rarely used 
but serve to reinforce peace of mind for those participating and bearing witness to the 
procedure. In an effort to maximize the comfort of the patient, those implementing MAiD inject 
a small amount of lidocaine into the veins of recipients, to numb the burning sensation 
associated with some of the drugs used, including propofol. Although lidocaine is inexpensive 
and widely available, such precautions are less common in executions, as evidenced in the final 
words of inmate Michael Wilson, who was heard saying “I can feel my whole body burning” as 
he died.277 These kinds of differences suggest that it is not merely the availability of drugs or 
the accessibility of expertise that predict a painless end of life, but rather that the caution, 
preparation and respect that participants dedicate to the event that shapes its outcome. 
Perhaps the state of mind of MAiD patients, who necessarily have to have been reflecting on 
and preparing for their deaths for weeks, is a factor. We might further speculate that the 
already declining physical health of MAiD patients distinguishes them from lethal injection 
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patients, but the botched executions of already old and infirm inmates complicate such a claim. 
For medical assistance in dying, the interaction is framed as care and upheld as an idealised 
final rite of passage. In the instance of execution, beyond the obvious fact that it enacts 
punishments, lethal injection sanitizes and attempts to disguise the nature of the act. Execution 
by lethal injection fails in its effort to embody the conflicting ideals of the Hippocratic oath and 
criminal justice. In its failure to provide the promised humane alternative, it further contributes 
to the hierarchizing of human life that is present elsewhere across the manifestations of global 
capital and the neoliberal erosion of the welfare state.  
3.5 Implications for Medicine and Assisted Dying in Dying in Canada 
These fumbles and failures speak volumes as to the unique status of lethal injection; it is 
neither exclusively a medical procedure, nor an act of law enforcement. Law enforcement 
workers have little to no expertise in anatomy or pharmacology, and although doctors are 
called on to verify the time and nature of an inmate’s death, they cannot and do not participate 
in executions because this would be in direct violation of the Hippocratic Oath binding all 
physicians to “Do No Harm.” It exists in an overlap between medicine and law but fails at 
meeting the goals or ideals of either one.278 Compounding pharmacies (who traditionally 
tailored drugs to unique needs and applications) are cooking up their own synthetic versions of 
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pentobarbital for use in executions, with uncertain and untested results. In some jurisdictions, 
compounding pharmacies are vying for the right to anonymity in producing pentobarbital for 
law enforcement for fear of public backlash. In this sense, the liminal status of lethal injection, 
as neither exclusively medical nor punitive, provides one in-road for fighting the legality and 
application of capital punishment. Beyond deliberating on the impossibility of humane 
execution, however, these institutional failures point to another problem for the pursuit of 
autonomy and dignity at the end of life: that pharmacology is designed to cure and medicine is 
itself necessarily at odds with killing.  
While the rate of execution in the United States has been on a steady decline every year 
since 1999, the numbers of medical patients opting for assistance in dying grows each year. 
Public support for the death penalty in the U.S. is at an all-time low, but acceptance of medical 
assistance in dying for the terminally ill is steadily rising in the country. As of 2016, either 
assisted suicide or euthanasia is legal in the Netherlands, Belgium, Colombia, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Germany, Japan, and Canada. In the U.S. it is currently legal in seven states. In 
increasing numbers, people are demanding the right to take matters into their own hands when 
life becomes unliveable. While barbiturates were once used to take the edge off of a long or 
stressful day, they are being used at increasing rates to take lives through assisted suicide. In 
both instances, barbiturates are being used to stifle and subdue those parts of life deemed not 
worth living, whether that of the unbearable anxiety of daily life, of a condemned criminal or of 
a suffering patient. This duality operates not as an exception to the patterns of biopolitical 
vectors, but, as Puar argues, is at the heart of it. 
 125 
Biopolitics deployed through neoliberal guises is a capacitation machine; biopolitics seeks 
capacitation for some as a liberal rationale (in some cases) or foil for the debilitation of 
many others. It is, in sum, an ableist mechanism that debilitates.279 
What distinguishes the two procedures, besides their dramatically different contexts, is that in 
the case of capital punishment bodily autonomy is constructed by the neoliberal state 
apparatus as problematic to the general social health of the population, while in the case of 
medical assistance in dying, death as the ultimate final act of bodily autonomy is upheld as 
essential to the health of the population.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 In the aftermath of botched executions, the search for viable lethal drugs continued. In 
2017, two U.S. states announced they would introduce fentanyl into their lethal injection 
protocols moving forward.280 This announcement took place the same year the opioid 
epidemic, which is being called “the deadliest drug crisis in American history,”281 resulted in 
record numbers of overdose deaths in the U.S. Canada’s own “serious and growing” opioid 
crisis resulted in nearly 3000 deaths in 2017.282 The reactions of shock that ensued—how could 
these agencies resort to using drugs now so widely associated with tragedy and accidental loss 
of life?—ignore the familiarity of such a trajectory, from clinical therapeutic treatment, to 
dangerous recreational craze, to controversial lethal tool, which, as I have detailed, has now 
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transpired in the careers of multiple barbiturates, then benzodiazepines such as midazolam and 
finally opiates like Fentanyl. The outrage surrounding lethal procedures seemed to suggest at 
face value that there is a push to improve the quality of the final moments of the dying person. 
As Lockett’s case, and those of other inmates who have requested alternate execution methods 
indicate however, those condemned to die would frequently choose other means if given the 
option. The drugs used in a lethal procedure are chosen for their ability to meet the 
expectations of those who must bear witness to the deaths. They facilitate an end of life that 
looks like something as familiar as a medical procedure; they made execution look like 
something other than being killed. A 2014 photo collection published by the New York 
Magazine’s Intelligencer depicts all of the available images of state execution chambers, from 
1991 to 2008.283 The images depict rooms intended for executions ranging from a gallows, to 
gas chambers, to electric chairs. While some of the older rooms with electric chairs might be 
mistaken for a turn-of-the-century historical image, most of the images from after 2000 look 
more like a teaching hospital operating theater with a stark, white, sanitary look to them, some 
using modern medical gurneys like those used to transport patients in medical settings. As 
Denno explains, “the reason we keep looking for something else… is because it’s not really for 
the prisoner. It’s for the people who have to watch it happen. We don’t want to feel squeamish 
or uncomfortable.”284 The appropriation of these drugs serves as an attempt to mask the 
realities of the state of capital punishment, by drawing it from the realm of punishment into 
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that of care. This transition illustrates the function of pharmaceutical technology in functioning 
as a boundary between social worlds.  
  The history of the popularisation of barbiturates exemplifies the biomedicalization of 
health itself, a process traced by Clarke et al., Lupton, and others,285 in which subjects who 
would have been considered healthy in previous decades, take up new rituals and 
recommendations in order to maintain their health. During this time, new drugs were 
proliferating in the service of improving everyday life, not just to treat illness. In their ability to 
facilitate a good night’s sleep and alleviate the anxiety and stress of life, the drugs initially 
represented the best modern medicine had to offer. At the same time, they bore witness to a 
reconfiguration of the role of medicine, which was moving towards a role of enhancing and 
improving life, rather than treating illness. Next, I explored the status of current research on 
barbiturates, including their effects on bodies and the theories about the manner in which they 
can produce a lethal outcome in patients. The uncertainty and indeterminacy of their function 
within the body underscore the inherent instability of drugs in general, whose function and 
purpose are usually disguised by a complex entity of agents, institutions and practices that we 
can think of as a symbolic economy of drugs.286 
 Clayton Lockett, whose execution by a so-called cocktail of experimental drugs, 
including benzodiazepines was botched, came to symbolize a moment of crisis for the 
institution of capital punishment itself. On the one hand, his death was accidentally made much 
more torturously slow and difficult as a result of efforts to make the practice of lethal injection 
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in the country impossible. On the other hand, I argue that Lockett’s final moments might also 
be read from the perspective of Puar’s theorization of debilitation, in which a slow and painful 
demise is not an accident but rather the intended effect of a biopolitical system which upholds 
the capacitation and good living of some at the intentional expense of the lives of others.  
 Next, I contemplated the manifestation of the simultaneously debilitating and 
enlivening effects of the drugs from a naturecultural perspective, asking what dynamics exist 
between the physiological processes of the drugs in question and the culturally-determined 
forces shaping their use and implementation. I interrogated the paradox of a simultaneous 
increase in the acceptability of one form of lethal procedure, while another faces elimination. 
Both medical assistance in dying and lethal injection rely on the role of the international drug 
industry, whose interventions can facilitate or interrupt their feasibility. Considered in 
juxtaposition with the national conversation about whether and how a good death can occur in 
Canada, I examined how the instances of botched executions forced American law enforcement 
agencies and international observers to ask whether a good death, or at the very least a quick 
and painless one, remains possible for condemned death row prisoners in the United States. 
The paradox that lies at the heart of each of these discursive events is that at some point in 
their histories, each one has been rationalized by liberal logics. While proponents of lethal 
injection believed they could modernize the execution procedure to sanitize the process and 
alleviate unnecessary suffering, proponents of medical assistance in dying likewise seek to 
alleviate unnecessary suffering, but in the name of respecting the rights of the individual and 
their absolute bodily autonomy. In the former case, the procedure debilitates, while in the 
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latter it prevents debilitation, granting the liberal subject the power to cut life off when 
suffering and debilitation become unbearable. 
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CHAPTER 4  
DISABILITY AND THE RIGHT TO DIE IN CANADA 
This chapter examines the efforts to expand MAiD eligibility criteria that immediately 
followed the passage of Bill C-14 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code. Disability was visible 
throughout the Carter proceedings in 2015, with the case against the criminalization of assisted 
suicide being argued by Joe Arvay, who uses a wheelchair. Before Carter, Sue Rodriguez’s 1993 
Supreme Court case for the right to die was rejected on the basis that making assisted suicide 
legal would make elderly and disabled people more vulnerable. In June 2016, immediately 
following the passage of the legislating permitting MAiD, Julia Lamb, a 29-year-old woman who 
is disabled, lead the challenge to the legislative restrictions that would likely make her ineligible 
for MAiD in the future. To better understand how disability plays a central role in determining 
the fate of permissible assistance in dying in Canada, I examine the efforts to justify the 
expansion of MAiD eligibility criteria to include people whose deaths are not “reasonably 
foreseeable.” The disability community, including advocacy groups and representative bodies, 
were sharply split on the implications of access to MAiD for disabled people. Both sides argued 
that the other would foster exclusion and undermine equality for people with disabilities. For 
some, like Arvay, who spoke out against what he understood as a reversal of the precedent set 
by the case he presented to the Supreme Court, denying MAiD to those without terminal illness 
or imminent death was “discriminatory” and “infantilizing,”287 to disabled people and 
represented a stripping of the autonomy granted to all Canadians in the Carter ruling. For 
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others like bioethicist and disability rights activist Jennifer Johannesen, the reasonably 
foreseeable clause is a necessary safe guard to protect disabled people and those who suffer 
“from poverty, from disenfranchisement, from exclusion, from poor health care,” and “poor 
palliative care.”288 I focus on the discontent with the reasonably foreseeable clause, scrutinizing 
it through the lenses of theories of compulsory able-bodiedness and crip theory. I seek to draw 
attention to the voices of disabled people on both sides of the debate. I draw on the disability 
and crip theorists Robert McRuer and Alison Kafer as a means of unpacking the uneven stakes 
of the debates for people of different abilities. To interrogate how the right to die moment in 
Canada is shaping understandings of disability in the country, I ask: What rhetorical strategies 
are used to justify the expansion of MAiD eligibility criteria in Canada? By considering what it 
would mean to grant people like Lamb, Moro, Brault and Nadeau-Whissell access to MAiD, this 
chapter imagines “other approaches to futurity beyond curative ones.”289 
If the autonomy of the medicalized body is complicated by a number of factors, 
including race, gender, class, and ability, then it is necessary to articulate how these processes 
may be shaping discourses of ‘good’ life and ‘dignified’ death today. Furthermore, and disability 
scholars Haegele and Hodge argue, “the way in which disability is defined is important because 
the language people use to describe individuals with disabilities influences their expectations 
and interactions with them.”290 Legal and media discourse about the right to die is important 
because it has the potential to shape perceptions of disabled people, in addition to rescripting 
the medical options available to people nearing the end of life. In order to tease out the frames 
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and limits of disability that have been the focus of this most recent debate with regard to 
Canada, I focus on four cases: Julia Lamb, Robyn Moro, Jean Brault and Suzanne Nadeau 
Whissell. These four people have in common a history of vocal support of eliminating the 
“reasonably foreseeable,” though their circumstances are otherwise different.   
Critical theories of biopolitics challenge the exclusion of minority bodies from the ideals of 
good living. Critical biopolitics upset the notion that there is only one good way of living. 
Theorizing death and dying through queer and disabled lenses is important because, just as it 
disrupts the limited scope of normalized good living, these perspectives can expand who is 
included in discourses that seek to rescript death and dying for the better. McRuer points out 
that although ability and sexuality are usually falsely dichotomized, they are always 
interdependent. 
Compulsory heterosexuality is intertwined with compulsory ablebodiedness; both 
systems work to (re)produce the able body and heterosexuality. But precisely because 
these systems depend on a queer/disabled existence that can never quite be contained, 
able-bodied heterosexuality’s hegemony is always in danger of collapse.291  
Crip politics draws on queer theory, expanding and politicizing a term that is “claimed by those 
whom it did not originally define.”292 Queerness and disability are linked for two key reasons. 
First, because both queer and disabled bodies are read as “other,” in that their future is 
presumed to follow something other than the “normal” reproductive trajectory. Second, much 
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like the category of queer, disability is positioned here as fluid and relational, subject to the 
culture and institutions that mark them as such.  
In the accounts of death and dying I detail here, there is an overt presence of the ‘never 
quite contained’ mode of living. The lives of Lamb, Moro, Brault and Nadeau-Whissell exceed 
easy categorization. The question of their deaths likewise exceeds containment in the laws 
meant to improve the experience of dying in the nation. In this chapter, I examine the 
paradoxical situation faced by those who have been left in a liminal space, somewhere without 
access to a ‘cure,’ but without MAiD. The people I discuss have been excluded on the basis of 
an ‘unforeseeable’ death by the stipulations of the legislation. In the process, I borrow from 
queer feminist disability scholar Alison Kafer’s theory of crip temporality to examine how 
disability is often cast “out of time.”293   
 While the ultimate legal fate of MAiD eligibility criteria will be undetermined until the 
Lamb case is settled, the debates surrounding the court challenge to Bill C-14 yielded an 
unforeseen opportunity. They provided a platform for ill and disabled people to detail the 
conditions that make their lives livable and meaningful. ‘Disability’ was not a stable category 
throughout the debates, since those affected by the exclusionary laws lived, or are living with 
different levels and timeframes of ability. Proponents of expanding access to MAiD likewise 
used a flexible language of ability to express their demands, sometimes enacting ableist 
subjectivity to “perform wholeness”294 and justify a life well lived, other times taking up the 
language of disability rights to denounce exclusion and demand equal accommodation of their 
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unique needs under the law. Under the conditions of compulsory able-bodiedness, the 
suffering of the disabled is naturalized, and MAiD advocacy by disabled subjects repositions 
assisted dying as an interruption of the medical model of disability in which intervention and 
cure supersede patient autonomy. This discourse of equality and self-determination holds a 
paradoxical relationship with the temporalities of medicine and disability. It cuts short the 
curative logics that conventionally extend into the final medicalized moments of life. At the 
same time, however, pro-MAiD disability discourse contradicts the importance of centering 
disabled longevity that grounds Kafer’s theory of crip time. Instead of demanding access to a 
future with greater longevity, the proponents featured here framed MAiD as improving both 
their lived experiences of the present and their final days of life. I also address disability rights 
criticism of MAiD that continued after Bill C-14, which was less prominent than challenges to 
eligibility criteria. To my knowledge, there are no disability rights groups challenging MAiD’s 
legality altogether in legal proceedings, for example, and though most press coverage I 
reviewed for this chapter addressed voices from both sides of the issue, there appeared to be 
some resignation on the part of groups fighting against MAiD in the two years that have passed 
since the legislation was enacted. I focus on the fight to expand access to MAiD for two reasons. 
First, this framing of disability counters nearly everything argued about disability in the context 
of MAiD leading up to legalization, in which the risk of harm to vulnerable people was the 
dominant anti-MAiD narrative. Second, the tradition of crip theory has a longstanding 
engagement with the problem of vulnerability and medicalization, one that I have not yet seen 
discussed in the context of a permissive system. I believe Lamb and the other cases discussed 
here provide a unique opportunity to attend to those who have lived the experience of 
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medicalization and disability, and who argue their needs are not being met with empathetic 
care.  
 
4.1 Background to the Legal Challenge to Bill C-14 
4.1.1 Summary of Lamb v. Canada’s Legal Context 
 As of June 27, 2016, the BCCLA (British Columbia Civil Liberties Association) has 
launched a court challenge that charges Bill C-14 with excluding people with degenerative 
illnesses (including, but not limited to: spinal muscular atrophy; multiple sclerosis; spinal 
stenosis; locked-in syndrome; severe conversion disorder; traumatic spinal injury; Parkinson's 
disease; and Huntingdon's disease) from having access to MAiD on the basis that the 
requirement that the person’s death must be “reasonably foreseeable” is both a contradiction 
of the precedent set in the Carter ruling, and a violation of their rights as defined in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. When the Bill was being debated in parliament, Lee 
Carter, the daughter of Kay Carter the plaintiff in the Supreme Court case argued295 that the 
Bill’s restrictions would have excluded her mother from accessing MAiD, despite the courts 
having ruled in favor of legalizing MAiD on her behalf (though she ultimately died before the 
ruling was made). 
The Carter ruling states that:  
                                                 
295 Bryden, “Children of Woman Who Ended Her Life in Switzerland Want Liberals to Amend Bill 
C-14 | The Star.” 
 136 
▪ MAID be available “to individuals with terminal and non-terminal grievous and 
irremediable medical conditions that cause enduring suffering that is intolerable to the 
individual in the circumstances of his or her condition” (recommendation 2); 
▪ a psychiatric condition should not be a bar to eligibility (recommendation 3); 
▪ the capacity of a person requesting MAID to provide informed consent should be 
assessed using existing medical practices (recommendation 5); 
▪ competent mature minors should have access to MAID within three years of the 
coming into force of the provisions relating to MAID for competent adults (and that 
during that three-year period, the issue of competent mature minors and MAID be 
examined) (recommendation 6); 
▪ advance requests for MAID should be permitted in certain circumstances 
(recommendation 7); 
▪ the request for MAID be made in writing and in the presence of two witnesses 
(recommendation 9); 
▪ the federal government work with the provinces and territories and their medical 
regulatory authorities to establish a process that respects the freedom of conscience 
of health care practitioners while respecting the needs of patients, and that objecting 
health care practitioners should be required to provide an effective referral for a 
patient (recommendation 10); 
▪ all publicly funded health care institutions provide MAID (recommendation 11); 
▪ MAID be carried out only if two physicians who are independent of one another have 
determined that the eligibility criteria are met (recommendation 12); 
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▪ physicians, nurse practitioners and registered nurses working under the direction of a 
physician to provide MAID be exempted from sections 14 and 241(b) of the Criminal 
Code (recommendation 13); and 
▪ Health Canada re-establish a Secretariat on Palliative and End-of-Life Care 
(recommendation 19).296 
In Bill C-14 - An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, a “grievous and irremediable medical condition” 
is defined in new section 241.2(2) as requiring all of the following criteria: 
• the person has a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability; 
• the person is in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; 
• the illness, disease or disability or the state of decline causes enduring physical or 
psychological suffering that is intolerable and cannot be relieved under conditions that 
the person considers acceptable; and 
• natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of the medical 
circumstances, although a prognosis as to the specific length of time remaining is not 
necessary.”297 
Lamb v. Canada references the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, stating that denying 
some people access to MAiD, Bill C-14 is in violation of the following section: 
“15.(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
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discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental 
or physical disability.”298 
4.1.2 Support for the “Reasonably Foreseeable” Restriction Clause in Disability Advocacy 
While the focus of this chapter is on those who used a disability perspective to support 
expanding the accessibility of MAiD, there were numerous other groups who fought the 
expansion of eligibility. For the most part, groups who had, before Bill C-14, expressed outright 
rejection of the possibility of legalizing MAiD, redirected their efforts towards ensuring that 
disabled people would not be harmed in the permissive system. Rather than seeking to 
invalidate legal MAiD by posing a legal challenge to Carter or Bill C-14, some concerned groups 
turned their efforts towards minimizing the threat to people with disabilities. For some, like 
David Baker, a lawyer representing the Council of Canadians with Disabilities and the Canadian 
Association for Community Living, resisting the BCCLA’s effort to expand criteria was 
paramount to protecting people with disabilities. Commenting on the BCCLA’s press release, 
Baker expressed concern that too many people could gain access to MAiD. “Is someone who is 
blind condemned to interminable suffering? Is someone who has autism condemned to 
interminable suffering?”299 Broadening eligibility, argued Amy Hasbrouk of Toujours Vivant/Not 
Dead Yet Canada, could put disabled people at risk because disabled people may already be 
experiencing “devaluation” from others: “If you’re surrounded by people who think that your 
life is a tragedy because you're disabled, of course you're going to believe that because that's 
the message that society gives you… Of course you're going to feel like your life is worthless if 
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everyone around you is telling you that.”300 These arguments are of course particularly 
important for considering the potential consequences of expanded eligibility. The fears of 
devaluing the lives of people living with disabilities is well-founded, as is the problematic 
category of suffering, which is by its very nature so difficult to quantify, let alone regulate.  
While my focus with this chapter is on pro-MAiD accessibility discourse within the 
disability framework, arguments in favour of protecting vulnerable people from abuse also 
deserve attention. In the media discussion of Bill C-14, Lamb’s case against Canada received 
more coverage than did supporters of the eligibility restrictions. In most instances, in the source 
texts I analyse here both sides of the issue were represented, but Lamb’s case (and argument) 
were headlined, while MAiD detractors like Baker and Hasbrouk appeared later on, as 
counterbalance to arguments in favor of expanding criteria.   
 
4.2 Case Descriptions 
4.2.1 Julia Lamb 
Julia Lamb is a 29-year old woman living in Chilliwack, British Columbia. She has had 
spinal muscular atrophy, “a genetic disease affecting the part of the nervous system that 
controls voluntary muscle movement,”301 from infancy. Lamb has severe osteoporosis and 
requires help with most daily activities. Since spinal muscular atrophy is a degenerative 
condition, she faces an increasing number of symptoms related to her illness, including 
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increasing difficulties with “breathing, swallowing, speaking and walking.”302 She lives 
independently and works part-time as a marketing assistant. She is the primary plaintiff in the 
constitutional court challenge filed by the BCCLA against the Bill C-14 on the basis that it is too 
restrictive.    
4.2.2 Robyn Moro 
 Robyn Moro was a 68-year old woman from Delta, British Columbia who was diagnosed 
shortly after retiring with Parkinson’s disease.303 She joined the Lamb V. Canada case as a 
plaintiff on May 23, 2017. She was initially denied access to MAiD but died with the assistance 
of a doctor on August 31, 2017. During the time between the denial of access to MAiD and her 
death, she participated in public advocacy of the BCCLA’s initiative to expand eligibility criteria, 
by giving media interviews. 
4.2.3 Jean Brault 
 Jean Brault was a 61-year-old man living in Sherbrooke, Quebec. A sudden illness at the 
age of 19 partially paralyzed him and restricted his ability to communicate. Brault attempted 
suicide multiple times in his life, once giving up a hunger strike when doctors threatened to 
send him to a psychiatric ward. After the passage of Quebec’s Bill 52: An Act to Amend End-of-
Life Care, he sought access to MAiD, but was denied on the basis of not being near enough to 
the end of life. In protest of being denied the procedure, and as a means of bringing about the 
symptoms necessary to be considered eligible, Brault began a 53-day hunger strike. At the end 
of the strike, during which he starved instead of dehydrating in order to be able to give 
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unimpaired consent, he was deemed eligible. He gave a television interview with the CBC two 
days before dying with medical assistance on April 7th, 2016. 
4.2.4 Suzanne Nadeau-Whissell 
 Suzanne Nadeau-Whissell was a palliative care nurse and public advocate of expanding 
access to MAiD, living in Estrie, Quebec. She was diagnosed with ALS shortly after retirement 
and created a blog she called “Le Vent Se Lève,” or roughly, “The Wind Picks Up,” to document 
and share her experiences with the public. She denounced the exclusion of people dying from 
conditions other than cancer from palliative care facilities304 and sought to de-stigmatize 
assisted dying practices in general. She died on November 28th, 2016 with medical assistance, 
after first announcing her end of life plans on her blog. 
4.3 The Context of Compulsory Able-Bodiedness 
Theories of disability and crip scholarship have a lot to offer the study of MAiD. While 
death with dignity advocates continue to grapple with what they understand as a reclamation 
of autonomy from the totalizing regime of medicalization, decades of disability scholarship have 
carved out a space for disabled folks that transcends the medical mode’s assumption that 
disabled people are child-like, passive and dependent.305 As sociologist Sara E. Greene explains, 
critical theories of disability have worked to distance the conflation of ‘sickness’ with disability, 
a central issue in the medical model of disability. Such conceptions of disability worked to 
exclude people with impairments from certain spheres of economic and social participation. 
Nagi and Zola’s important contributions, for example, moved toward dynamic and non-medical 
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understandings of disability that focused instead on the relationship between people with 
disabilities and their environment.306 This perspective enables a shift away from focusing on 
individual experiences of disability and towards understandings of “the interaction between 
society, impairments, and people.”307 One problem in drawing parallels between disability and 
the growing attention to the needs and rights of those nearing the end of life is that it might 
reify the association with mortality that disability activism has struggled against. At the same 
time, however, those seeking to establish greater autonomy for the dying could benefit from 
the disability perspectives that challenge medicalization and emphasize community care and 
decision making. Compulsory able-bodiedness is inescapable in the MAiD debate, shaping the 
culturally-embedded values that define good living for all sides of the debate, in addition to 
influencing the language that delineates the acceptable, from the unacceptable ways of living. 
 
4.3.1 Describing a Life Fully Lived 
 In a similar manner to the Carter case, a central rhetorical strategy for expanding MAiD 
eligibility criteria was in framing the lives of the individuals affected as full, long or happy. The 
fight against the restrictions straddles the question of compulsory able-bodiedness, a concept 
that expands Adrienne Rich’s influential contention in “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian 
Existence.”308 In some cases, the framing of the lives of those affected by the restrictions to 
MAiD in the C-14 bill represented them as living full lives in spite of their conditions, while in 
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others illness or disability were framed as a limitation to fulfilling life, against which they 
struggled to live well as best they could. Throughout the statements made denouncing 
limitations, the uneven positioning of disability and disabling illness as obstacle to good living 
demonstrates the complexity of regulating end of life practices for such a wide variety of 
circumstances.  
Statements about Julia Lamb in particular emphasized her independence, work and 
participation in a wide variety of social activities. The BCCLA press release and statements from 
and about Lamb in media coverage underline the fact that spinal muscular atrophy had not 
stopped her from having enjoyed a fulfilling life. In her own words, Julia describes the 
opportunities she has enjoyed, in spite of her mobility issues.  
I was a happy child. My parents called me a social butterfly… My family went on many 
adventures including river rafting camping and trips around the country. I was always told 
growing up to never let any obstacles deter me or hold me back from what I wanted in 
life. I took that message to heart and lived life.309 
Such descriptions serve to distance Lamb’s experiences of living with disability from 
assumptions that life with disability is always necessarily lacking from the fulfilling experiences 
that are ascribed to able-bodied lives. They offer a way of forgoing the charge that Lamb, 
whose age (she was 25 in 2016) marks her request for MAiD as less naturally or obviously 
acceptable than the individuals of a more advanced age who were upheld as representative 
cases during the Carter case.   
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 Just as Lamb’s fulfilling childhood is levied as indication that she has not had an unhappy 
or limited life, media coverage of Lamb’s story foregrounds her continued participation in 
familiar rituals of work, travel and communication. Attention to the ways Lamb’s life resembles 
that of the average twenty-five-year-old works to underscore that at present life with spinal 
muscular atrophy is still rewarding and productive for her. 
She works part-time as a marketing assistant for a clothing company, writing newsletters 
and managing social-media accounts, mostly from home – though she makes weekly 
visits, in her wheelchair, to the company's outlet and to competitors to do market 
research, the court documents say. She can use her hands to type.310 
Working with the connectivity provided by her wheelchair and the communication afforded by 
the internet offers Julia the social and professional connections associated with a good life. 
Such descriptions offer the opportunity to recast living with a disabling illness as having the 
potential to resemble the lives of any other able-bodied person.  
 Robyn Moro was likewise described as having enjoyed a full life. After her eligibility was 
reconsidered Moro passed with medical assistance after the Lamb v. Canada court challenge, 
for which she was a plaintiff, was filed. The descriptions of her life emphasize the happiness she 
enjoyed before her illness interrupted a ‘normal’ life. A statement released by her husband 
Lenard Moro after her death through the BCCLA details moments from a happier time in their 
lives.  
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Prior to her diagnosis Robyn was an independent, active grandmother. She enjoyed 
spending time with her four grandchildren. She loved the outdoors, boating and 
camping. She and her husband would often host friends and family in their home.311 
Unlike the framing of Lamb’s case as living independently with disabling illness, this statement 
points to Moro’s illness as, in addition to other grievous symptoms, having stripped away her 
independence. In positioning the illness as having taken away her independence, Moro 
gestures to how obtaining the right to die with MAiD is also a way of reclaiming a measure of 
independence. Having been initially denied access to MAiD, Moro’s case illustrates the 
confusion that has surrounded the legislation. In many instances, physicians and other care 
workers have been uncertain about the legality of providing MAiD, resulting in long waiting 
times, or periods of uncertainty for those, like Moro, who were not immediately obvious 
acceptable candidates. 
 Jean Brault, although his case received a great deal less English language press coverage 
in the national media, was also positioned as having lived a fulfilling life. Like Moro, however, 
depictions of Brault’s life emphasized his illness as an interruption of a fulfilling life. Brault’s 
paralysis is the result of a brain illness at the age of 19. In a feature article published by the 
French language arm of CBC, Brault’s condition is understood as limiting his opportunities:  
In April 2016, Jean marked the 42nd anniversary of his disability. At the young age of 19, 
athletic and completely healthy, his fate befell him: a blood clot affected his cerebellum 
and brain stem, leaving him partially paralyzed and unable to speak. Doctors said he had 
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little chance of regaining the use of his limbs and voice, but he succeeded through his 
efforts and determination and was able to build an interesting life.312 
The young age at which Brault was affected by his illness, paired with the 42 years he has lived 
with disability are used to signify his prolonged suffering. At the same time, however, the 
statement underlines his having ‘made the best’ of the time he had. Brault’s life is represented 
as coming to an end, with his choice to die likewise interpreted as being a reasonable one, 
given his living conditions. Brault is the only person among the cases addressed here who is 
noted as having attempted suicide in the past. Describing his life as interesting seems to side 
step the more positive labels attached to the lives of Lamb and Moro. His disabling condition is 
marked as an unfortunate “detour” in what might otherwise have been happy, able-bodied life. 
 A collage of images of Brault’s youth313 featured in coverage of his story illustrates the 
slippery duality of reasoning with able-bodiedness. One image shows Brault as a toddler riding 
a bicycle. In others he is playing the guitar, posing on the beach with a boat, and next to a 
horse. The most striking is one of Brault as a young teen, posing with two friends, all three in 
swim trunks. Arms draped over the back of the chair, he is relaxed, perhaps at a backyard pool, 
or on a family vacation. Brault is immediately recognizable as the same man who is depicted in 
the present day. Both are looking out at the camera from a reclined position, but the tanned 
skin and muscles of the young man are in stark contrast to the older, paler man with grey hair, 
set upright in a reclining soft chair under a blanket. Brault lived well, the contrasting images 
seem to suggest, but there is no returning to his able-bodied past. The images are not unlike 
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those you might see in a funeral slideshow, in which the happier days are celebrated after 
someone has passed. Such representations have a palliative effect;314 they distract from the 
painful reality of facing death.  
 
Figure 3 Jean Brault Family Photos 
 Suzanne Nadeau-Whissell expressed her end of life experience as complete, signaling 
that her illness had not been a complete interruption of her life. Although she herself was not 
excluded by permissibility restrictions, in her work as a palliative care nurse herself, she had 
lobbied against the effort of palliative care facilities who were fighting for exclusion from 
providing MAiD. In a post on the blog she updated throughout her illness, Nadeau-Whissell 
called for continued attention to finding a cure for ALS, but also expressed that she had made 
peace with the life she had lived. 
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I want to thank the followers of my blog. You have given me wings! Above all, I hope I 
have educated people about ALS. The better it becomes known, the easier it will be for us 
to find a cure. I remain hopeful that Estrie’s citizens and media will participate in the 
Marche de la SLA [March Against ALS] each year! My mission on Earth is ended.315 
Giving testimony to her experiences advocating both for awareness and pursuit of a cure for 
ALS, and also in voicing her support of MAiD, Nadeau-Whissell’s blog served as a platform for 
expressing her experiences with illness and accepting death. She announced her decision in 
advance and had advocated for the practice of assisted dying throughout her illness. In Nadeau-
Whissell’s rendering, the figure of the ill body is mobilized to take action against ignorance 
about the realities of the disease. At the same time that she fought for awareness and change, 
however, the documenting of her decline and the progressive loss of her abilities are used as 
justification for MAiD. Illness and the debilitating effects of her disease are refigured as 
justification in rationalizing voluntary death.  
 The figure of the healthy, happy, able body looms large in the accounts of the lives of 
those positioning themselves as proximate to the MAiD issue. Although most of the testimonies 
given depict the subjects as having come to terms with the realities of their condition, their 
liveliness is always negotiated with reference to the activities and states of being that we 
understand as good and healthy. In the cases of Brault and Nadeau-Whissell, testimonies of 
their experience served as preemptive grieving rituals, marking a coming to terms with the 
immediacy of death, but also providing an opportunity for them to speak frankly and openly 
about their end-of-life experiences. Lobbying for MAiD effectively provided Brault and Nadeau-
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Whissell the opportunity to take part in their own memorialization. West describes the impulse 
to take an active role in narrating one’s own mediated end of life experiences as a way to 
“resist the default of social invisibility”316 that is associated with dying. Her study of 
documentary representations of the end of life demonstrates how offering greater visibility to 
the final stage of life works against the death taboo, a gesture that may “puncture” the 
fictitious neoliberal subjectivity that is exclusively autonomous and invulnerable.317 Nadeau-
Whissell’s blogging practice enacts this same impulse to make visible her experiences. In this 
sense, the impulse towards increasing the visibility of people in states of illness and decline 
works to dismantle the limiting frames of longevity and vitality that are the legacy of our 
medicalized gaze. 
At the same time that the testimonies of Lamb, Moro, Brault and Nadeau-Whissell seek 
to reclaim a measure of agency with the help of the right to MAiD, however, their reasoning 
necessarily takes place within the space of compulsory able-bodiedness. As disability scholar 
Carol Gill notes, the matter of right-to-die laws risks naturalizing the suffering of the disabled. 
She argues that disabled people face additional disadvantages when it comes to the question of 
euthanasia. Their suffering, while it may be primarily the results of institutional shortcomings, is 
naturalized when assessments about their wellbeing and prospects for the futures are laid out 
along ableist logics that assume disabled lives are not worth living. In the U.S. cases that Gill 
studied, the right to die is considered “dynamically different, more natural, or more reasonable 
for disabled people than for non-disabled people.”318 People articulating their need for and 
                                                 
316 West, “Invitation to Witness,” 1486. 
317 West, 1481. 
318 Gill, “Depression in the Context of Disability and the ‘Right to Die,’” 171. 
 150 
right to MAiD in Canada had to walk a fine line. In their pursuit of the right to a good death, the 
testimonies mobilized the imagery of a good and happy life. The healthy, bourgeois, able body 
figures heavily throughout these discourses. In order to frame death as reasonable, those 
fighting against the exclusionary clauses of the post-Bill C-14 legislation had to draw upon 
ableist markers of good living. In reality, such markers of fulfillment—a healthy active lifestyle, 
a close-knit family, outdoorsy recreation—were unevenly available to those making their case. 
In drawing attention to the fulfillment they enjoyed, these speakers sought to make a case for 
the “cultural acceptability”319 of their deaths. Within the same gesture, however, such framing 
risks naturalizing the suffering of disabled bodies in general. It could lead people to assume that 
everyone who lives with disability is unhappy and suffering. 
 
4.3.2 Denouncing Exclusion 
 In order to argue against the restrictive criteria, people fighting to expand MAiD 
eligibility explained who would be affected and detailed how they themselves were affected by 
the decisions. Grace Pastine of the BCCLA explained that many people were contacting their 
organization frustrated to learn that they were no longer eligible, although they believed 
themselves to be eligible after the Carter ruling.  
I think there are many Julia Lambs… people who are paralyzed from the neck down, 
individuals whose pain is extreme, chronic, unending, untreatable, who are suffering 
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greatly because their lives no longer have meaning, but they are simply not eligible under 
the government's new legislation…320 
Offering generalized descriptions of the conditions of those affected provides a sense of unity 
among the diverse group on individuals in question. Arguments denouncing exclusion tended to 
focus on the negative experiences and lived realities of the people in question, rather than 
naming illnesses or disabilities outright. To focus on the breadth of people affected, the court 
challenge to C-14 also pointed to young people, who might be suffering from debilitating 
illness, suggesting that the current legislation is a violation of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedom’s guarantee that “Every individual is equal before and under the law.”321  
This inequality is imposed on younger persons and/or persons who are materially 
physically disabled, which are both personal characteristics listed as enumerated grounds 
of discrimination under s. 15( 1 ).322 
Qualifying the law as being a violation of guaranteed rights draws attention away from the 
opposing view that restrictions would protect the vulnerable from abuse or coercion.  
Positioning the court challenge as unconstitutional suggests that the present law is the 
reason for the continued suffering of many people. “This law deliberately excludes a class of 
people: those who are suffering with no immediate end in sight,” argued Pastine, “How can we 
now turn away and ignore their pleas?” 323 “My option is to die by dehydration,” Moro said in a 
television interview, “It takes usually apparently about 12 days to die. And that’s all that people 
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like me have.”324 While much of the court challenge was grounded on the “reasonably 
foreseeable” clause, others, such as Dying with Dignity denounced the exclusion of those who 
could not give informed consent at the time of death because of their illness. 
Our supporters were heartbroken last year when they learned that the federal assisted 
dying law would unfairly restrict choice for individuals with dementia and other 
conditions that rob victims of their mental capacity.325 
The focus on the inclusion of people with mental illness was much more controversial than 
those with neuromuscular disorders like Lamb, Moro and Brault, since many feared that it 
would be impossible to get truly informed consent. Nevertheless, groups denouncing the 
restrictive criteria demanded greater consideration be given to anyone who might be excluded 
by the current laws.  
 Some pointed to the ways that legal ambiguity was causing great distress to those trying 
to access MAiD as the legal deliberation was taking place. For people like Moro, argued her 
husband, having life and death hanging in the balance of such legal minutiae was agonizing. 
Moro weighed against the exclusion (which was ultimately overturned), explaining how 
confusion about the permissibility criteria had upset his wife’s plans.  
It seems very wrong that someone could be denied an end to their terrible suffering 
because they were not going die. It seems just as wrong to be ineligible one day and then 
eligible the next based solely on an interpretation.326 
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Lobbying simultaneously for clearer rules than those laid out by C-14, and against the exclusion 
of those whose deaths are not imminent, Moro’s letter asks that greater consideration be 
afforded to those who are experiencing some of the worst periods of their lives. 
 Nadeau-Whissell utilized her position as a palliative care nurse to advocate for those 
excluded by the restrictions. Living in Quebec, where the Bill 52, “An Act Respecting End of Life 
Care” passed before C-14 made MAiD legal nationwide, Nadeau-Whissell’s access to MAiD 
would likely have been denied if C-14 had not been passed in time. Her final reflections 
expressed frustration on behalf of all those who suffered without an end in sight. 
I am an activist for justice and an end to discrimination against those nearing the end of 
life! We’re all going to die. We, the population, share a part of the responsibility to 
uphold our own rights. Therefore, we must express ourselves! As for people who suffer 
from diseases other than cancer, they have been forgotten in our society and need 
adequate palliative care! Do we not all have the right to die without discrimination, in 
dignity, and according to our own will?327 
Making her decision to access MAiD public served as a political tool for Nadeau-Whissell, who 
used her blog as a platform for making public the private suffering of those excluded from 
access. Drawing from her work as a palliative care nurse, a role for which she bore witness to 
many different end of life scenarios, she speaks against the forgetting and exclusion of those 
living their final moments, suggesting that both frank discussions about the end of life, and the 
possibility of requesting MAiD can improve conditions for those affected.  
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 McRuer argues that disability and able-bodiedness are mutually constitutive, that one 
cannot exist without the other. Representations of these two categories serve to reinforce the 
boundary between them. In examining the “…institutional sites where compulsory able-
bodiedness and heterosexuality are produced and secured and where queerness and disability 
are (partially and inadequately) contained”328 crip theory moves to challenge the preservation 
of such boundaries that takes place in the institutions of the law and domestic life.  The figure 
of the crippled, ill body disrupts hegemonic narratives of ability. The “cult of ability (centered 
on discipline and domesticity),”329 is challenged by queer and disabled identities that interrupt 
presumed identities that take shape in the spaces of domestic life.  
 People denouncing their exclusion from MAiD have lived with a variety of conditions. 
There is no doubt some danger in trying to lump together disabled people with those who have 
lived most of their lives as able-bodied people, only to develop debilitating illness in old age. 
Furthermore, crip and disability theorists and activists have worked hard to separate the 
representation of people with disabilities with the association of death and decline.330 The fact 
that it has been primarily disabled people who were excluded from accessing MAiD, however, 
makes clear that ableism is part of the issue and that exclusion is deeply troubling for some of 
those who are affected by the restrictive clauses. Particularly for those who have lived with 
disabling conditions for most of their lives, the exclusion from the new permissive system only 
adds to a long list of privileges and activities from which they have been excluded.  
                                                 
328 McRuer, Crip Theory, 3. 
329 McRuer, 3. 
330 Kafer, Feminist, Queer, Crip; Linton, Claiming Disability. 
 155 
 Exclusion, as disability scholars explain, is not accidental. As Rosemarie Garland-
Thompson explains, pathologizing disabled bodies serves to reinforce the “social power and 
status” of the unmarked, “neutral space of normalcy.”331 In the case of eligibility for MAiD, this 
neutral space of normalcy is articulated in the discourses of good living that are attached to 
able-bodied living and the fulfillment of social expectations that are associated with ‘normal’ 
bodies. In the sense that “homosexuality and disability clearly share a pathologized past,” 
explains McRuer, the two categories have served to reinforce the idealized (heterosexual and 
able-bodied) subject; a figure that serves as “a nonidentity, as the natural order of things.”332 
Following Garland-Thompson and McRuer, I would argue that the exclusionary clauses 
associated with MAiD in Canada function to legitimate the autonomous healthy individual as 
the ideological centre. 
 Further complicating the matter of access to MAiD, is the problem of vulnerability. The 
exclusionary clauses have been widely regarded as a necessary protectionary measure, 
including people within networks of disability scholarship and activism.333 Concern for 
vulnerable older and disabled people was a motivation for those who fought against the 
institution of a permissive system for years before the Carter decision. Yet as the statements 
detailed above illustrate, excluding some people because their situations do not fit with 
proscribed criteria may also serve to reinforce limiting determinations about embodied ideals. 
As Garland-Thomson notes, 
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Constructed as the embodiment of corporeal insufficiency and deviance, the physically 
disabled body becomes a repository for social anxieties about such troubling concerns as 
vulnerability, control, and identity.334 
For those denouncing their exclusion from access to MAiD, the law as it stands in Bill C-14 does 
not represent protection from abuse, or a shield from vulnerability, but rather an obstacle that 
prolongs suffering. In this sense, people denouncing exclusionary MAiD criteria are also 
effectively suggesting that there may be other better ways to protect vulnerable, or suffering 
individuals nearing the end of their lives, besides restricting their access to MAiD. 
 
4.3.3 Asserting Self-Determination 
 The framing of the Lamb V. Canada case was centered on asserting the right to die as a 
right like any of the others guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In 
aligning this claim to rights with the claims made by plaintiff Gloria Taylor in the Carter case, 
Lamb and the BCCLA position Bill C-14 as stripping Lamb and others of a right afforded to other 
Canadians. Much of the language of the Lamb court challenge is reminiscent of the language of 
self-determination that was the focus of pro-MAiD discourse during the lobbying for and 
subsequent transition to a permissive system. 
The right to liberty is engaged and infringed by state interference with the right of the 
individual to a protected sphere of autonomy over decisions of fundamental personal 
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importance. The choice to live or die, and to control the when and how of one’s death, 
are decisions of profound and fundamental personal importance.335 
In arguing that the right is one that defines personhood, the wording of the case points to the 
potential for the restrictive clause to devalue the rights of people like Lamb and others in 
parallel situations. In Lamb’s own press conference, the wording was even stronger: 
This is about agency, choice, and compassion. This is about the most fundamental values 
that define being Canadian. Respecting each other’s choices, even when those choices are 
different from one another.336 
Unlike the Carter ruling, which did make reference to the establishment of women’s 
reproductive rights in the country, the Lamb case does not directly draw on this marker of 
bodily autonomy. And yet Lamb’s phrasing directly parallels the wording of prochoice advocacy 
that has been associated with the legalization of abortion. “It's a deeply personal decision and it 
should be mine to make.”337 In claiming the decision as her own, Lamb effectively asks that her 
audience consider the alternative to granting her the right to die. Lamb links the restrictions of 
C-14 with the prospect of prolonged suffering to lay her claim to the right to choose.    
 Nadeau-Whissell used her final farewell blog post to underscore her argument for the 
individual’s right to choose to die. She works to distance her decision from appearing as an act 
of desperation.  
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I wasn’t depressed, I was just being realistic. I was weighing the pros and cons. I was living 
in my own truth. No one can understand what someone else is going through… As long as 
we’re not all, without exception, guaranteed the right to death in dignity where and when 
we desire it, then there will still be work to do. I hope at least I’ve made people stop to 
think. I would even like to think that I’ve made a small difference in some people’s lives. I 
am passing the torch now to all of you, whose turn it will be, one day, to face death.338 
In emphasizing how important the right to choose the “when” and “how” of her death, Nadeau-
Whisell makes the claim for MAiD as a decision one may come to as the result of reasonable 
reflection. Such a claim works to highlight MAiD as a desirable feature of civil society. Finally, in 
her reminder to her readers that they too will undoubtedly face such a difficult decision one 
day, Nadeau-Whissell echoes one of the claims common across disability scholarship, that we 
must recognize “illness and disability as part of what makes us human.”339 The pictures that 
accompany her messages to readers on the blog further make Nadeau-Whisell’s case. She 
poses laying on a reclining chair, surrounded her large family, who are all dressed up in 
matching Christmas pajamas. Her posts emphasize the possibilities for closure that MAiD has 
provided her. Using her blog to express her gratitude to family and caregivers, and to those 
who helped her make her case for the acceptance of MAiD serve to demonstrate her belief that 
having MAiD as an option allows someone to die in the best way possible, with intentionality 
and in the presence of friends and family. Such a claim to the generalizability of MAiD as a 
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potentially positive social force attempts to move beyond its association with suffering and 
centers its potential to improve the conditions of dying for all Canadians. 
 
4.4 Medicalization and Curative Time 
Queer feminist disability theorist Alison Kafer identifies a paradox in the futures imagined 
for disabled people. In recounting her own experiences in recovery from a disabling accident, 
Kafer delineates between two contradicting “imagined futures” that could be attached to her 
experience. In the first, disability is cast as a “pitiable misfortune, a tragedy that effectively 
prevents one from leading a good life,” while in the second, a critical approach to disability in 
society points to “ableism—not disability—as the obstacle to a good life.”340 In unpacking this 
dichotomy, Kafer illustrates how the hegemony of medical reason shapes how we look at illness 
and disability. Labelling this a “curative imaginary,” Kafer argues that fixation on curing and 
eliminating disability attempts to erase and undermine the lived experiences of people living 
with disabilities, who are cast into a “liminal temporality” as a result.341 
I am concerned here with compulsory able-bodiedness/able-mindedness, not with 
individual sick and disabled people’s relationships to particular medical interventions; a 
desire for a cure is not necessarily an anti-crip or anti-disability rights and justice position. 
I am speaking here about a curative imaginary, an understanding of disability that not 
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only expects and assumes intervention but also cannot imagine or comprehend anything 
other than intervention.342 
Curative reason suggests that the only good future is one in which illness and disability are 
eradicated. Since not all bodies can (or want to) be “cured” of what ails them, what is to be 
made of the futurity of disability in the era of medicalization?  
In exploring disability’s relationship with futurity and desire, Kafer draws parallels 
between crip politics and Edelman and Halberstam’s theories of queer futures and 
temporalities.343 She argues that ‘crip time’ both mirrors and exceeds queer time. Crip bodies 
are often read in the same ways as queer bodies. They are seen as undesirable, or as posing a 
threat to heteronormative reproductive futures, by disrupting the centrality of the figure of the 
child to the future. Unlike queer theorizations of time that problematize the predominant 
fixation with longevity as “health” and “stability,”344 Kafer’s understanding of crip time 
embraces the importance of longevity since disabled people are too often erased from 
idealized futures. “I, we, need to imagine crip futures because disabled people are continually 
being written out of the future, rendered as the sign of the future no one wants.”345 A 
configuration of temporality that acknowledges crip bodies both interrupts the notion that 
disability is always and only a ‘pitiable misfortune’ and also poses a threat to the teleology of 
curative time. While some medical care is of course necessary, as the statements below 
illustrate, it is also important to prioritize individual experience, particularly at the end of life.  
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4.4.1 Articulating Frustration with the “Reasonably Foreseeable” Rule 
 On June 17th, when Bill C-14 was assented, the most controversial section was the 
language that identified what constitutes a “grievous and irremediable medical condition.” The 
Canadian Medical Association offered further clarification: “What constitutes enduring and 
intolerable suffering; it is a matter of the patient’s subjective interpretation.”346 The definition 
of “reasonably foreseeable,” however, is more elusive. According to the Bill, candidates must 
meet all of four criteria to be considered eligible. In this section, I focus on the most 
controversial of the four as a means of unpacking what it signifies about curative reason in the 
context of MAiD. The criterion that precipitated immediate legal upheaval states that someone 
has a grievous and irremediable medical condition if:  
(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their 
medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the 
specific length of time that they have remaining.347 
For those arguing for the expansion of the criteria to include people like Lamb and Moro, 
“reasonably foreseeable” was seen as a roadblock because their conditions were such that 
interminable suffering would come much sooner than would any signs of the immanency of 
death. For others, the phrasing was plainly illogical. After all, argued some, is death not to some 
extent reasonably foreseeable for everyone? On the other hand, from a clinical perspective, 
predicting death is not particularly straightforward and the phrasing of the law created upset 
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among doctors. In 2017, Quebec, whose own provincially mandated permissive MAiD 
legislation was superseded by Bill C-14, the health minister reported that pressure from 
professional orders convinced him to press the federal government for clarification. “That part 
of the law creates problems because you can’t define what is a reasonably foreseeable death… 
it is unworkable, inapplicable, too fuzzy.”348 Clinical practice requires careful detail and logical 
prediction, but foreseeing death seemed to be beyond the purview of even those providers 
who wanted to participate in MAiD. 
 One of the more troubling results linked to the phrasing of the law was Jean Brault’s 
hunger strike. Brault went 53 days without food and 8 without water, both in protest of his 
exclusion from the eligibility criteria, and in order to force a decline in his condition that would 
render him eligible. Speaking to media after his strike proved successful, Brault called the 
existing laws inhumane. He argued that it was incomprehensible to “force people almost to the 
point of self-mutilation so they can benefit from a law that is poorly thought out and non-
inclusive, a law that basically excludes those who have the biggest stake in its use.”349 Not being 
attached to high profile legal cases, Brault’s case remains relatively unknown outside of 
Quebec. In publicly denouncing his exclusion from MAiD, Brault’s words underscore the 
impossibility of perfectly ‘containing’ end of life experiences into tidy categories. The 
descriptions of his life underline a long slow decline, at the end of which a reprieve was briefly 
offered, then taken away again when he was denied.    
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 It is impossible to detail the end-of-life experiences of those denied access to MAiD 
without constantly making reference to the complex and ever-changing legal timeline that 
shaped their realities. For example, many people requested MAiD after Carter, but before C-14 
by filing for legal exemptions from the ban on assisted dying. In these cases, as in the Carter 
ruling, no reference to the reasonable foreseeability of death had to be made.350 In this sense, 
the BCCLA case argued, the federal legislation took away the rights to death with dignity that 
the Supreme Court had mandated in Carter. Their fates were doubly bound up in the conflicting 
determinations of medicine and the law.  
 Many of the individuals opposing restrictions on MAiD face degenerative diagnoses for 
which the only guarantee is a gradual decline in condition. Although ALS, SMA, Parkinson’s and 
other neuromuscular degenerative disorders vary in symptoms and prognosis, most people 
living with these disorders will lose one capacity after another. In many of the plaintiff’s 
testimonies and media statements, attention to the likelihood of a declining quality of life 
served a central role in arguing for more flexible access to MAiD. As Kafer, drawing on Jain and 
Puar, details, a prognosis for ill or disabled people does more than introduce sickness into 
someone’s life; it can upset their lived experience of chronology altogether. “Living in 
‘prognosis time’ is thus a liminal temporality, a casting out of time; rather than a stable, steady 
progression through the stages of life, time is arrested, stopped.”351 For those experiencing 
debilitating illness, the foreseeability of the future plays a bigger role than it does for a doctor. 
A stark prognosis, or one that involves continuous decline represents a greater urgency of the 
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present, while the future seems to shrink, explains Kafer, recounting the experiences of poet 
and disability activist with muscular dystrophy Laura Hershey. “Futurity itself becomes tenuous, 
precarious.”352  
  Lamb’s court challenge takes aim at the unreasonableness of the “reasonably 
foreseeable” criteria, arguing that numerous jurisdictions now allow MAiD for people “for 
whom a natural death is not reasonably foreseeable or who are not in an advanced state of 
irreversible decline.”353 But beyond challenging the clause on the basis of legal precedent, as 
the court challenge does, Lamb’s own recasting of the experience of the foreseeable is more 
arresting: 
I feel a shadow looming over me. I know I can lose the ability to breathe well enough on 
my own and require a ventilator which will affect my ability to speak. I can lose the 
remaining function in my hands and arms which would lead to the inability to use my 
computer, write and use my phone. If I reach a point where I require constant care I will 
lose my independence and freedom. I am terrified by the idea I can become trapped in a 
state of physical and mental suffering that goes on for months, years or even decades. 
Having to think about the future causes me immense stress.354  
Rather than having access to a means of bypassing the most intolerable of the final moments of 
life, as “persons of requisite physical ability”355 have been granted, Lamb argues that she is 
instead trapped in the prognosis time that Kafer details, in which the present and future are 
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collapsed into a distressing liminal state of chronology. By arguing that MAiD represents a 
reprieve from the daunting future of her reality, Lamb may also be making a case for effectively 
lessening the grip that prognosis time has over her present day reality.   
 
4.4.2 Addressing Suffering and the Loss of Ability to Communicate 
Detailed descriptions of the suffering that patients have experienced and anticipate 
experiencing are a central feature of arguments in favour of expanding eligibility criteria. In 
particular, while many listed descriptions of their present situation, an even greater emphasis 
was placed on the anguish caused by foreseeing a steady decline in the patient’s condition. In 
this sense, it is the future suffering that this discourse holds to the light. Arguing that this 
anticipation exacerbated their struggles, plaintiffs and advocates sought to show how granting 
the right to MAiD would improve the end of life experiences of those excluded by the 
restrictions of C-14. With the understanding that most disabled and ill people face a biopolitical 
devaluation of their lives and futures under the hegemony of an ableist society, how should we 
understand Lamb’s demands? Does the demand for the right to curtail future suffering using 
MAiD threaten vulnerable disabled people when, as Kafer argues, “disabled people are 
continually being written out of the future” to begin with? In this section I explore the 
relationship between anticipated suffering and the ongoing lived experiences of people with 
illnesses and disabilities.  
Arguments about expanding MAiD paradoxically point to medicine as both the 
perpetrator of extending suffering and the relief of it. Karsoho et al.’s study of MAiD’s legal and 
expert discourse during the Carter case found that “proponents see curative medicine as 
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complicit in the production of suffering at the end of life.”356 In the language used by those 
discussing suffering during medicalized end-of-life care, the medicalization of dying, and more 
specifically curative efforts are seen as the cause of extended suffering. In some cases, this 
suffering is the result of extended interventions that aim to prolong life, while in others even 
palliative care aimed at improving the quality of dying without intervention, such as pain 
medication and antidepressants, were perceived as causing increased suffering for patients at 
the end of their lives.   
When Quebec requested clarification of the C-14 criteria, health minister Gaétan 
Barrette called suffering the “common denominator”357 in all of the problems surrounding the 
laws. The BCCLA pointed out that waiting out the slow process of legal change has proved 
impossible for some experiencing unbearable suffering.  
We do not want sick and suffering Canadians to have to endure another incredibly long 
wait. We know from Carter that some people simply won't be able to wait. Some will die 
in agony. Some will be forced to live in agony. And so we're asking the government to not 
put any delays in the way.358 
The narrative of the Lamb court challenge relies heavily on positioning the denial of MAiD as 
perpetrating tormenting conditions for patients. Having been denied MAiD initially, they 
argued, Moro “suffered unbearably throughout the summer”359 until her condition was 
reassessed and she was granted MAiD. Lamb’s testimony explains how with each new symptom 
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that results from her deteriorating condition, such as the “excruciating headaches”360 that she 
experiences as a result of breathing problems throughout the night, her living conditions 
become less bearable. 
 In some cases, emphasizing the small daily pleasures that Lamb still enjoys enabled her 
to express frustration in trying to imagine life without them. “Julia may lose the use of her 
hands,” the court challenge details, “She fears losing the ability to drive her wheelchair and 
write and type because she loves to express herself through writing. She also loves to use 
illustration and drawing programs on her computer.”361 Talking about her communication 
habits, and the importance of her daily routines enables Lamb to frame her experience outside 
the curative frames of medical reason. 
I know that potentially, given the nature of my disease, it is progressive, so there may 
come a time where I could be grievously ill and suffering. Things like not being able to 
breathe properly and communicate, not being able to write, not being able to use my 
hands.362 
Lamb’s claim is for her right to having a future on her own terms, even if that future includes 
accepting death. This is a radical claim because it also demands that she be granted more self-
determination through enacting her right to a life without fear of future suffering now. Kafer’s 
approach demonstrates the inextricability of disabled, crip futures and presents. In offering “a 
politics of crip futurity, an insistence on thinking these imagined futures—and hence, these 
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lived presents—differently”363 she insists on modes of futurity that improve the lives of 
disabled people today.  Given Lamb and Moro’s explicit claims that MAiD represents not only 
the elimination of future suffering but would (or could have) also improve the conditions of 
their present lives, we should consider the possibility that MAiD may signify for some not a 
threat to vulnerable or disabled people, but, so long as it does not enact an erasure of disability, 
may also be a means of empowering those whose present conditions are shaped by the 
anticipation of irreversible decline.  
 
4.4.3 Expressing Relief 
Nadeau-Whissell and Brault, who did ultimately die with medical assistance, expressed 
relief at having had the right to go out on their own terms. Brault and Nadeau-Whissell’s final 
statements underscore their belief that MAiD enables a ‘good death’ by both alleviating 
suffering and enabling rituals of closure, such as saying goodbye to family and friends.    
Brault was uniquely positioned to express his final sentiments about the process in that 
he gave a television interview two days before his MAiD procedure was scheduled. Brault’s 
MAiD experience took place after Carter and Quebec’s Bill n°52, An Act respecting end-of-life 
care, so his initial denial of access to the procedure was on the basis of the provincial law, as 
the federal legislation had not yet passed. Even without the criteria of a “reasonably 
foreseeable” death, Brault was likely denied on the basis of not suffering from an advanced 
state of irreversible decline in capability, one of the Quebec law’s eligibility criteria.364 In the 
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interview, Brault expresses that, even having been denied MAiD initially, he is relieved to go out 
on his own terms. In the final question, the interviewer asks Brault how he feels, now that his 
request has been granted. His voice cracks, perhaps from emotion or the strain of speaking, as 
he explains his relief. 
I feel happy, I feel relaxed, I feel like it’s the first time since very, very long ago that 
anyone’s heard what I was saying […] It’s like a total, absolute liberation.365 
Expressing MAiD as lifting a weight from his conscience, Brault gives the impression that his 
final 48 hours may be the happiest he has experienced in years. In the final moments of the 
clip, Brault is shown surrounded by his family, looking at old family photos, and presumably 
saying goodbye. Such depictions of MAiD as providing an opportunity to approach death 
without fear, and to provide certainty enough to enable family rituals of closure emphasize how 
MAiD is understood as providing for a ‘good’ death.   
 Similar to Brault, Nadeau-Whissell also expresses the relief MAiD provides by knowing 
her death was coming. She describes a range of emotions but explains that it is ultimately a 
lifting of emotional weight. “There’s something surreal about knowing in advance the day and 
time of one’s own death! It’s fucked up, even! But what a deliverance, what a relief!”366 In 
underscoring the emotions of relief and resolution, Nadeau-Whissell distances the MAiD 
experience from associations with trauma and desperation. Although MAiD occurs within the 
frame of medicine, such discourses of relief and closure interrupt the logics of medicine. With 
regard to ill, and particularly disabled bodies, argues Kafer, the medical model “frames atypical 
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bodies and minds as deviant, pathological, and defective.”367 In demonstrating that MAiD offers 
a relief that no conventional medical treatment can, Brault and Whissell insist that it was rather 
curative medicine’s prolongation of suffering, rather than illness itself that have constrained 
their lives. Such a move points to the social and cultural processes that surround death and 
dying as the reason for trauma and suffering, rather than the lived experience of illness located 
at the level of the individual. At the same time that this gesture reflects on the communal 
aspect of dying, it also prioritizes individual experience, allowing Brault and Nadeau-Whissell to 
narrate their final days in ways that break with the prognostic language of medicine. In so 
doing, this discourse bends the temporal conventions of curative reason. It cuts short the time 
afforded to treatment and cure, while extending the time available for dying a good death.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Those seeking to express discontent with restrictive criteria in the MAiD criteria were 
faced with the challenge of articulating their concerns from vastly different circumstances. All 
of the arguments made took place within a frame of medicalization and compulsory able-
bodiedness. As a result, people justifying the lifting of restrictions made sense of their 
situations using language that signals these frames. Those who wanted to express that their 
lives had been fully lived used ableist language to detail experiences and activities that affirmed 
having lived a good life. In denouncing their exclusion from the existing legislation, they pointed 
to unfair criteria restricting their right to make a final decision how to die. Finally, they asserted 
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their right to self-determination much in the way that others who pushed for the institution of 
a permissive system in the first place did.  
Since assistance in dying occurs within the realm of medicine, and is still subject to all of 
the prognostic reasoning that accompanies medical care, people seeking the expansion of 
permissibility criteria strive to undermine the grip of curative time over their lives and futures. 
They argued against the logic of the “reasonably foreseeable clause,” suggesting that it cannot 
align with the realities of many people nearing the end of life. They detailed the suffering they 
have experienced, regardless of medicine’s best efforts. They articulated the conditions beyond 
the direct symptoms of their illnesses that were making their lives unlivable, in a register that 
occurs outside the curative frames of medical reason. Finally, for those who did ultimately die 
with assistance, they expressed relief at having had the right to die on their own terms.  
The statements from Lamb, Moro, Brault and Nadeau-Whissell suggest that for some ill 
and disabled people, MAiD represents the same dignity-as-autonomy that it does for other 
proponents. Unlike the majority of people who seek access to MAiD, however, those living with 
the debilitating effects of illness or disability without the immanence of death fall outside of the 
more familiar linearity of a life’s trajectory. Curative imaginings of life under medicalization 
obscure all possibilities besides intervention, treatment and cure. Even as the shifting tides of 
Canada’s permissive system are moving towards articulating a limit to the totality of curative 
medicine’s authority, accounts of disabled experiences during this period of time suggest that 
because the discourse took place in the space of compulsory able-bodiedness, at times pro-
MAiD advocates reinforced ableist standards of quality of life.  
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The figure of the rational, able-bodied, autonomous liberal subject on which Canada’s 
biopolitical order is built is tenuous and unstable. We might say, as McRuer says of able-bodied 
heterosexuality’s hegemony, that this subjectivity is “always in danger of collapse.”368 The 
continuation of this figure is dependent on the identification of the disabled other, who serves 
to represent the inverse of the latter. The continued primacy of medicalization likewise 
depends on the figure of disability. In signifying the incurable, disability threatens the reach of 
medicine’s power. Under the hegemony of curative medicine’s reach into all stages of life, all 
bodies are viewed as sites for continued improvement and intervention. The double bind of 
compulsory able-bodiedness is such that even while most able-bodied people move through life 
without being called upon to ‘foresee’ their futures, illness and disability engender an urgency 
to predict trajectories of living and dying, forcing an impossible balance between their 
experience of the present, and a futurity bound to the ideals of curative medicine.  
In the context of MAiD debates, disability comes to signify the outer limit of life worth 
living. As Canada’s transition to a permissive system demonstrates, access to MAiD is 
increasingly viewed as a right inherent to liberal subjectivity. In serving as an additional barrier 
to this right, the present legal system reinforces the view that people with impairments and 
disabilities lack a capacity for autonomous self-determination that others possess. Such a 
distinction serves to make the category of the rational, able-bodied, self-determining liberal 
subject possible in the first place. This positioning of disability further illustrates how, as 
Garland-Thompson argues, disability is constructed as a “repository” for social anxieties about 
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“vulnerability, control and identity.”369 The result is that, in addition to dealing with the 
challenges of living in a society ill-adapted to their needs, disabled people are held accountable 
for fending off a whole host of broader social fears.  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Key Findings 
In the introductory chapter, I provide an overview of scholarly conversations relevant to 
examining the end of life from the perspective of critical discourses of health and wellness, and 
with regard to Canada’s unique social landscape. Specifically, I provide basic background detail 
on how its settler colonial past shapes the social imaginary, and the concept of universal care. I 
situate the Canadian context within Western ideals of health and wellness and examine how 
this sets the stage for the regimes of “good living” that shape our understandings of health. I 
provide an overview of the research design of the project, detail for the research procedures 
for each chapter, and a rationale for the choice of critical discourse analysis as research 
method. Finally, I provide a conceptual overview of the dissertation as a whole.  
 Chapter two, the first analytical chapter, considers how the shift toward greater 
autonomy from medicine at the end of life took place in Canadian public discourse. Examining 
this sampling of data provided a broad snapshot of the state of public discourse on assisted 
dying in the months immediately prior to and following the Carter Supreme Court decision and 
the legislation that followed. I demonstrate how, even at the time of passing Bill C-14, the 
public was divided on the moral permissiveness of the issue. I analyzed these texts with the aim 
of isolating and examining assumptions about autonomy within the frame of medicine. I drew 
from existing critical studies of the social construction of death to interpret the significance to 
shared conceptions of autonomy in Canada. This chapter’s most significant contribution is a 
clearer understanding how the politics of dying are changing. Although notable exclusions from 
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the law illustrate how discourses surrounding death still problematically favor self-
determination over dependence, a transition in which death is viewed as something other than 
failure should be considered a positive one. My key takeaway from this stage of the research 
was that it demonstrated how, despite its focus on death, the question of MAiD is ultimately a 
concern about life and living.  
 Chapter three considers the relationship between the medicalization of death and 
barbiturates, the drugs used in medically assisted deaths and in capital punishment. Since these 
two very different forms of death are facilitated by barbiturates, I examined the links between 
them in an attempt to better understand how MAiD figures in the broader context of the 
medicalization of death. I drew on the work of Puar to argue that barbiturates follow the 
biopolitical metrics of capacitation and debilitation; they facilitate capacitation for some as a 
liberal rationale, while enacting in the same vector the deliberate debilitation of others. By 
treating drugs as an entryway into examining the biopolitical construction of a “good death,” 
this chapter examines how the means for inducing death are linked to their history for treating 
anxiety and sleeplessness. A good death, this historical connection suggests, is one without 
fear. While the drugs do work to calm the patients themselves, their popularity both in punitive 
and medical applications is also linked to those who must bear witness to someone’s final 
moments, to give the appearance that the process is a peaceful and painless one. 
 Chapter four scrutinizes the rhetorical strategies used to justify the expansion of MAiD 
eligibility criteria in Canada. During the process of collecting coverage of this facet of the 
debate, four individuals, Julia Lamb, Robyn Moro, Jean Brault, and Suzanne Nadeau-Whissell, 
who were directly affected by the legislation, served as representative cases. In order to further 
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examine their experiences, and amplify their opinions in my study, I refocused data collected to 
media texts by and about these four people. I analysed each case in the context of critical 
disability theories of medicalization, with the aim of better understanding how these efforts to 
renegotiate MAiD access fit within broader debates about the medicalization of disability. This 
chapter directly engages the dispute that MAiD proponents have with curative medicine, 
detailing how individuals claim that their lives are made worse by efforts to cure at any cost, 
particularly in the final stages of life. The eligibility restrictions seem to have the primary effect 
of reassuring the living that no harm will be done, rather than of ensuring fairness for those 
who are dying. Likewise, the social history of barbiturates suggests that the drugs used to 
induce death are central to calming the anxieties of those who must bear witness. In this sense, 
the eligibility restrictions and the drugs share the focus on those the dying leave behind, 
sometimes at the expense of people at the end of their lives.  
 
5.2 Discussion 
 Across these chapters, there emerged multiple, sometimes conflicting accounts of the 
social function of MAiD. Encountering such conflict or dissension is typical for critical health 
communication scholars, who “consider struggle, conflict and tensions to be the natural state” 
of discourse.370 This approach seeks to go beyond description of discourse, towards an “ethical 
position with regards to the implications of that communicative activity.” 371 In this sense, the 
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tensions between different accounts of MAiD serve as a robust foundation for considering its 
implications. In this section, I present these implications as they relate to all chapters. 
Specifically, three themes emerged: the relationship between death and identity, the biopolitics 
of permission, and the interrelated history of drugs and anxiety. These discussions are intended 
to offer new ways of thinking about the investments that the state has in individual health.372 In 
the process of teasing out these investments, my analysis exposes connections across multiple 
discursive arenas—chiefly legal, pharmaceutical, and medical—which make up the changes 
taking place in end of life rituals in Canada. These are relevant to the growing number of 
jurisdictions worldwide debating legislation of their own (currently including at least 20 U.S. 
states, as well as Australia, Lithuania, and Portugal). At the same time, it also extends the scope 
of critical health communication studies, which more often scrutinize regimes of health and 
longevity, into examining the care disparities that shape the end of life.  
 
5.2.1 Death and Identity  
 The debate about MAiD became a matter of national identity. A major underlying 
question for opponents and proponents alike was “Is this practice acceptable to Canadians?”, 
“Can this happen in Canada?” As such, as the contextual history of bodies under universal care 
illustrates, the question of health is bound up in larger concerns about the legacy of the 
national body. With MAiD now a legal and viable option, one at least 4000 people have chosen 
since 2015, hastening death is now a choice available to those who meet the criteria. On one 
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level, the transition to a permissive system suggests that choosing MAiD may become just an 
addition to the range of choices that make up the rituals of individualist health and wellness. To 
the extent that this choice departs from the view of death as failure, it should be viewed as 
positive. Opting for a healthy, timely death might become another designation under neoliberal 
subject formation, not unlike those between productivity, deviancy, illness that have also 
undergone changes in the transition between waged labor and hypercapitalist surplus 
accumulation.373 On another level, however, if MAiD represents an option to some, mostly 
white, bodies, then like all other ‘healthy choices’ it is overdetermined by the colonial logics 
that already naturalize pain, suffering and injury of impoverished and racialized others. If 
choosing the timing and conditions of one’s approaching death grows in popularity, it will be 
critical to continue to expose the taken-for-granted ways that healthcare options operate as 
vector of the systematic construction and maintenance of inequalities,374 that are linked to 
culture and social institutions. 
 
 
5.2.2 Biopolitics of Permission 
As the discussion of autonomy in dying discourse demonstrates, the permission to 
access MAiD has been established through a particular set of rhetorical gestures. These 
gestures might be understood as a reworking of the conventional ‘make live’ ‘let die’ division 
that Foucault identified in contemporary biopolitics. Each of the plaintiffs in the court cases that 
have set precedent for the legalization of MAiD have had to demonstrate that they have 
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sufficient autonomy to merit access to the procedure. The fact of legalization however, and 
much of the discourse surrounding legal deliberation and government legislation, obscures the 
reality that many people find ways to die with assistance whether or not it is legal. In this sense, 
MAiD resembles the fight for reproductive rights. Sue Rodriguez, the first plaintiff seeking 
assisted suicide in the 1990s died with assistance in secret despite losing her Supreme Court 
case. Though only a few doctors, such as Dr. Ellen Wiebe in Vancouver, spoke publicly about 
willingness to participate in MAiD before legalization, many participated in some form of MAiD 
in the years before Bill C-14 passed. The difference between those deaths and the kinds of 
deaths with MAiD that will occur now is one of permission. Permission played a key role across 
each of the arenas of MAiD examined throughout the dissertation.  
Each of the four modes of discourse detailed (moral rejection, medical-rationalist, 
medical-revivalist, and autonomy in dying) articulated the permission to die differently. For 
moral rejection discourse, authorization is not something a person can request or be granted. 
For medical-rationalists, permission to die lies beyond the scope of doctors, whose authority 
only encompasses the power to cure. Medical-revivalists, who share a commitment to revising 
the limits of medical convention, seek to incorporate the possibility of granting permission to 
die into practice. Autonomy in dying discourse goes beyond permission, fixing on the inherent 
right of individuals to consent to their own deaths voluntarily. These four distinct views of 
permission, however, do not tell the whole story. The afterlife of colonialism deeply influences 
the manner in which autonomy and consent are granted; it naturalizes the autonomy of those 
white, able-bodied individuals who have historically epitomized the healthy body.  
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Beyond the political and subjective expression of permission and autonomy in discourse, 
the pharmaceutical dimension of this study also exposes a gulf of permission. Though conceived 
as a treatment to common complaints of anxiety, sleeplessness, and stress—symptoms that 
are, of course, present across class and demographic boundaries—barbiturates’ therapeutic 
and recreational use illustrate how the permission to take the edge off is unevenly granted, 
favoring those privileged enough to gain access through legal avenues. In this sense, the history 
of barbiturates is a precursor to the contemporary phenomenon of granting privileged 
populations access to marijuana to treat anxiety and PTSD, while mass incarcerating others who 
do the same. In both cases, the permission and autonomy to take health into one’s own hands 
is treated as a right of the privileged few.   
In chapter 4, permission is a direct issue of access. Exploring the challenges faced by 
those who have been excluded from the new permissive MAiD system exposes how the effort 
to protect ‘vulnerable’ people from harm paradoxically strips them of the agency and self-
determination newly granted to others. This chapter exposes the temporal dimensions of 
disability, where permission operates within a double bind. Not only do people with disabilities 
face social barriers to living as they choose, but, as the four cases analyzed illustrate, those 
seeking greater control over their end-of-life scenarios also face disproportionate barriers. This 
stage of the research in particular served as a reminder that those who are most often subject 
to the regimes of medicine are probably the most qualified to critique it. This analysis reaffirms 
that the field of disability studies is uniquely qualified to contribute to social studies of medicine 
and the institutions and practices under which all of us must live.375 Finally, it suggests that 
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there is further work to be done in centering disability expertise in discussions of medicalization 
at all stages of life. 
 
5.2.3 Drugs, Anxiety and Suffering 
Another common theme throughout the project is the tension between physical and 
psychological suffering. What distinguishes proponents of MAiD from other positions is the 
centrality of the trope of suffering, and, more specifically, that curative medicine is “complicit in 
the production of suffering at the end of life.”376 In the discourses of autonomy, the avoidance 
of suffering is central to the pursuit of legal MAiD, and yet in the course of lobbying for access 
to the procedure, subjects had to perform a particular kind of happiness. As the testimonies of 
Gloria Taylor, Julia Lamb, Robyn Moro, Jean Brault and others demonstrate, the question of a 
timely death is inextricable from the performance of a particular mode of living that aligns with 
the ideals of health and fulfilment. That the path to being granted access to a painless, timely 
death is through the rituals of healthy independent living might seem innocuous if it were not 
for the fact that the same logic is used to exclude people from access. Taylor and others who 
have sought or are seeking MAiD are not doing so because of their past lives, but because of 
their present conditions. These patterns that emerged in the work of recasting MAiD as 
culturally acceptable is more often about the conscience of those left behind more than it is 
about any inherent individual right. 
The people excluded from access discussed in the previous chapter illustrate how MAiD 
represents more than a swift and painless exit for many people. Lamb and Nadeau-Whissell in 
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particular expressed how the right to access MAiD represented to them peace of mind and the 
relief from suffering about the worry about their inevitable decline. From this angle, merely the 
existence of a truly permissive system—without necessarily making use of the procedure 
itself—holds the promise of improving the psychological wellbeing of people with degenerative 
neuromuscular disorders in particular, for whom declining conditions present serious anxiety. 
This is not to say that MAiD should be rationalized in instances of disability, but rather that we 
should consider the possibility that the procedure is being reconceived as a non-curative act of 
care. Although there remains a danger that in the future MAiD might grow closer in association 
with disability, the present situation suggests that efforts to protect the rights of people with 
disabilities should continue to focus on building institutions that support the needs of people 
with disabilities on their own terms, rather than fixating on defending vulnerable people.  
The drug facet of the story of MAiD also complicates a traditional view of vulnerability at 
the end of life. Since the Danish producer of the lethal injection drugs ceased distribution to the 
United States, the affected inmates have only faced harsher and more uncertain end-of-life 
scenarios. Although it is the drugs that link together such dissimilar practices as lethal injection 
and MAiD, the boundary between the two practices exposes deep-seated hopes for what we 
expect from a good death: a timely, swift and painless exit, without anxiety or psychological 
suffering.  
 
5.3 Implications for Future Research 
 Within Canada, the findings of this research have critical significance to the ongoing 
development of the Lamb v. Canada court case, which will determine if Julia Lamb and others 
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with disabling conditions have access to MAiD. Specifically, there is more work to be done in 
understanding how people close to the assisted dying process, such as policymakers, hospital 
administrators, nurses and physicians, make sense of the challenges relating to ableism and the 
end of life. Many well-meaning professionals have never experienced life with a significant 
impairment,377 and tend to inaccurately assume that life with impairment is inherently 
inferior.378 Close attention to such concerns will be necessary to charting a thorough account of 
the cultural impacts of implementing legal assisted dying in Canada. More broadly, critical 
health research should continue to engage the shifting terrain of assisted dying practice. Since 
the significance of MAiD is so closely bound up in geographical, social, cultural and political 
contexts, it will be critical to continue to trace its expansion into disparate social contexts.  
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